DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN VENEZUELA

CHAPTER VI
 

VI.       THE RIGHT TO LIFE, TO HUMANE TREATMENT, AND TO PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY

667.          The rights to life and to humane treatment are basic rights, essential for the exercise of all other rights, and they are essential minimums for the exercise of any activity.

668.          Violence affects all Venezuela’s citizens, who face acts of common and organized crime and also the excessive use of force on the part of the law enforcement authorities. In particular, violence affects people who are in the State’s custody, held in prisons and detention centers, where thousands of people have been wounded or killed in recent years. The IACHR has also received information indicating that violence in Venezuela affects specific groups, such as campesinos (small-scale or subsistence farmers), trade unionists, and women.

669.          In light of the State’s obligation to ensure individual security, the IACHR will analyze the information received and assess whether the provisions and policies adopted by the State are appropriate and sufficient for protecting, respecting, and ensuring the rights to life and to humane treatment of the Venezuelan population, particularly those sectors that are most vulnerable to violence.

A.         Violence and citizen security

670.          Security has always been one of the main functions of states, and citizen security is the situation that allows persons to live free from the threat of violence and crime, and where the state has the necessary capacities to guarantee and protect human rights that are directly affected by them. Therefore, citizen security is closely linked with the rights that need to be protected in view of their special vulnerability to violent or criminal acts, such as the rights to life, to physical integrity, and to personal freedom, among others.

671.          In light of the above, although the State has noted that “citizen security in general terms cannot be a concern of the Commission, if it is not related to cases of human rights violations committed by state agents,”[566] in the IACHR’s view, a close relationship exists between citizen security and human rights. The Commission appreciates that in its observations on the present report, the State has recognized that citizen security is a concern and a duty of the Venezuelan State.[567]

672.          The Commission has indicated on multiple occasions that states must take steps not only to protect their citizens from human rights violations committed by state agents, but also to prevent and punish acts of violence among private citizens. The Commission has also spoken about states’ obligations in connection with the actions of non-state agents involved in organized crime, corruption, drug trafficking, etc. Since a lack of security directly affects the full enjoyment of people’s basic rights, the IACHR has underscored the importance of addressing citizen security and respect for human rights, and of taking effective steps to prevent, control, and reduce crime and violence.[568]

673.          The Commission has also stated that crime and violence seriously undermine the rule of law, and for that reason, states are obliged to prevent and prosecute crimes, provided that it is done within a framework of respect for human rights.[569] In this regard, the Inter-American Court has highlighted “the duty the States have to protect everybody, avoiding crimes, punishing the parties responsible for them, and maintaining public order […] However, the States’ fight against crime must take place within the limits and pursuant to the procedures that permit the preservation of both public security and a complete respect of the human rights of those submitted to their jurisdiction.”[570]

674.          In light of these principles, in this chapter the IACHR will analyze Venezuela’s current legal framework for ensuring citizen security, the State’s initiatives to improve the violence situation, and the results of those efforts, and it will offer the recommendations it deems appropriate in order to help fight public insecurity in the country.

1.         Protection and promotion of public security

a.         Regulatory framework for security forces

675.          In any democratic state, the military and the police, along with other security forces, play a crucial role in protecting citizens and their rights; it is therefore vital that their actions strictly comply with the rules of the democratic constitutional order, international human rights treaties, and international humanitarian law.[571] In this section, the IACHR will therefore analyze whether Venezuela’s current regulatory framework governing the actions of its security agencies is appropriate and sufficient for ensuring the security of its citizens and whether it is in line with the applicable international provisions.

676.          The right to the State’s protection from threats to public security within a framework of respect for human rights is enshrined in Article 55 of the Venezuelan Constitution in the following terms:

Every person has the right to protection by the State, through the citizen safety organs regulated by law, from situations that constitute a threat, vulnerability, or risk to the physical integrity of individuals, their property, the enjoyment of rights, and the fulfillment of their duties. Participation by citizens in programs for purposes of prevention, citizen safety, and emergency management shall be regulated by a special law. The State’s security forces shall respect the human dignity and rights of all persons. The use of weapons or toxic substances by police and security officers shall be limited by the principles of necessity, suitability, opportunity, and proportionality, in accordance with law.

677.          Other constitutional provisions, however, are a cause for concern in terms of the democratic concept of state defense and security. Among others, the Commission has already expressed its concern regarding those that allow the military to participate in maintaining law and order in Venezuela.[572] Thus, Article 328 of the Constitution refers to the nation’s armed forces as an institution “organized by the State to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the nation and to ensure the integrity of its geographical space, through military defense, cooperation for the purpose of maintaining domestic order, and active participation in national development.” Similarly, Article 329 of the Constitution of Venezuela states that:

The Army, Navy, and Air Force have as their essential responsibility the planning, execution, and control of military operations as required to ensure the defense of the Nation. The National Guard shall cooperate in carrying out these operations, and it shall have as its basic responsibility that of conducting operations as required to maintain domestic order within the country. The National Armed Forces may carry out activities of administrative policing and criminal investigation activities as provided for by law.

678.          Thus, the Constitution allows components of the Armed Forces to participate in matters of domestic security. In turn, the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces[573] provides, in Article 3, that:

The basic mission of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces is to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of the nation and ensure the integrity of its geographical space, through military defense, cooperation for the purpose of maintaining internal order, and active participation in national development.

679.          Similarly, Article 20 of the Organic National Security Law[574] governs cooperation by the Armed Forces in the maintenance of domestic order in the following terms:

The National Armed Forces are one of basic elements for the comprehensive defense of the nation, organized by the State to conduct its military defense in joint responsibility with society. Its components, within the corresponding fields of action, are responsible for planning, executing, and controlling military operations for guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of the Nation, ensuring the integrity of the territory and other geographical spaces of the Republic, and cooperating in maintaining domestic order. Laws shall determine the participation of the National Armed Forces in the comprehensive development of the nation.

680.          The Commission sees with concern that the National Guard, attached to the Ministry of Defense, has been given responsibilities in citizen security and law and order.[575] Thus, according to information provided by the State, “the National Guard, even though it is a part of the National Armed Forces, has been performing tasks in the areas of law and order and urban security, in different areas of the country, and its involvement is justified when the municipal or state police are overwhelmed by the security situation.”[576]

681.          In its observations on the present report, the State considered it opportune to clarify that according to Article 332 of the Constitution, the citizen security agencies are civilian in nature. Additionally, it reported that “the participation of the National Armed Force in public order can only be used in situations of national emergency or security of the nation.” It also stated that “all the components of the Venezuelan armed force have special training and courses on human rights so that they know how to treat citizens.”[577]

682.          The Commission has said that in a democratic system, a clear and precise separation is needed between domestic security, as a function of the police, and national defense, as a function of the armed forces,[578] since they are two agencies with substantial differences in the purposes for which they were created and in their training and skills. In the IACHR’s opinion, the history of the Hemisphere shows that the involvement of the armed forces in matters of domestic security is generally accompanied by human rights violations amid acts of violence, which means that the participation of the armed forces in matters of domestic security should be avoided.[579]

683.          Since the armed forces lack appropriate training for the control of internal security, the task of combating domestic insecurity, crime, and violence should be assigned to an efficient civilian police force that respects human rights.[580] It is vital that the armed forces do not participate in citizen security activities and that when they do so, in exceptional circumstances, they remain subordinate to civilian authorities. The IACHR therefore calls again on the Venezuelan State to amend its laws that allow the armed forces to participate in matters of domestic security and to take all steps necessary to ensure an effective separation between its domestic and external security agencies.

684.          The Commission has also noticed the provisions that establish the joint responsibility of the State and society in the comprehensive security and defense of the nation. Under Article 326 of the Constitution:

National security is based on joint responsibility between the State and civil society to implement the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, freedom, justice, solidarity, promotion and conservation of the environment, and affirmation of human rights, as well as on progressively meeting the individual and collective needs of the Venezuelan people, based on a sustainable and productive development for the entire national community. The principle of joint responsibility applies to the economic, social, political, cultural, geographical, environmental, and military spheres.

685.          Similarly, Article 5 of the Organic National Security Law provides that:

The State and society are jointly responsible for the comprehensive security and defense of the nation, and the various activities they carry out in the economic, social, political, cultural, geographical, environmental, and military arenas shall be aimed satisfying the national interests and objectives set out in the Constitution and in law.

686.          As the Commission has noted, national security as a function of the state’s defense against external aggression is a duty of the state, which has a monopoly on the use of public force. Therefore, this duty cannot be extended to civil society; indeed, it is not even feasible to place the latter on an equal plane with respect to this duty of the state. The state may receive cooperation from civil society on certain security matters, but that is not to say that possession of and responsibility for such a duty may reside also with institutions alien to the state.[581]

687.          In the IACHR’s opinion, the involvement of civil society organizations should be limited to the formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of security programs and policies. In light of these considerations, the Commission recommended in 2005 that Venezuela amend Article 326 of the Constitution and Article 5 of the Organic National Security Law[582] as regards the joint responsibility of society and the State for security matters. Since that recommendation has not yet been met, the IACHR reiterates it in this report.

688.          In its observations on the present report, the State once again emphasized that “coresponsibility between the State and Venezuelan society is one of the fundamental principles underlying our Constitution, according to which the State has its specific duties and responsibilities and the citizens have some rights and obligations to fulfill in public affairs. Giving society an opportunity to consolidate a social state of law and justice aids in the consolidation of the fundamental social rights, such as nutrition, education, health, employment, and even the defense and security of the nation.”[583]

689.          More recently, the Executive Branch of government, using its power to legislate by decree, has enacted decree-laws with provisions that apply to citizen security – such as the Decree with the Scope, Effect, and Force of Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force[584] and the Decree with the Scope, Effect, and Force of Organic Law on the Bolivarian National Armed Forces[585] – and the Commission will study the main effects of these in the following paragraphs.

690.          In the drafting of the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force, it should be noted that several of the recommendations set out in the final report of the National Police Reform Commission (CONAREPOL, by its Spanish acronym) were taken into account, and that the Reform Commission involved a large degree of civil society participation. The Commission has been informed that civil society organizations enjoyed extensive participation in the discussions within that Commission, but that they were not allowed the same level of participation when the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force was debated and that not all the CONAREPOL recommendations were included. Although the Commission believes that it would have been good for the civil society organizations involved in the CONAREPOL process to have participated in the discussion on the law that was adopted following the Commission’s recommendation, it believes that their contribution in drawing up the National Commission’s recommendations ensured the inclusion of a series of regulatory advances in the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force.

691.          The Commission notes that this organic law aims to renovate the police system, with a complete redesign of the organization, structure, and functioning of the national, state, and municipal police forces. The Commission applauds this law’s unification of police education, training, and technical assistance at the different territorial levels and its setting the groundwork for the design of a national policy governing the use of force. It is also positive that the law establishes the civilian nature of the police service,[586] thus breaking the trend towards the militarization of social control[587] and complying with the transitory provision of the Constitution requiring the executive branch to organize the creation of a national civilian police force.

692.          The State has pointed out that this law regulates the appropriate use of force and the registration of firearms, and that it creates two ministerial councils for the formulation and implementation of public policies for policing, prevention, and citizen security: the Police System Council and the Prevention and Council for Prevention and Citizen Security.[588] The Commission also applauds other provisions of this law including: the creation, within the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, of an office for permanently evaluating the performance of all police departments, including their compliance with human rights standards (Article 18); the assignment of an important role in police supervision to the citizenry (Article 77); and the creation of internal affairs units within all police forces, along with independent disciplinary units (Article 80).

693.          Finally, the Commission calls for the implementation of the transitory provisions of the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force whereby the regulations and resolutions necessary for the enforcement of this Law should already have been enacted, and a Police Function Statute should also have been drawn up and enacted.

694.          As regards the Organic Law of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, the Commission notes that according to Article 1, the law is intended to “establish the principles and provisions governing the organization, functioning, and administration of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, within the framework of joint responsibility between the State and society, as a foundation for the security of the Nation, in line with the supreme goals of preserving the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Republic.” The IACHR reiterates its comments in earlier paragraphs regarding the fact that national security is the responsibility of the State, in which the use of public force is invested, and that placing society on an equal footing with the State in its duty of guaranteeing national security is not compatible with human rights standards.

695.          The Commission has received expressions of concern from various civil society organizations regarding this law,[589] particularly the creation, under Article 43, of the National Bolivarian Militia as a “special body organized by the Venezuelan State, comprising the Military Reserve and the Territorial Militia, separate from the Bolivarian National Armed Forces in the comprehensive defense of the Nation, to assist in guaranteeing its independence and sovereignty.”

696.          The law states that the Bolivarian National Militia is under the direct command of the President of the Republic and, according to Article 44, its mission is to “train, prepare, and organize the people for comprehensive defense in order to complement the level of operational readiness of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces and to contribute to the maintenance of the domestic order, security, defense, and comprehensive development of the Nation, with the purpose of assisting the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of the Nation’s geographical space.”

697.          In connection with this, the State has pointed out that the Organic Law of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces provides for the creation of the General Command of the Bolivarian National Militia, with the purpose of “complementing the Bolivarian National Armed Forces in the comprehensive defense of the Nation, to assist in guaranteeing its independence and sovereignty.” As reported by the State, the Bolivarian National Militia was created as a symbol of fusion between the military and the civilian spheres to enable citizens to enlist in the military for a period of time and then, upon return to civilian life, to contribute their knowledge, organizational abilities, and discipline to the development of the Nation. The State also explains that the Bolivarian National Militia is intended to complement the active forces of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces in discharging its duties, to provide replacements for its units and other activities assigned to it, and to participate in national development and in cooperation for maintaining domestic order. The Bolivarian National Militia also participates actively in economic, social, political, cultural, geographical, environmental, and military development, and in any activity that helps exalt our beloved homeland.[590]

698.          In addition, in a document published to inform the populace about the contents of this and other enabling laws, the State said that these provisions “transcend the idea that separates ‘the military’ (the armed forces) and ‘the people,’ by promoting the joint responsibility of citizens in the defense of the nation.”[591] It also explained that “efforts have been made to demonize militias, which actually comprise the current reserves plus the people willing to defend their revolution [… and that] some despotic governments refrain from incorporating their peoples into their defense strategies, out of fear of losing power through the strength of those people.”[592]

699.          The Commission notes with extreme concern that, as the State has reported, citizens receive military training through the Bolivarian National Militia and then return to civilian life to cooperate with the maintenance of domestic order. The IACHR emphatically points out that military training is not appropriate for controlling domestic security, and that fighting violence domestically must solely be the task of a properly trained civilian police force that acts in strict compliance with human rights. In the Commission’s view, citizens who receive military training must not be used for internal defense, and neither should the role of society vis-à-vis national security be distorted.

700.          The IACHR also notes with concern the vague language used in defining the structure, functions, and control of these militias which, in accordance with the Law and as explained by the State, are to participate in any activity that helps exalt the homeland and are called on to defend the Bolivarian Revolution, which means that members of the Bolivarian National Militia may make use of force without clearly defined constraints. In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission recommends amending all those provisions that allow the Bolivarian National Militia to be involved in matters of domestic security.

701.          Regarding the other piece of security legislation enacted by means of an enabling law, the Decree Law on the National Intelligence and Counterintelligence System,[593] the Commission applauds the repeal of this legislation on June 10, 2008,[594] one month after its enactment. This law, which required all people to assist the intelligence services, provided in Article 16 for the creation of a nationwide system of informers and, in Article 20, allowed the obtaining of information, documents, and objects inherent to the security, defense, and comprehensive development of the nation without the requirement of a court order. As it stated in its 2008 Annual Report,[595] the Commission was happy to receive the news that the law had been repealed and that it was the President’s intention never again to include provisions of that kind in Venezuela’s laws.[596]

702.          In spite of recognizing that one of this law’s main problems was that it allowed intelligence gathered without a court order to be used as evidence at trial, in September 2009 the National Assembly of Venezuela approved a partial amendment of the Organic Criminal Procedural Code that expands the authorities’ powers to record and use private conversations in legal proceedings without requiring a court order. The amendment includes a provision that requires any public or private company or body that provides telecommunications, banking, or financial services to create “24/7 units” to process and submit to the Office of the Attorney General such information as it may require, in real time if so requested, and without requiring authorization from a judge.[597] Some human rights organizations have said that the ultimate goal of this legislation is to monitor political dissidents.

703.          In connection with this amendment, the IACHR believes it should remind the State that intelligence and investigation activities must at all times respect people’s fundamental rights, including their right to privacy and to due legal process; the law must therefore ensure that limits are placed on the ability to intercept private communications, and it must require judicial control over such measures. 

704.          At the same time, the Commission applauds the criminalization of the offense of contract killing under Article 12 of the Law against Organized Crime.[598] The State explains that this legislation is intended to prevent, investigate, prosecute, criminalize, and punish offenses related to organized crime, as provided for in the Constitution and in the applicable international treaties.[599]

705.          It is also important to note that, with the aim of controlling the performance of public officials charged with law enforcement, the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice adopted the Code of Conduct for Civilian and Military Officials Performing Police Functions at the National, State, and Municipal Levels.[600] According to the State, this code of conduct is based on constitutional principles and international human rights protection instruments, and it reaffirms that policing is a public, civilian service.[601]

706.          At the same time, the Commission notes that although Venezuela has made some regulatory progress with prohibiting torture, particularly in the 1999 Constitution[602] and the Organic Criminal Procedural Code,[603] and although it has ratified the most important international torture conventions, the crime of torture is not adequately covered by the Venezuelan Penal Code, which only refers to cases in which the victims have been formally arrested and are in the custody and under the responsibility of the State,[604] which poses problems in punishing those guilty of the practice. Moreover, the State has not met the obligation set down in the fourth transitory provision of the Constitution,[605] whereby during the first year after its installation (which occurred in August 2000), the National Assembly had to enact legislation on punishing torture, either through a special law or by reforming the Penal Code. In its observations on the present report, the State recognized that there is a legislative delay in relation to compliance with this transitory disposition and stated that this has been an “involuntary oversight” by the National Assembly.[606]

707.          As of the date of this report, Venezuela has not yet enacted legislation to punish and prevent torture. The IACHR, in its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Venezuela of 2003, noted with particular concern the legislature’s delay in addressing torture[607] and it recommended that the State incorporate in its domestic law the exclusion of any evidence obtained under torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, in accordance with the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.[608] In this report, the Inter-American Commission again recommends that the State of Venezuela enact appropriate legislation on the crime of torture, in light of the international legal doctrine that absolutely prohibits all forms of torture, both physical and psychological, a principle that now belongs to the realm of the ius cogens[609] and that forms part of the international treaties against torture of the OAS and the UN that the State of Venezuela has ratified. 

708.          The Commission is aware of the tension that exists between, on the one hand, the State’s obligation of maintaining order and security and, on the other, people’s rights. As a result, international human rights law, and the agencies tasked with enforcing it, have striven to define provisions and criteria that strike the necessary balance. In light of those provisions and criteria, and of the comments offered in this section, the IACHR believes that the current regulatory framework in Venezuela is not conducive to guaranteeing its inhabitants citizen security within a framework of respect for their basic rights, and it recommends that the State pursue the necessary reforms to ensure that its laws governing the actions of security agencies respect its internationally-acquired human rights commitments.

b.         State policies and programs to guarantee citizen security

709.          In addition to an adequate regulatory framework, the prevention and reduction of crime and other acts of violence demands the implementation of actions, policies, and programs that are both effective and respectful of human rights.

710.          The State has told the Commission that “the public policies that will enable us to comprehensively tackle crime are those being enforced by the revolutionary Bolivarian government of President Hugo Chávez Frías.”[610] In this regard, at the hearing held at the Inter-American Commission on October 28, 2008,[611] the State argued that crime was an epidemic that affected, without exception, all the nations of the Americas, and that it was due to structural factors such as poverty, inadequate education, and the breakdown of the family.

711.          With specific reference to Venezuela, the State indicated that public insecurity had been a national problem since the early 1980s, and that since the triumph of the Bolivarian Revolution in late 1998, citizen security is seen in its broadest dimensions in order to counter the consequences of exclusion. Thus, the State reported that it has carried out “actions that strengthen and guarantee security in health, in education, in employment, in peaceful coexistence, and in other areas.” In particular, it explained that “with the establishment of the Social Missions, essentially intended to resolve various key problems of Venezuelan society that have accrued over more than thirty years, very successful and prioritized work began on the historical causes that create and drive such conflicts.” The State highlighted its achievements in poverty reduction, the human development index, and investments in education and health. In the State’s view, offering work, education, health, and social protection leads to an increase in the population’s quality of life, the effects of which can seen in the gradual reduction of such economically-motivated crimes as robberies and theft.[612]

712.          The Commission concurs with the State on the relationship that exists between higher living standards and lower rates of crime and violence. At the same time, the Commission applauds the specific steps taken by the State in connection with citizen security. As noted in the previous section, one important initiative by the State was the creation, in April 2006, of the National Police Reform Commission (CONAREPOL, by its Spanish acronym). The IACHR duly recorded its pleasure at the CONAREPOL’s creation,[613] the aim of which was to construct, through a process of broad consultation with the community in general and the social and institutional stakeholders involved, and through a rigorous analysis of the existing police forces, a new policing model to address the challenges to be met by the police in the process of democratization and social inclusion.

713.          CONAREPOL issued its report in 2007, noting the need for police reform in the following terms:

[…] the high levels of police violence, the inability of the forces to tackle crime, and the frequent participation of police officers in crimes imposed an unavoidable need for reforms. In 2005, the national crime rate was reported as 877 per 100,000 inhabitants, with 37 murders per 100,000 people, one of the highest figures in Latin America (Provea, 2006). Between 2000 and 2006, according to figures provided by the Attorney General’s office, the number of deaths at police hands exceeded 5,600 cases. In the months immediately prior to the start of the reform process, police officers were involved in at least three cases that outraged public opinion: the June 2005 deaths of three young men in Barrio Kennedy, Caracas, killed by judicial police officers who confused them with the killers of one of their colleagues; and the kidnapping and murder of three children and their driver, and the abduction and death of a businessman of Italian origin, both of which took place in March 2006. That series of factors underscores the need for a reform process that has been postponed on too many occasions.[614]

714.          CONAREPOL issued its recommendations in May 2007, the first of which addressed the need to enact legislation to regulate the police system as a whole, along with other laws covering the police forces in line with the model proposed by the National Commission in its recommendations. As a result of this reform initiative, on February 28, 2008, under enabling legislation, the President enacted the Decree of the Organic Law of the National Police Service and the National Police Force, which was already analyzed by the IACHR in the previous section.  However, according to information received by the Commission, other recommendations made by CONAREPOL have not been duly implemented.[615]

715.          At the same time, with the aim of enforcing the provisions of the Decree with the Scope, Effect, and Force of Organic Law of the National Police Service and the National Police Force, the Police System Commission (COMISIPOL, by its Spanish acronym) was created on November 10, 2008, with the task of carrying out the transformation process and establishing a new policing system in Venezuela. According to the State’s reports,[616] the COMISIPOL has been operating since 2009 under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice and it has been tasked with advising and implementing public policies related to the police service, on a temporary, interinstitutional, technical assistance, consultative, and participatory basis.

716.          The State also reported that the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice created a strategic security plan, called the Citizen Security Plan, to prevent and control insecurity. According to the information furnished by the State, this plan initially operated in the Caracas Metropolitan District, the area with the highest numbers of reported crimes, and it has gradually been extended nationwide. It began in January 2008 in the Caracas Metropolitan Area with the participation of several agencies, including the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which implemented mechanisms to oversee its deployment and to ensure that the police officers deployed acted in accordance with human rights. Among these mechanisms, guidelines for action were designed and inspection forms were drawn up for preventive custody centers and police checkpoints, which served to guide the actions of all the Deputy Ombudsmen’s Offices in the nation’s states.[617]

717.          The State reported that a series of inspection operations were carried out in the early morning hours, in order to monitor police actions at checkpoints in the various municipalities and to examine the functioning of preventive custody centers. At those centers, information was gathered about the general infrastructure conditions, daily incident books, lists of detainees, the contents of arrest and seizure records, the physical conditions of detainees, their legal status, and the number of individuals held in each cell. The operation included interviewing the detainees. At the police checkpoints, information was gathered about the officers deployed, checking such details as their ID, uniforms, equipment, weapons, vehicles, and the time spent at the checkpoint.[618]

718.          The result of these inspections was a report containing a general diagnosis of the findings, which led to the preparation of observations and recommendations based on respect for human rights, subsequently sent to authorities at the ministries of the Interior and Justice, Health and Social Development, and Participation and Social Protection, and to the municipal authorities of Sucre, Baruta, and Libertador.[619]

719.          Based on this Pilot Plan in Caracas, the State indicated that it would be implementing the Citizen Security Plan at the national level, in order to ensure citizen security through policies aimed at upholding social peace, balanced territorial development, and the stability of the nation, and to preserve and strengthen democracy. The goal of the plan, according to the information the State submitted to the IACHR, is to reduce insecurity by resolving two problems: the generalized perception of insecurity among the population, and the high prevailing crime rates.[620]

720.          The Commission looks favorably on this effort by the State to control insecurity and, in particular, to analyze the situation and implement recommendations based on respect for human rights. Nevertheless, the IACHR has also received troubling reports about the implementation of the pilot security plan in Caracas. First of all, the information received by the IACHR indicates that the plan was launched with 2,800 participants: 1,450 officers of the Metropolitan Police; 800 members of the National Guard; 200 officers from PoliMiranda; 80 from the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps; and 100 Land Transportation Police, all under the leadership of Regional Commander No. 5 of the National Guard.[621]

721.          In connection with this, the Commission reiterates its comments in earlier paragraphs stating that the National Guard, because of its military training and dependency on the Armed Forces, should not participate in domestic security operations or direct such efforts. The training given to the forces responsible for external security often emphasizes fighting and defeating an enemy and, consequently, it is inappropriate for ensuring citizen security at the domestic level. The approach to security of the members of the National Guard was made apparent in the installation of additional checkpoints to control insecurity in Plaza Miranda and Plaza Venezuela in the city of Caracas. During the operation, the Chief of the General Staff of National Guard Regional Command No. 5 addressed the participating police officers and soldiers and said: “We cannot trust anyone. Any criminal who dares to confront us will suffer the strength of the institution. I want, if possible, to eliminate them. We have to ensure we are respected.”[622]

722.          The IACHR has also received information about abuses committed by members of the National Guard during the implementation of the Caracas Security Plan. For example, the Commission learned of the alleged murder of Carlos Eduardo Leal Hernández, aged 34, at the hands of National Guard officers participating in this plan, which occurred only a few weeks after its launch in January 2008. According to the victim’s mother, her son went out to buy cigarettes and, as he was on his way back, ten members of the National Guard involved in the Caracas Security Plan ordered him to stop; as he failed to respond, they shot him in the back.[623] Cases like these underscore the Commission’s concern about the National Guard’s participation in activities that should be the sole responsibility of the police. The IACHR reiterates that States must not confuse the concepts of public security and national security, when there can be no doubt that common crime – regardless of how serious it is – does not pose a military threat to state sovereignty.[624]

723.          In relation to these facts, in its observations on the present report, the State reported that it had “made advances in the training and preparation of the new National Guard.” In this sense, it emphasized that the curriculum of the School for the Training of Officials of the National Guard contains a mandatory course on human rights and international humanitarian law and in this way it has ensured that the members of the National Armed Forces guarantee, in all their professional acts, compliance with human rights.[625]

724.          In addition, the State has also told the Commission about other initiatives intended to tackle public security, such as the National Strategy for Coexistence and Citizen Security, which is a security system intended to minimize the occurrence of crime in the country. According to the State, this strategy involves measures to reform the police institutions and to reincorporate offenders and outlaws into society. The State also noted that it has drawn up an inventory of the weapons held by the security forces, which also included digital ballistics testing. It also described a plan to create a deposit for holding weapons that have been seized or are being used as evidence in court proceedings, accessible only to judges and prosecutors. The final phase of this project includes a plan to disarm the population, and to extend gun controls over the population in general.[626]

725.          The State also informed the IACHR of the existence of the “National Community Prevention Plan,” the program “The Police Go to School,” the “Sowing Values for Life: Comprehensive National Prevention Plan,” the “Disarmament Plan,” as well as other preventive strategies. The State also reported that it has placed high priority on the preparation of the “Manual of Provisions and Procedures for the Progressive and Differentiated Use of Police Force,” the “Manual of Rules for Detainees’ Guarantees,” the “Manual on the Structure and Functioning of the Community Police Service,” and the Statute of Police Functions, all with the aim of further pursuing its fight against crime.[627]

726.          In addition, the State reported it had conducted an awareness campaign to reject violence and reinforce the values of life, peace, solidarity, and coexistence. Among other activities, it described days on which programs to exchange war toys for educational toys and other educational and sporting supplies were organized, thereby educating Venezuelan families and raising their levels of awareness and joint responsibility in violence prevention.[628] The Commission was also told about the introduction of telephone hotlines for complaints, and about various human rights information and education campaigns using pamphlets and informational leaflets.[629]

727.          The State also reported the creation, pursuant to the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force, of the Community Police Service, intended to work hand-in-hand with local communities. The same law also regulates oversight of police management and of citizen participation in policing functions, establishing the mechanisms available to community councils and other grassroots organizations for creating, along with local police, plans and projects for citizen security, and for assessing and monitoring how the police perform their duties. The State also noted that it has promoted the development of facilities to encourage the creation of community organizations, such as the Comprehensive Prevention Committees, and to promote their participation on community councils as stakeholders with joint responsibility for public security matters.[630]

728.          In connection with this, the IACHR has heard concerned comments stating that the aim of this is to transfer responsibilities of the State, such as citizen security, to the community councils. As the Commission was told, the interpretation has been that these councils are to be given policing functions, in that paragraphs 6 and 9 of Article 21 of the Community Council Law make them responsible for setting up Community Information Systems and for promoting the defense of the nation’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In response, the State has argued that under the principle of joint responsibility enshrined in the Constitution, the Community Councils are to assist in tasks related to national security and defense.

729.          The Commission again states that civil society can play an important collaborative role in certain security-related matters, as was shown with its participation in the CONAREPOL process. Certainly, it is useful to involve civil society organizations and community organizations in assessing police performance and in designing plans and projects for citizen security, since members of society have first-hand knowledge of the main issues affecting their security. However, the importance of this collaboration must not be confused with a joint responsibility for national security, the protection of which is the duty of those state agencies that society has entrusted with the use of force.

730.          Finally, as regards organized crime, the State indicated that “it has been found that the increase in crime of contract killing is the result of the entry into the country of Colombian paramilitary gangs, which are carrying out targeted killings, particularly in the borderlands and in the center of the country. Similarly, there has been an increase in the number of abductions (express kidnappings) and in offences related to drug trafficking.”[631] According to the information received, to respond to the alert caused in Venezuela by Colombia’s plans to demobilize its irregular fighters, the executive branch has taken actions to minimize the incidence of crime in the borderlands and to effectively address the phenomena of abductions, contract killings, and drug trafficking. According to the information furnished by the State, great emphasis has been placed on strengthening the presence of the State in border regions, enhancing intelligence activities, and improving the operational capacity of all officials deployed in those areas.[632]

731.          With regard to the information furnished by the State regarding the citizen security plans and projects undertaken in Venezuela, the State told the IACHR that “they indicate a clear resolve to reduce crime levels.”[633]

732.          The Commission appreciates all the information received about the State’s efforts to implement policies for ensuring the security of its citizens from the effects of common and organized crime and dealing with possible abuses of force by state agents; the Commission notes, however, that in many cases, the State’s response to public insecurity has been inadequate and, on occasions, even incompatible with respect for human rights, particularly as regards matters involving participation by the Armed Forces in maintaining domestic order and the joint responsibility of society for security-related issues. Moreover, the IACHR has received no information about the specific results of these plans and projects and notes with concern that, as will be seen in the following section, violence statistics in Venezuela remain a cause for alarm.

2.                  Situation of violence and public insecurity

733.          The Commission regrets that the State gave no response to the IACHR’s request for statistics on acts of violence affecting the citizenry contained in the questionnaire for analyzing the situation of human rights in Venezuela.[634] In response to the IACHR’s request that the State submit its annual figures for violent crimes committed against citizens over the past five years, broken down by gender and socioeconomic level,[635] the State merely returned the figures contained in the research conducted by the National Police Reform Commission, and so the most recent statistics submitted by the State cover the year 2005 and do not allow the information to be analyzed in accordance with the victims’ gender and socioeconomic level. 

734.          The State’s attitude underscores the comments made to the IACHR by civil society organizations, indicating how difficult it was to obtain official figures about levels of violence in Venezuela,[636] as a result of which they have had to collect unofficial figures. The information made available to the Commission, at its hearings, from public information sources, and from the reports of state agencies such as the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, indicates a grave situation evidenced by the levels of common crime and of violence committed by state agents. Thus, 77% of the Venezuelan population believes that the main problem facing the country is insecurity.[637]

735.          As for the official figures, the most recent data made available to Venezuelan human rights organizations by the Attorney General’s Office are taken from that service’s records for the period January to November 2007. Those figures report 17 cases of torture, 3,097 cases of criminal injury, 104 cases of harassment, 1,156 housebreakings, 449 threats, and 1,357 abuses of authority. The Commission also received statistical data from the State at the Hearing on Citizen Security and Violence in Venezuela held in October 2008. According to those figures, between January and September 2008 alone, there were 1,350 attempted robberies, 1,317 cases of attempted criminal injury, 690 attempted thefts, and 375 attempted murders, along with other crimes. For the same period, the government reported 13,257 individuals arrested, of whom 2,715 were caught in flagrante delicto.[638] The IACHR has also received information emphasizing that, according to CICPC, in 2008 there were a total of 13,780 homicides, which is equivalent to an average of 1,148 homicides per month and 38 per day.[639]

736.          According to information published by the Institute for Coexistence and Citizen Security Research (INCOSEC, by its Spanish acronym),[640] “crime during the first quarter of 2009 shows a substantial increase that is particularly reflected in the factors associated with murders, violence against women and the family, vehicle robbery and theft, and kidnappings.” Using statistics from the Attorney General’s Office, the Institute states that in 2009, compared to the previous year, the homicide rate rose by 29% in Caracas and 31% in the country as a whole; in Caracas vehicle robbery and theft increased by 20%, and reported abductions rose by 68%. It also reports that in the capital, while the first quarter of 2008 closed with 654 homicides – in other words, an average of 218 killings a month and seven a day – the first quarter of 2009 reported a total of 844 homicides, for an average of 281 killings per month or nine every day.

737.          The figures contained in the most recent reports on citizen security published by Venezuelan organizations are not based on official statistics, due to the difficulty of obtaining them. The 2008 annual report of PROVEA, which uses figures from the Peace Center of the Central University of Venezuela, notes a serious decline in civic coexistence in the country. As evidence for this, it reports that from January to September 2008 there were 23,169 robberies, 8.06% more than in the previous year. Abductions also increased, but at a faster rate: during the first nine months of 2008, 101.10% more cases were recorded than in the same period in 2007. Similarly, the national murder rate continues to rise, with an increase from 45 per 100,000 inhabitants in the year 2006 to 48 per 100,000 in 2007, when a national total of 13,236 homicides were recorded.[641]

738.          In examining acts of violence that affect the citizenry, an important distinction must be made between common crime and violent acts attributable to agents of the State, including police officers, militia members, the Armed Forces, and other security agencies. With respect to incidents directly attributable to the security forces, although the State did not respond to the IACHR’s request information on the proportion of violent crimes committed by State agents,[642] it did report that, according to figures from the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, “20% of the crimes in Venezuela are committed by the police themselves.”[643]

739.          Neither did the State answer the request for information on the annual figures for deaths occurring in confrontations with the police over the past five years,[644] although it did report that figures from the Attorney General’s Office indicate that during 2008, a total of 509 killings occurred during confrontations or ajusticiamentos.[645] (In Venezuela, arbitrary denials of the right to life through extrajudicial killings are generally known as “ajusticiamentos”).[646] In its observations on the present report, the State indicated that it does not attempt to deny that extrajudicial executions occur in Venezuela, but clarified that it did not recognize the statistics provided by human rights organizations, because of their unreliability.[647]

740.          The State acknowledges that a preponderance of the reported extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances involve the police, chiefly state and municipal police forces, and it explains that these phenomena are the result of the structural problems that the Venezuelan State, along with other sister countries in the Latin American region, have faced for years. According to the State, in spite of its resolve to continue improving mechanisms and actions to uphold the right to life and physical integrity, certain practices that violate or undermine human rights still remain common in certain state agencies, including the police.[648]

741.          In the view of the Minister of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, one of the reasons behind this situation is the poor academic preparation of police officers, since only 3.6% have received training and 70% do not have procedural manuals.[649] The State has also informed the Commission about the low levels of education prevailing among police officers, of whom 70.46% only finished secondary school, 6.96% only finished primary education, 12.40% did not finish their secondary education, and a mere 3.63% completed university studies.[650]

742.          In light of the absence of official figures on acts of violence directly attributable to State agents, the Commission believes that the statistics contained in the annual report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman go some way toward reflecting the situation of insecurity prevailing in the country and so the following paragraphs will refer to those figures. The Commission notes, however, that these can in no way be considered complete figures, since the report of the Ombudsman’s Office deals solely with cases that were reported to it; thus, it does not include cases reported directly to the Attorney General’s Office or cases that, for whatever reason, are not brought to the attention of the authorities.

743.          During 2008, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman recorded a total of 134 complaints involving arbitrary killings arising from the alleged actions of officers from different state security agencies. According to the report, 100% of the arbitrary killing complaints involved extrajudicial executions, and there were no complaints alleging deaths caused through the excessive use of force. The total figure is down from that reported in 2007, when 155 complaints were received, made up of 148 executions, three deaths through excessive use of force, and four as a result of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[651]

744.          The report of the Human Rights Ombudsman indicates that most victims of extrajudicial killings were aged between 18 and 28 years (42.54%), followed by victims aged between 12 and 17 (19.40%). The agencies most frequently identified as the perpetrators of arbitrary executions were the state police forces of various regions, with a total of 65 complaints (48.51%); the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps, with 32 complaints (23.88%); and municipal police forces, with 17 complaints (12.69%).[652]

745.          The report from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman describes a number of notorious cases involving police violations of the right to life. One of these cases occurred on April 29, 2009, when four officers of the Intelligence and Coordination Division of the Lara State Police Force informed the Attorney General’s Office about the deaths of two citizens, who were killed on the old El Tostado road in the Jalaito sector of Pavia, allegedly during a confrontation with the police. Subsequent investigations nevertheless revealed that the victims were two brothers – one a law student, and the other a farmer – and that their bodies were found with several gunshot wounds, scraped knees, and signs of torture.[653] According to statements made by the victims’ father, his children were executed by the police, and “they were not criminals, and they were not armed.” They had gone to a bank to deposit 22,000 bolivars and were later found dead.[654] In connection with the incident, four police officers were tried for the crime of aggravated homicide, with premeditation and for futile and ignoble reasons, and for improper use of firearms.[655]

746.          Another case in the report narrates the actions of the police in the early morning hours of October 23, 2008, at Agua Clara stream, located at a resort in Chabasquén in the state of Portuguesa, where the bodies of six people were found, after presumably having been taken there from Sanare, in the state of Lara. The corpses belonged to four children, aged between 15 and 17, and two adults aged 18 and 39. In the same incident, another three adolescents of between 17 and 18 years of age were injured but managed to escape. In connection with this incident, in November 2008, the Attorney General’s Office Service accused 10 officers of the Lara State Armed Police Force of forced disappearance and aggravated homicide, with premeditation and for futile and ignoble reasons; attempted aggravated homicide, with premeditation and for futile and ignoble reasons; housebreaking by public officials; and the crimes of torture and immoral physical abuse, sexual abuse of minors, and breaches of international pacts and treaties, as provided for in the Organic Criminal Procedural Code and the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents.[656]

747.          In May 2008, police officers from the state of Táchira were involved in the death of eight citizens and the criminal injuring of another two in San Cristóbal, Táchira. The incident took place during the night of May 30, at the El Pedregal Pool Center, when ten heavily armed individuals, including police officers, arrived in cars and motorcycles and opened fire on the owners of the business and some of their customers. In November 2008, two officers were charged with the crimes of complicity in aggravated intentional homicide, criminal conspiracy, and violation of international pacts and covenants signed by the Republic.[657]

748.          Another case that could be cited as an example of state violence involved three police officers from the state of Mérida and a chief inspector from the Directorate of Intelligence Services, who were implicated in the deaths of eight citizens and the criminal injuring of another in an incident that took place in Brisas de Onia district, in El Vigía, Mérida, on January 24, 2009. Four of the victims were adolescents and the other four were aged between 19 and 21. According to information from the Attorney General’s Office, they were on the main street in the district when a van drove past from which they were fired upon several times, killing them. The state officials were accused of the crimes of aggravated homicide with premeditation, making use of a stolen vehicle, illegally changing registration plates, concealment of a military weapon, and criminal conspiracy.[658]

749.          The report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman for 2008 indicates that during that year, it recorded a total of 2,197 complaints involving violations of physical integrity committed by the State’s security forces. The report notes that this figure represents a fall of 11.9% over the 2007 level, when 2,494 complaints were made. According to the report, violations of physical integrity in Venezuela follow one of four patterns: abuses of authority; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; death threats; and torture. More than half the victims of violations of physical integrity at the hands of Venezuelan security officials were aged between 20 and 39.[659]

750.          Of these patterns, the most frequent were abuses of authority, regarding which the Human Rights Ombudsman reported receiving 1,081 complaints during 2008. That year, the Human Rights Ombudsman received 874 complaints of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, compared to 934 in 2007. Most of the victims were aged between 20 and 34 (43.48%) and the agencies most frequently accused were the state police forces with 400 complaints, followed by the municipal police forces with 230.[660] The Human Rights Ombudsman received 155 complaints of situations in which public officials allegedly threatened the lives of victims or their family members in 2008, compared to 179 in 2007. Most of the people who received death threats were aged between 20 and 34 (50.97%).[661]

751.          Regarding cases of torture, the report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman[662] indicates that there was an increase in the number of complaints compared to the previous year, a matter of great concern, as the report itself notes, because torture can also inherently entail the other three forms of violations of physical integrity (abuses of authority, cruel treatment, and death threats).[663] During 2008, the Human Rights Ombudsman received 87 allegations of torture, broken down into 66 cases of physical torture and 21 cases of psychological torture. In 2007, a total of 78 complaints were received. Most of the victims were aged between 20 and 34.[664]

752.          The report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman states that in contrast to complaints alleging abuses of authority or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, among the torture cases it received the most frequently cited agency was, both in 2008 and in previous years, the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps (CICPC, by its Spanish acronym), the security force responsible for investigating criminal cases. Thus, the report said that, “torture remains one of the techniques used by some of the officers of this police agency to obtain testimony, confessions, or any other information helpful in casting light on an investigation. The CICPC is also at the forefront in allegations of violations of the right to life and death threats.”[665]

753.          Although the figures for torture in Venezuela cited by the various state agencies and nongovernmental organizations do not concur, the annual report of PROVEA agrees with the annual report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in indicating that 2008 saw an increase in the number of torture cases. Significantly, the same organization had reported a fall in the number of incidents involving torture for more than three consecutive years. According to PROVEA, “torture remains a common practice in some police forces.”[666]

754.          Similarly, the Support Network for Justice and Peace, an organization with more than 20 years’ experience working with torture victims in Venezuela, states that “torture is an ingrained practice in the State’s security forces, has spread to all police and military agencies, and has not been effectively banned or punished.”[667] According to this organization, the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps, the Metropolitan Police, the National Guard, the state and municipal police forces, and the army, as well as other bodies, have been involved in acts of torture. It adds that different methods of torture are used in Venezuela, with physical and psychological torture generally being combined. The most frequent forms of torture are beating and kicking; death threats and/or torture of an individual or relative; verbal assaults; handcuffing; isolation and denial of sustenance; asphyxiation with plastic bags; throwing victims against walls, on to the floor, or down stairs; tying their hands and feet; stripping off clothes; blindfolding; and electric shocks. These incidents of torture and mistreatment occur during detention at police and military facilities, as a form of discipline, to maintain control in the country’s prisons and jails, to secure confessions during investigations, or to maintain order during demonstrations and protests, as well as in other contexts.[668]

755.          The report of the Human Rights Ombudsman also contains alarming figures about cases of forced disappearance in Venezuela.[669] During 2008, the Human Rights Ombudsman recorded 33 forced disappearances that are being investigated and monitored by the office. The figure is only one lower than the number for year 2007.[670]

756.          The IACHR is alarmed by the number of cases alleging or indicating the commission of extrajudicial killings, torture, forced disappearances, death threats, abuses of authority, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment in recent years in Venezuela. Of course, the State has the right and duty to ensure its own security. However, regardless of how serious certain actions may be, power may not be exercised without constraints, nor may the State use indiscriminate means to attain its objectives in violation of human rights. On the contrary, “the use of force by law enforcement officials must be defined by exceptionality and must be planned and proportionally limited by the authorities.”[671] The Commission urges the State to take all the measures necessary to eradicate from its security forces all practices that undermine the basic rights of those people whom the State has a duty to protect.

757.          Now, as has been stated more than once above, the State must not only protect people from the arbitrary use of force by its security forces, it also has the obligation of adopting the measures necessary to ensure its citizens’ security from acts of violence and crime, through methods that uphold human rights standards within a democratic society.

758.          According to the information received by the Commission, murders, abductions, contract killings, and rural violence are the phenomena that most frequently affect the security of Venezuela’s citizens.  Concern therefore exists about the information received indicating that since February 2005, no official figures on homicides, abductions, or other crimes in Venezuela have been published and, moreover, that the Web pages where the figures could be previously found have since been taken down. The State has criticized the figures quoted in the IACHR’s annual reports, but it has furnished no information that might clarify those numbers and enable the Commission to assess the situation.

759.          At the October 2008 Hearing on Citizen Security and Violence in Venezuela, the Commission formally asked the State for official figures on the murder rate in Venezuela but, to date, the State has not responded to that request.[672] Neither has the Commission been able to access official figures through the Web pages of the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Popular Power for Interior Relations and Justice, or the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps.

760.          At that hearing, the petitioners provided the Commission with statistics according to which in 2006 there were 12,257 homicides, giving a rate of 45 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In the year 2007, 13,156 murders were recorded, increasing the rate to 49 per 100,000. For 2008, public information sources indicate that 14,589 homicides were committed. It should be noted that these figures do not include people killed by the police, incidents that are recorded as resisting authority, nor do they include investigations of suspicious deaths.

761.          Therefore, although no public statistics about the topic are available or accessible, all the sources of information cited lead to the conclusion that violence levels are increasing. Even the State has acknowledged that the national murder rate has been on the increase.[673]

762.          One source of particular concern is the number of children and adolescents who are victims of murder in Venezuela. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) states that the country’s murder rate has risen, and that homicide represents the main cause of death among male adolescents aged between 15 and 19 years. According to UNICEF’s figures, 5,379 children and adolescents suffered violent deaths in 2007, and a third of that total were murders. UNICEF also notes that although there are insufficient official figures on other forms of violence against children and women, there are other indicators of high levels of domestic violence.[674] The latest figures from NGOs that work to protect the rights of children and adolescents date back to 2005, when the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps stopped publishing figures on homicides in Venezuela.

763.          As for abductions, while official figures are again not available, PROVEA’s annual report indicates that in 2005 there were 206 kidnappings, 232 in 2006, 182 in 2007, and 366 in 2008, giving an increase between 2007 and 2008 of more than 100%.[675]

764.          The National Federation of Cattlemen reports similar figures. According to that organization, in 2008 there were 308 kidnappings, and between January and July 2009, there were 231 reported in the whole country. Specifically, the state with the highest number of abductions was Zulia with 40; it is followed by Barinas with 36, Táchira with 26, Aragua with 25, Miranda and the Capital District with 25, Lara with 24, and Yaracuy, Carabobo, and Anzoátegui with 12 each. The records of the cattlemen’s organization indicates that in 2009, 71 merchants, 69 students, 22 cattlemen, 15 business owners, 12 housewives, and 25 other people have been abducted. The figures indicate that as of July 28, 2009, 55 of those victims remained in captivity, 112 had been released, 48 had been rescued, four had been freed through police pressure, seven escaped from their captors, and five had been killed. They also indicate that from January to July 15, 2009, there had been some 470 cases of “express” kidnappings in Caracas.[676]

765.          In its observations on the present report, the State asserted that it does not recognize the statistics of PROVEA and the National Federation of Cattlemen with respect to kidnappings in Venezuela, while at the same time it does not deny that kidnappings have increased. In the State’s opinion, this situation is due to the “invasion of Colombian paramilitaries that has occurred in the country, committing crimes, especially kidnappings and contract killings […], murdering Venezuelan campesinos by orders of large landowners in Venezuela.” The State adds that it “has redoubled efforts to investigate and punish these crimes, which are difficult to prove, because the contract killers in the majority of cases flee to Colombia, and the witnesses are intimidated from testifying. The victims are not only campesinos, but also in some cases, human rights defenders.”[677]

766.          In connection with the right to life, another cause for concern is the persistence of contract killings in Venezuela, which chiefly affect campesino and trade-union[678] leaders, but have also claimed the lives of officials of the judiciary,[679] business owners,[680] students,[681] and prison wardens,[682] as well as others.

767.          According to reports reaching the IACHR,

the struggle for land rights and being the beneficiary of the government’s agrarian reform process have, on occasions, endangered the lives and physical integrity of campesinos (small-scale and subsistence farmers). In some cases, simply identifying a landowner as an individual who should be affected by agrarian reform has been enough for attempts to be made against that person’s life. In others, receiving a land grant or daring to occupy a tract of doubtful ownership has motivated attacks.[683]

768.          In connection with this, the Commission takes note of the report produced by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman entitled Rural Violence.[684] According to that report, with the enactment of the Land and Agrarian Development Law,[685] conflicts of interest have arisen that have, in some cases, claimed human lives. An outbreak of violence, pressure, deaths, and criminal injuries at the hand of contract killers has emerged, intended to intimidate campesinos and the officials responsible in this area and to prevent enforcement of the law.

769.          In the report, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman conducted an investigation into campesinos who have been killed, injured, or harassed as a result of the enforcement of the Land and Agrarian Development Law, or for reasons that predate that law but are related to land ownership issues under the framework of the new legal and constitutional regime. The report indicates that as a result of the State’s policies to democratize land with agricultural potential, there has been an increase in the targeted killing of campesino leaders, carried out by contract killers.

770.          According to the investigation by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the victims represent a clearly identified segment of the population: campesinos, particularly agrarian leaders, who support the national project pursued by the national government. The figures obtained by the Ombudsman’s Office indicate that:

In spite of the existence of the national government’s resolved initiative to tackle large-scale land ownership and ensure food security by emphasizing the democratization of land, it is true that there are structural weaknesses that undermine citizen security and state protection in this vulnerable sector. It can be seen that most of these killings remain unpunished, occurring in a context of conflict between landowners, the State, and campesinos.[686]

771.          According to the report, the Ombudsman’s Office’s investigation revealed that the State’s presence and action in ensuring citizen security and safeguarding campesinos’ lives and physical integrity was inadequate. At the same time, the most recent annual report from PROVEA also indicates that the phenomenon of violence and social conflict in rural areas has worsened since the enactment of the Land Law in 2001, and it states that the recovery of “idle and unproductive land” has cost the lives of landless campesinos, of those who have occupied or rescued plots, and of large- and medium-scale landowners.[687]

772.          In September 2009, the Simón Bolívar National Socialist Front of Campesinos and Fishers, the Jirajara Campesino Socialist Front, and representatives of the Mission Boves publicly claimed that since 2001, when the new Land and Agrarian Development Law was enacted, 220 people, including two children, had been killed by agents of landholders with ties to paramilitaries and other organized mafias.[688] This violence has mostly affected the rural population, along with indigenous peoples.

773.          With reference to contract killings in Venezuela, “although the State does not deny that there have been regrettable cases involving campesinos who have lost their lives or suffered criminal injuries, [it notes] that the deaths do not add up to the totals given and that not all have been contract killings: that is, a person who kills another for money or at the request of someone else who pays the killer.”[689] The State also informed the Commission that it has ordered the commencement of all investigations in those cases in which a publicly actionable crime is suspected.

774.          While these murders, abductions, and contract killings do not necessarily involve agents of the Venezuelan State, the State’s failure to prevent such outbreaks of violence, to investigate their causes, and to punish the guilty triggers its international responsibility, even though the State maintains that “the fact that murders and extrajudicial killings and institutional reforms take place in a country – everyday occurrences in all the countries of the world – cannot lead the Commission to conclude that the State is violating human rights.”[690]

775.          Also of extreme concern is information received[691] with respect to the activities of violent groups. The information received by the Commission indicates that violent groups known as Movimiento Tupamaro, Colectivo La Piedrita, Colectivo Alexis Vive, Unidad Popular Venezolana, and Grupo Carapaica have been acting with the encouragement and acquiescence of the Venezuelan State. According to what has been reported to this Commission, these groups are urban in nature, have training similar to the police or military, some of their members belong to State entities, and they control popular urban areas, primarily in the city of Caracas. Therefore, it is necessary to have the permission of these violent groups to enter certain zones in the city. 

776.          According to what was reported to the Commission, these groups have a close relationship with the police forces and occasionally use their resources. In fact, the IACHR received alarming information according to which, despite not being professional police, the leaders of the Movimiento Tupamaro had been had been named directors of the metropolitan police for six months. Moreover, the Commission was informed that its leaders were clearly identified and even appeared publicly alongside leaders linked to the government.  

777.          According to the information received by the IACHR, the group Colectivo La Piedrita was involved in attacks against the television channel Globovisión, against political actors in Ateneo de Caracas, against the newspaper El Nuevo País, against the headquarters of the COPEI party, against the apostolic nunciature, and against the journalist Marta Colomina. An arrest warrant was issued against its principal leader, Valentín Santana, but he is still free. Additionally, the group Unidad Popular Venezolana is a Venezuelan political party, directed by Lina Ron, and it was involved in the forceful takeover of the Palace of the Archbishop of Caracas, as well as attacks against the television stations RCTV and Globovisión. For the last attack on this television station, an arrest warrant was issued against Lina Ron, which was lifted last October 14.

778.          Upon receiving this information during its hearings, the IACHR asked the State for an official pronouncement on the existence or non-existence of these groups as well as on the legality or illegality of their actions. In his response, the representative of the State indicated:

Irregular groups exist, on both sides. In Venezuela, the conflict has become so generalized that there are radical people on the opposition side. So radical that military personnel participated in the coup of April 11, more than 50 generals and officials went to protest in the Plaza Altamira and they were protesting and calling for subversion by their comrades-at-arms for four months. These situations, then, have occurred in Venezuela. In our situation, we have the case of Lina Ron, who is a compatriot who supports President Chávez but does not understand that she must respect the law, the case of La Piedrita, these cases are discussed but when something happens there has been punishment. The cases of our campesinos, but they make sense, why? Because who starts killing campesino leaders, since the law on agrarian reform was passed? That is to say, since the moment when they started to combat the landed estates, from that moment, the landowners brought hired assassins from Colombia and sent them to kill campesino leaders. Of course, some of these campesino leaders, already tired of this situation, sometimes commit acts of violence as well. But all of this is a problem of the conflict, a conflict that President Chávez did not create, that has been aimed at overthrowing and ousting the government of President Chávez.[692]

779.          The Commission observes with concern the existence of violent groups that act with the participation or tolerance of state agents.

780.          Finally, the Commission is concerned by reports claiming that the Jewish community in Venezuela is being especially affected by violent incidents. The information received by the IACHR refers to anti-Semitic statements and incidents in various media outlets, together with graffiti painted on the walls of various Jewish institutions and homes.[693]

781.          In addition, the Commission was informed that on December 2, 2007, police officers raided the headquarters of the Hebrew Social, Cultural, and Sports Center (“La Hebraica”) in Caracas. According to the reports, some 30 officers of the Intelligence and Prevention Services Directorate (DISIP, by its Spanish acronym) forced their way into the Center, where they were received by the establishment’s watchmen, who afforded them direct access. The information claims that, absent a prosecutor from the Attorney General’s Office, the police officers presented an order from the Third Control Court of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Caracas Metropolitan Area and the 41st Prosecutor of the Caracas Metropolitan Area Public Prosecution Service that allegedly gave no grounds for the operation, and that they then proceeded to conduct an exhaustive examination of various areas of the center. At the end of the procedure, it is claimed that the officers prepared, in the presence of the Hebrew Center’s president, a report stating that no irregularities had been found. Various sectors of the Jewish community in Venezuela and abroad noted their concern, deeming the raid to be irregular and describing it as an act intended to create tension between Venezuela’s Jewish community and the national government.

782.          In response to the situation, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 41(d) of the American Convention on Human Rights, the IACHR asked the State to submit information on the incident and on the reasons for the operation carried out at La Hebraica in Caracas on December 2, 2007. On January 7, 2008, the State told the IACHR that “the operation in question was intended to conduct a detailed search of all the facility’s rooms in order to locate evidence of criminalistic interest related to the alleged commission of a crime against public order, the community, or national security, such as side arms and rifles, ammunition, explosives, and components for making explosive devices.” The Commission believes that the information furnished by the State regarding the operation at the Hebrew Center is inadequate to explain the incident that occurred at the institution’s headquarters.

783.          In addition, the State reported that during 2009, the media campaign that seeks to depict President Chávez as an anti-Semite continued, and that on January 31, 2009, the synagogue located in the Maripérez district of Caracas was vandalized by persons as yet unidentified. The State indicated that the Attorney General’s Office appointed the 41st National Prosecutor, to begin an investigation to identify the perpetrators. Shortly after the vandalism took place, President Hugo Chávez Frías, Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro Moros, and other officials of the Venezuelan State emphatically condemned the incident. Similarly, on February 6, 2009, the Attorney General of the Republic reported that charges had been brought against the watchmen on duty in the early morning hours of January 31, when a group of 10 or 12 individuals entered the synagogue belonging to Venezuela’s Jewish community.[694]

784.          The IACHR takes note of a speech made by President Chávez on Christmas Eve in 2005, in which he stated:

[…] the world has enough for everyone, indeed, but it happens that some minorities, the descendants of those who crucified Christ, the descendants of the same who threw Bolívar out of here and they also crucified him in their way in Santa Marta, there in Colombia. A minority that seized the world’s riches, a minority that seized the planet’s gold, silver, minerals, water, good land, petroleum, riches, and they have concentrated the riches in a few hands: less than ten percent of the population of the world owns more than half of the riches of the whole world and to the … [sic] more than half the people of the world are poor and each day there are more poor people in the entire world. We here have decided, decided to change history and every day more heads of state, presidents, and leaders accompany us, will accompany us […].[695]

785.          The Commission has also learned that after declarations by governmental authorities that were anti-Semitic in tone, there were expressions with anti-Semitic content in opinion programs and articles, including in government-controlled media or media aligned with the government such as Cadena Venezolana de Televisión (VTV).[696] In turn, these declarations contributed to creating an atmosphere of intimidation and violence against the Jewish community in Venezuela. The foregoing, added to the lack of investigation and sanctioning of those responsible for these acts, including those in which state forces participated, constitutes a threat to the life and physical integrity of the Jewish community in Venezuela.

786.          The Commission views these violent acts with concern, aware that they could also affect the right of freedom of worship in Venezuela, and it will therefore remain alert to the information it receives about the steps taken by the State to keep such violent acts against the Jewish community in Venezuela from reoccurring, to establish the truth about the incidents, and to punish the guilty.

787.          In consideration of the overview of citizen security in Venezuela given in this section, the IACHR believes that the actions taken by the State to combat the causes of violence, reduce crime levels, and eradicate organized crime have been insufficient. The figures made available to the IACHR also show that the State has not succeeded in bringing the actions of its public security forces into line with human rights standards, which has led to violations of the right to life enshrined in Article 4 of the American Convention, and of the right to humane treatment, protected by Article 5 of that same Inter-American instrument.

3.                  Impunity in cases of violence

788.          As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the State has a duty to prevent, investigate, and punish violations of the right to life and humane treatment; moreover, that duty is not limited to violations committed by state agents but also includes incidents in which private citizens are involved. If the authorities charged with investigating and punishing such incidents fail to act, a situation of impunity arises with respect to violations of rights protected by the American Convention.

789.          The Commission has already noted its concern at the high levels of impunity surrounding the numerous extrajudicial killings committed by state agents as ajusticiamientos of suspected criminals or of marginalized members of society as part of its claimed protection of citizen security. The IACHR has also expressed concern at the slow progress with the investigations into the troubling number of contract killings, which are having a particular impact on campesinos and on people involved with land reclaim processes.[697]

790.          Although Article 29 of the Venezuelan Constitution establishes the State’s obligation of investigating and punishing human rights crimes committed by its authorities, there are allegations of challenges to the prosecution of those responsible for crimes committed in Venezuela. As stated above, the specific criminalization of torture is a challenge the Venezuelan State still has to meet but, in addition, the vast legislative dispersion of criminal law is an obstacle for the proper investigation of crimes, as well as for their punishment.

791.          In connection with this, the Attorney General of the Republic herself has noted the need for a new code to be enacted, covering all the offenses dealt with in the Organic Law Against Organized Crime, the Law Against Corruption, the Organic Law Against Illicit Trafficking and Consumption of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances, the Law Against Money Exchange Offenses, the Law on People’s Access to Goods and Services, and others. According to the Attorney General, “on occasions, prosecutors, in determining the nature of a punishable action detected in flagrante, begin to study the facts and they have with them the Criminal Code, the Law on Women’s Right to a Life Free of Violence, and the Drugs Law, but that day they didn’t bring the Law Against Computer Crime with them, and it’s not available, and so when crimes are detected in flagrante, prosecutors have to carry with them a whole series of laws.” In addition, the Attorney General noted that on account of the various different pieces of criminal legislation in existence, opinions varied about the applicability of the Penal Code versus the Organic Law against Organized Crime.[698]

792.          Another factor that contributes to impunity in Venezuela, particularly when crimes are committed by officials of the State, is the fact that the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps is attached to the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, along with the fact that the Medical Examiner’s Office is a dependent agency of the Corps. In the Commission’s view, this dependent relationship hinders the impartiality and autonomy of these agencies’ investigations, in that when those involved in acts of torture or other human rights violations belong to the Investigations Corps, it is difficult for the agencies to adopt reports incriminating them, given that they belong to the same body.

793.          The Commission has also received expressions of concern noting that 20% of the bodies presumably involved in homicide cases are held by the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps, a body that, in the opinion of certain Venezuelan civil society organizations, seriously compromises independence at the start of an investigation.[699] The IACHR regrets that the Venezuelan State has not adopted the Commission’s recommendations in this regard,[700] and it again states that to ensure the independence of its actions, the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps should be located within the Attorney General’s Office or given its autonomy.

794.          Even the Attorney General of the Republic has admitted encountering the “obstacle posed by technical and scientific evidence of key importance in clarifying events.” As she said, investigations sometimes require certain very specific and technical formalities, which can only be carried out by experts. Since the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps has the most specialized equipment, when a member of the Corps commits a crime, the technical testing is carried out by one of his colleagues or friends.[701]

795.          Meanwhile, until those recommendations are implemented, the Commission views positively the creation, in 2008, of the Criminalistics Unit against Violation of Basic Rights within the Attorney General’s Office.[702] The Unit’s sole function is to search for evidence and other elements to prove that criminal acts have been committed in investigations involving violations of basic rights and to identify the responsibilities of the participants therein.[703] Although the Commission has not been informed of the Criminalistics Unit’s start of operations, on April 29, 2009, according to a press release put out by the Attorney General’s Office, the process of selecting those officers who are to be the Unit’s members had begun. The significance of the creation of the Criminalistics Unit within the Attorney General’s Office is that those offices will not be attached to any police agency, which will increase the autonomy and independence of the tests they carry out.

796.          The IACHR has learned of other actions taken by the State to assist the effective investigation of crimes that affect the security of the Venezuelan people and to eradicate impunity. The State reported that the Attorney General’s Office has developed a system to oversee and monitor the actions of its prosecutors with jurisdiction over the protection of basic rights and the execution of judgments, through a “Monthly Summary of Actions and Cases,” together with oversight of the tasks entrusted to them and updating the internal case files that have been opened.[704]

797.          The Attorney General’s Office has also implemented a “Monitoring Plan for Cases Involving Violations of Basic Rights,” which enables follow-up of the numbers of cases opened at the different prosecutors’ offices for the crimes of homicide, forced disappearances, torture, criminal injuries, illegal detentions, housebreaking, etc.

798.          Another important step in resolving the crimes that most affect the Venezuelan population is the implementation, in the year 2008, of Municipal Prosecutors’ Offices with jurisdiction to deal with offenses punishable by prison terms of three years or less.[705] Based on their knowledge of their communities’ needs, these Prosecutors’ Offices would be able to assist in establishing strategies to attack the most common crimes in the areas where they were created.

799.          Also significant is the creation, inside the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, of the Special Ombudsman’s Office for Police Matters, which is intended to pursue independent investigations into complaints of police abuses and into cases involving the actions of the State’s security agents. This Special Ombudsman’s Office was created by the Organic Law on the Police Service and the National Police Force to strengthen the work of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in promoting, defending, and monitoring human rights.

800.          The Special Ombudsman’s Office for Police Matters is empowered to open and pursue investigations into human rights violations committed by state officials, either on its own initiative or after a complaint is filed. It is also authorized to urge the competent criminal investigation agencies to secure the evidence needed to clarify incidents in which human rights may have been violated and to monitor, on a permanent basis, cases opened against police officers that are being processed directly by the Attorney General’s Office through its investigation auxiliaries or that are before the courts.

801.          The Commission also applauds the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman’s production of monthly reports with qualitative and quantitative data on allegations of arbitrary executions and forced disappearances, broken down by the victims’ age and sex and indicating the agencies accused of the violations, on statistical charts, enabling the involvement of the State’s security forces in such crimes to be identified. In this context, the Commission for Updating Case Files dealing with civil rights was created, with the aim of compiling the cases nationwide dealing with violations of the right to life and liberty currently before the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.[706]

802.          The Inter-American Commission has also learned of the existence, within the National Assembly, of a Special Commission for Investigating Attacks against and Killings of Campesinos and Indigenous People by Landowners. It does not, however, have any information on the specific work of this Commission or the results of its undertakings.

803.          In spite of the actions taken, particularly those of the Attorney General’s Office, to ensure that violations of the Venezuelan people’s rights to life and humane treatment are properly investigated, the information received by the IACHR indicates that high levels of impunity surround those incidents. For example, according to information given to the IACHR by the State, between January and September 2008, the different prosecutors’ offices opened a total of 6,422 cases related to human rights violations, which led to the production of only 3,688 final decisions. The State also reported that in connection with those incidents, 584 public officials had been identified as suspects, with formal charges brought against 463.[707] The State did not, however, provide information on how many were in fact convicted of those charges.

804.          According to information furnished by the State on the criminal proceedings initiated for the alleged commission of the crime of homicide by state agents while on duty or as a result of their official functions, between 2000 and July 2006 a total of 1,766 were identified as suspects, 858 were formally charged, and 178 were convicted.[708] According to figures from the Attorney General’s Office collated by the Venezuelan press, 6,885 members of the Venezuelan State’s security forces were identified as possible suspects in the killings and ajusticiamientos of 7,243 people between January 2000 and November 2007. Of these, only 412 are in prison,[709] representing 5.98% of the total.

805.          According to the 2008 Report of the Attorney General of the Republic, between January and September 2008 a total of 6,422 cases related to alleged violations of human rights were recorded: i.e., for the commission of the crimes of homicide, forced disappearance, torture, criminal injury, illegal detentions, and housebreaking. Those 6,422 proceedings led to only 3,688 final decisions and the identification as suspects of 584 public officials, of whom 463 were formally charged.[710] Nor does the Attorney General’s report contain statistics on the total number of state agents convicted of those crimes.

806.          As for more recent figures, the Attorney General of the Republic reported that the Attorney General’s Office admitted 10,858 cases against police officers allegedly involved in human rights crimes between 2008 and March 2009. Of these 10,858 cases, 755 involved homicides in which police involvement was suspected. For that crime, between 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, prosecutors produced a total of 253 final decisions, as a result of which 134 state agents were detained.[711]

807.          With reference to other crimes, such as criminal injury, abuses of authority, housebreaking, illegal detentions, torture, forced disappearance, and harassment, the Attorney General’s Office reported that it processed 10,103 cases between 2008 and March 2009. Prosecutors had succeeded in resolving 5,641 of these, which means that only 55% had been resolved and were covered by final decisions. Regarding killings during alleged shootouts and ajusticiamientos, between 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, 367 state agents were identified as suspects and 384 were charged, but only 12 convictions were obtained.[712] Over the same period, for violations of human rights other than those already identified, 558 state agents were identified as suspects, 374 were charged, 22 were imprisoned, and 10 were convicted. Thus, in the total number of cases of human rights violations dealt with by the prosecutors of the Attorney General’s Office between January 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, 942 state agents were identified as suspects, 741 were formally charged, 146 were imprisoned, and only 22 were convicted.[713]

808.          With respect to contract killings, the analysis of the cases of rural killings by the Human Rights Ombudsman indicated a tendency on the part of the police to conceal information of value to investigations, material weaknesses within the police agencies, and a lack of independence among those charged with investigating such crimes, particularly those affecting the vulnerable sector of the campesino population. According to the report, those factors have a direct impact on the investigation of cases. Another reason for impunity detected by the Ombudsman’s Office’s investigation are the delays and lack of proactivity in processing cases involving campesinos killed as result of the struggle for land and its democratization under the Land and Agrarian Development Law, and the failure of prosecutors to investigate cases of attacks and harassment.[714]

809.          Bearing in mind the above, at the Hearing on Citizen Security and Violence in Venezuela,[715] the petitioning organizations[716] noted that one of the problems with the greatest impact on public insecurity in Venezuela was impunity. The IACHR therefore calls on the State to take all the steps necessary to ensure due diligence and effectiveness in both its investigations and its imposition of the corresponding administrative, disciplinary, and criminal sanctions, with respect to both individuals accused of committing common crimes that affect citizens’ security and people belonging to the State’s security forces proven to have abused their authority to the detriment of the population.

810.          In light of the Commission’s analysis contained in the present chapter regarding citizen security in Venezuela, the Commission exhorts the State to assume the fulfillment of its international obligations to protect and ensure human rights in their relation with citizen security by adapting the internal norms and the State’s machinery to the aforementioned standards. 

B.         Violence in prisons

811.          The situation of insecurity and violence prevailing in Venezuela’s prisons has been a source of particular concern to the IACHR, which has held hearings, has issued press releases and reports on specific cases, and has asked the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of detainees held in Venezuelan prisons and penitentiaries.

812.          Deprivation of liberty does not does not strip people of all their human rights.[717] Since the State has a special guarantor’s duty with respect to people held in its custody, it has a particular responsibility to ensure that detainees enjoy the conditions necessary to lead a decent existence and to contribute to their effective enjoyment of those rights that may under no circumstances be restricted.

813.          In light of this, the Commission will examine Venezuela’s current regulatory framework along with the information available on the policies adopted by the State to uphold the rights of people held in custody, making reference to figures on violence inside prisons, in order to determine whether the State has met its protection obligation with respect to those people whose liberty it has suspended.

1.         Protection of detainees’ rights

a.         Regulatory framework for the protection of detainees

814.          International human rights law requires that states guarantee the rights of people held in their custody. Thus, in this section the IACHR will analyze whether the regulatory framework in force in Venezuela is adequate and appropriate for guaranteeing the security of detainees and whether it is in line with the applicable international provisions.

815.          Article 44 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela states that personal liberty is inviolable and that consequently “no person may be arrested or detained except under a court order, unless he is caught in flagrante delicto.” In such cases, the authorities are obliged to bring the detainee before a judicial authority within no more than 48 hours following the arrest.

816.          Article 44 of the Constitution also establishes other guarantees, such as the right of all detainees to communicate immediately with their family, attorney, or other trusted person, and the right of those persons to be informed of where the detainee is being held; the right to immediate notification of the reasons for the arrest; and the requirement to leave a written record in the case file on the physical and mental state of the arrested person.

817.          With reference to the prison system, Article 272 of the Venezuelan Constitution states that:

The State shall guarantee a penitentiary system such as to ensure the rehabilitation of inmates and respect for their human rights. To this end, penitentiary establishments shall have areas for work, study, sports, and recreation; they shall operate under the direction of professional penologists with academic credentials; and they shall be governed under the decentralized administration of state or municipal governments; they may also be subject to privatization arrangements. In such establishments, an open regimen shall be preferred, as well as the model of custodial agricultural colonies. In all cases punishment formulas without restriction of freedom shall be applied in preference over measures that restrict freedom. The State shall create the necessary institutions to provide post-penitentiary assistance for the reincorporation of the inmate into society and shall encourage the creation of an autonomous penitentiary institution with personnel of an exclusively technical nature.

818.          In spite of the constitutional provisions that enshrine adequate guarantees for the protection of people held in the State’s custody, the Commission has received information indicating that certain provisions in the Criminal Code, the Organic Criminal Procedural Code, and the Prison Regime Law undermine the basic rights of detainees.

819.          In the area of criminal procedure, the Commission notes the key importance of the recent passage of the Law Partially Amending the Organic Criminal Procedural Code, in light of the fact that one of the main problems affecting Venezuela’s prison inmates is overcrowding.[718] This law contains amendments to various articles covering the actions of both judges and parties during criminal trials.  As indicated in the rationale, the amendments are a contribution to the actions that must be taken to counteract procedural delays.

820.          Thus, Articles 183 to 189 were amended, to require that summonses and notifications be served promptly. Amendments were also made to: Article 327, establishing a maximum of 20 days for the scheduling of a preliminary hearing, in the event that it is deferred; Article 301, to expand the deadline given to the Attorney General’s Office to formulate a dismissal of a complaint; and Article 323, requiring that the parties must be present when a dismissal is ordered.

821.          Article 244 was also amended, which now provides that a request for an extension of a detention order may be filed with any court that is hearing the case, as was Article 392, to expand the scope of active extradition, so that now extradition may be requested when a court order for arrest exists against the person sought. The Commission believes that these reforms, in that they will have an impact on dispatch in criminal proceedings, represent a step forward in ensuring detainees better protection.

822.          In the area of criminal law, the Commission has been closely monitoring calls to repeal an amendment of the Penal Code[719] made in 2005. In April 2008, inmates at 11 prisons began a hunger strike demanding the repeal of this reform, which had amended articles of the Penal Code to deny convicts imprisoned for armed robbery, attacks, or other violent offences the possibility of working outside the prison or of obtaining parole benefits and periods of supervised freedom. The hunger strike lasted for five weeks, and members of the inmates’ families supported the protest through a series of demonstrations.

823.          The strike ended when the Supreme Court of Justice[720] admitted a remedy for annulment and ordered precautionary measures to suspend the enforcement of Articles 374, 375, 406, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460.4, and 470, final part, of the Venezuelan Penal Code, together with the final section of Articles 31 and 32 of the Organic Law Against Illicit Trafficking and Consumption of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. As of the date of this report’s adoption, the Supreme Court of Justice has not issued final judgment on this remedy, which seeks the repeal of the articles of the Penal Code that restrict the right to parole benefits and alternative ways of serving sentences.

824.          In addition, the Commission has learned of the existence of a draft Organic Prison System Code, which seeks to update and gather together all the legal instruments governing prison matters in Venezuela. The draft was prepared by the National Assembly’s Subcommittee on Human Rights and involved participation by representatives of the different agencies with jurisdiction over the matter.[721] The IACHR regrets that the bill was not put on the legislative agenda for 2008 and it urges the State to discuss the draft with the urgency demanded by the conditions prevailing in Venezuela’s prisons.

825.          In taking away a person’s freedom, the State assumes a special status as guarantor and it consequently has the obligation of ensuring, through all means available to it, that detainees can enjoy their basic rights and, in particular, the right to life and humane treatment. In the Commission’s view, the urgent situation within Venezuela’s prisons requires the Venezuelan State to adopt measures to allow the implementation of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by the international obligations acquired by the State. The IACHR will therefore continue to monitor the legislative reforms and new laws adopted by the State to guarantee the rights of people held in its custody.

b.         State policies and programs to prevent prison violence

826.          The Commission is aware that in addition to an adequate regulatory framework for prisons, there is an urgent need to implement specific actions and policies with an immediate impact on the situation of risk faced by detainees. The State’s obligation toward prison inmates is not limited to merely enacting provisions to protect them, nor is it enough for state agents to refrain from actions that could injure the lives and persons of detainees; instead, international human rights law requires states to adopt all measures available to them to guarantee the lives and personal integrity of people held in their custody. In this section, the IACHR will therefore analyze the plans and actions adopted with respect to Venezuela’s prisons, their effectiveness in ensuring the security of people held in state custody, and their observance of the applicable international provisions.

827.          The State has said that it is not unaware of the problem of violence in its prisons, but it stresses that it has been swift to adopt corrective measures. It points to actions including personnel training, the introduction of Human Rights Offices with specialized personnel, and the actions of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the agency that successfully sought the precautionary measure suspending implementation of those articles of the Penal Code that restricted the right to parole benefits.[722]

828.          The IACHR notes that, with a view to improving the situation of detainees, on November 23, 2004, the President of the Republic decreed a Prison Emergency,[723] assuming a firm commitment to tackling and resolving problems in the country’s prisons. Under the decree, a Presidential Commission for the Prison Emergency was appointed and given two tasks: immediately addressing the situation of inmates awaiting trial in prisons, in order to reach a degree of judicial normalcy; and conducting an analysis of the nation’s prisons and proposing short-, medium-, and long-terms solutions toward a major reform of the system.

829.          The Presidential Commission for the Prison Emergency spent 2005 and 2006 analyzing the prison system and designing policies for it. Although the Presidential Commission has not been formally dissolved, during 2007, 2008, and 2009, it issued no new calls for working meetings. According to information from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, in June 2008 the Minister of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice called together the top authorities of the Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman to create the Commission for Establishing Prison Policies and announced the creation of the Vice Ministry of Prison Affairs. This commission was to replace the Presidential Commission for the Prison Emergency, but the plans never crystallized.[724] However, the State has reported that the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, as the agency responsible for the prison system, continued to implement and execute the public policies designed by that interinstitutional commission.[725]

830.          During the emergency, the Interior and Justice Ministry adopted the Venezuelan Prison System Humanization Plan. According to information published by the National Prison Service Directorate, the Prison Humanization project emerged as the Venezuelan State’s response to the extreme deterioration of a system dominated by anarchy, apathy, and corruption. The Prison System Humanization Plan seeks to address the prison problem by means of: (1) a new institutional structure, with an efficient organizational framework, rules, and procedures; (2) appropriate prison infrastructure, in line with the size of the prison population, with all the basic services needed for a decent existence; and (3) comprehensive attention, providing inmates awaiting trial and convicts alike with the conditions and tools needed to develop their potential and capacity.[726]

831.          The plan involves all the country’s prisons and is intended to reduce violence within them, improve health conditions, and encourage the social reincorporation of inmates. According to the State, under this plan, since November 2005 new prison facilities have been built and the infrastructure of existing prisons has been improved. The plan has also introduced structural changes in prison staff training, and it will implement a high-technology solution to strengthen prison security and custody. The plan also provides for comprehensive programs for inmates, providing assistance in the areas of health, nutrition, education, recreation, and job training and skill acquisition; it has also provided vehicles for prisoner transfers and other services to foster the human dimension inside Venezuela’s prisons.[727]

832.          In addition, the Commission acknowledged and welcomed[728] the State’s initiative whereby the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, through its General Directorate for Human Rights, has appointed human rights delegates at all prisons nationwide, together with the detention centers located in some police stations, to provide a swift response to outbreaks of violence and other complaints lodged by inmates.

833.          Similarly, on August 7, 2008, the Attorney General’s Office created prosecutors’ offices at the national level with jurisdiction over the prison system,[729] which are tasked with overseeing compliance with the prisons regime and the provisions of the Constitution, the Organic Criminal Procedural Code, the Prison Regime Law, and the UN’s international instruments governing the treatment of prisoners. According to information submitted to the IACHR by the State, there are 26 prosecutors’ offices dealing with and monitoring the execution of judgments and overseeing the applicable prison regime, and in August 2008[730] the creation of an additional ten prosecutors’ offices at the national level with jurisdiction over the prisons regime was ordered.[731] However, according to information from the Attorney General’s Office, at the close of 2008, only two of these prosecutors’ offices were fully operational.[732] The Commission also shares the concern of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman that, in spite of these efforts, the number of detainees being held while awaiting trial is far greater than the number of convicts in prison under final judgments.[733]

834.          The State also informed the Commission that in September 2008, the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice created a National Pardons Commission.[734] The chief purpose of this commission is to propose detainees suitable for receiving presidential pardons in accordance with the following criteria: humanitarian considerations, the seriousness of their crimes, having completed half their sentences, good behavior while in prison, a favorable assessment from the multidisciplinary technical team, and no recidivism.[735] Under the terms of this decree, by the end of 2008 the President of the Republic had granted 71 pardons.

835.          In October 2008, the State informed the Commission about the “relaunch of the plan to reduce prison violence,” and noted that four teams of itinerant judges had been attached to the prisons at Uribana, San Juan de los Morros, PGV, and Sabaneta, and that efficiency in confiscating weapons had been enhanced, with the plan producing total seizures of 2,213 bladed weapons, 113 pistols, 107 revolvers, 445 improvised firearms, 43 shotguns, two submachine guns, 60 grenades, and 5,432 rounds of ammunition.[736]

836.          The State also informed the IACHR about the creation, on December 15, 2008, under Decree No. 6,553, of the Superior Prisons Council to serve as the national governing body for the design and formulation of structural policies to deal comprehensively with the prison system. This Council comprises representatives of the Legislature (National Assembly), of the Judiciary (Supreme Court of Justice), of the Citizens’ Branch of government (Public Prosecution Service and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman), and representatives of the Executive Branch (Ministries of Popular Power for Education, for Sport, for Culture, for Community Economies, for Health, for Higher Education, for Defense and the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, which chairs it).

837.          According to the information received, the Superior Prisons Council’s powers include overseeing the right to life and humane treatment of the prison population; issuing policies to guarantee compliance with all the security and custody protocols needed to provide an appropriate regime of treatment and attention for prison inmates; designing and executing policies to guarantee the prison population comprehensive attention in the areas of education, health, culture, sport, work, technical and job training, and nutrition; guaranteeing the implementation of judicial policies; proposing regulatory plans to regulate prison affairs to the competent bodies, along with all other legal measures necessary to transform the Venezuelan prison system; and encouraging the participation of relatives on community councils, in nongovernmental organizations, and in other bodies whose work is germane to prison affairs.[737]

838.          Under the aegis of the Superior Prisons Council, Regional Prisons Councils were established, bringing together prison directors, presiding judges of judicial criminal districts, the state delegates of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the senior prosecutors of the Attorney General’s Office, and the regional commanders of the Bolivarian National Guard. These regional councils function as decentralized and operational state units, responsible for oversight and direct control of the plans and programs established by the Superior Prisons Council.[738]

839.          According to the State, since the creation of the Superior Prisons Council there has been a 30% fall in violence levels in the various prisons of the Capital Region; this, in the State’s view, indicates that the project and it comprehensive approach are working.[739]

840.          The State also reported the creation of the National Prison Service Directorate, to replace the Directorate of Inmate Custody and Rehabilitation, as part of its new approach to dealing with its prison population.[740]

841.          With regard to the procedural delays that affect the trials of detainees in Venezuela, the IACHR applauds the creation of the Prisons Commissions set up at several detention centers in order to undertake case reviews; it also appreciates the creation of the itinerant judges program, which was established to ensure effective judicial oversight during the control and trial phases of cases against people who remain detained while facing trial and who require swift justice. According to information from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, however, in practice those judges’ courts are only effectively functioning in the states of Zulia, Guárico, Falcón, Miranda, and Carabobo.[741] The IACHR places great weight on the information furnished by the State indicating that it plans to strengthen the efforts of itinerant judges and prosecutors at certain prisons.[742]

842.          With reference to the prison visits regime, the State reported that it planned to abolish the traditional practice of allowing prisoners visitors on weekends only, and to establish a system whereby relatives may visit inmates any day of the week. The State added that it was going to install a system of controlled access to prisoners for inspection and vigilance tasks, noting that work was underway to implement a less invasive and more respectful inspection system for the visiting relatives of inmates, reducing physical contact between prison officials and visitors.[743] According to the State, the general objective of this access control system is to install control systems to prevent the entry of weapons, drugs, explosives, and other prohibited items into 27 of the country’s prisons. It will entail the installation of X-ray machines, 40 weapons detectors, and 37 digital closed-circuit TV systems for the exclusive monitoring of prison entryways.[744]

843.          In the area of polices to reduce violence inside prisons, the State underscored the implementation of the Prison Symphonic Orchestra Project, which was launched on February 6, 2007, to prevent idleness among inmates which, in the State’s opinion, leads to violence. According to the State’s report, between 2007 and August 2009, 1,086 inmates had come into contact with the Prison Symphonic Orchestra and 486 were considered orchestra alumni.[745]

844.          In addition, the State identified the elements that have helped reduce violence, including educational, cultural, and sporting endeavors in the country’s different prisons. According to the State, the missions have also played a key role within the prison system, by providing inmates with academic and job training in order to facilitate their reincorporation into society upon completing their sentences.[746] The Director General of Inmate Custody and Rehabilitation indicated that 39.59% of the prison population (8,915 inmates) was participating in the education and training missions promoted by the national government.[747]

845.          To tackle the problem of overcrowding, which remains a structural feature of the Venezuelan penal system, the Prison Humanization Plan aims to build 15 Prison Communities which, according to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, will follow a model that seeks to ensure inmates their rights and social services.[748] The idea of these new centers is to provide the spaces necessary to implement personalized prison treatment, to encourage the rehabilitation and effective reincorporation of inmates, through sport, work, culture, and recreation. A pilot test of the model was put in place at the Carabobo Penitentiary Center and, according to the competent authorities, it has yielded very significant results.[749]  Six new Prison Communities were planned to be opened during 2008: Yare Terraza A, with a capacity for 432 inmates; Yare II, for 300 inmates; Rodeo III, for 432; Anzoátegui Judicial Prison, for 324; Santa Ana, for 648; and the Coro Prison Community, for 850. Regrettably, the last of these was only one that was actually finished; it was inaugurated on July 12, 2008.[750]

846.          At the same time, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman created a Special Ombudsman’s Office with national jurisdiction over the prison regime; this agency provides technical support to the different units of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, specifically in the design of guidelines, programs, and activities for the promotion, defense, and monitoring of detainees’ human rights.[751]

847.          The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, under its Building a Community for Human Rights program, has also implemented a project targeting prison matters. Through this program, the Human Rights Ombudsman has set up Human Rights Defense Councils within prisons, to design plans and projects for resolving community problems, such as the lack of quality public services and issues related to the rights to health, education, nutrition, humane treatment, housing, etc.[752]

848.          According to the State, these Councils organize and represent all the inmates of different prison blocks, who can present to them their recommendations. Thus, the Councils offer a direct communications channel between representatives of the institutions and the prison community and they provide a forum for dialogue, agreements, and commitments for resolving prison conflicts.

849.          According to information from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, this program was launched in February 2008 at six of the country’s prisons, benefiting an estimated total inmate population of 7,752. Seven Human Rights Defense Councils were set up at those prisons, to carry out analyses of the main problems affecting each of them, and to prepare work plans for promoting interinstitutional actions aimed at the adoption of measures. This initiative involved 30% of the inmates at each center acting as spokesmen, along with 60 family members. Among other achievements, the Ombudsman’s Office claims that previously denied parole benefits were obtained, and improvements were made to various aspects of internal prison services.[753]  The State also claims that these Human Rights Councils have brought about a significant reduction in prison violence.[754]

850.          In consideration of the plans, projects, and programs described in this section, the State maintains it has taken all the appropriate steps to eliminate prison violence.[755] The IACHR believes the information received is positive and demonstrates a serious willingness on the part of the State to adopt policies to protect the rights of people held in its custody; nevertheless, the information received by the IACHR regarding conditions at Venezuela’s prisons that will be dealt with in the following section indicates that these policies have not been sufficient to prevent the continued occurrence of violent incidents at Venezuelan prisons that have caused alarming numbers of deaths and injuries among inmates. That stance is shared by the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which has said that:

In spite of the actions and efforts of the competent agencies, […] the prison situation has not changed significantly, and there is still much to be done to bring it into line with the model of a prison system that upholds human rights described in Article 272 of the Constitution and with the provisions set out in the international human rights protection instruments signed and ratified by the Venezuelan State.[756]

2.         Prison violence and conditions

851.          As the Inter-American Court has established, the essence of the right to personal liberty is the protection of the liberty of the individual from arbitrary or unlawful interference by the State and the guarantee of a detained individual’s right of defense.[757] Moreover, deprivation of freedom frequently affects, as a necessary result, the enjoyment of other human rights in addition to the right to personal liberty.[758] Although such restrictions must be subject to strict limitations, other rights – such as the right to life, to humane treatment, and to due process – cannot be restricted under any circumstances during internment, and any restriction of those is prohibited by international human rights law. Persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to have those rights respected and ensured just as those who are not so deprived.[759]

852.          The Commission has received information indicating violations of Venezuelan prisoners’ rights to personal liberty, to life, and to humane treatment. Similarly, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman has summarized the factors leading to the burgeoning of violence at Venezuelan prisons in the following terms: “delays at trial, overcrowding, dilapidated prison facilities, the failure to classify inmates, the lack of vital basic services, [and] the presence of weapons and drugs.”[760]

853.          Regarding the right to personal liberty, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman states that it has frequently identified practices in which one or several individuals are taken to detention centers or other formal or informal detention facilities without good reason. The office has also recorded situations involving denials of freedom using mechanisms such as checkpoints, which occur in the context of either selective or general control operations or raids. According to the Ombudsman’s Office, these procedures often lead to violations of humane treatment or, in the worst cases, to disappearances or executions.[761]

854.          The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman reports that violations of the right to personal liberty are generally accompanied by abuses of authority and, frequently, by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[762] The Ombudsman’s Office has noted that many arbitrary denials of liberty in Venezuela entail physical or psychological abuse and, on occasions, can lead to disappearances or executions.  It also reports that many cases of police brutality take place as a result of police actions that undermine guarantees of personal liberty and of transit.[763]

855.          The Annual Report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman indicates that in Venezuela it is common for detainees to be kept incommunicado, for their merchandise or personal effects to be confiscated, for victims’ ID papers to be taken from them, or for them to be transferred to different detention centers, along with other irregular situations. Moreover, it further states that in numerous cases, illegal denials of liberty are a part of the investigation procedures of the CICPC, and that arbitrary transfers by this investigation corps presage the torturing of the victim or other physical attacks with the aim of obtaining information.[764]

856.          Information from the Ombudsman’s Office indicates that during 2008, it recorded a total of 430 complaints involving illegal denials of liberty, incommunicado detention, and forced disappearances, compared to 410 during 2007, which represents an increase of 4.87%.[765]

857.          In connection with this information, the IACHR points out that sections 2 and 3 of Article 7 of the American Convention place limits on public power and expressly prohibit both illegal and arbitrary arrests; it therefore calls on the State to take the steps necessary to put an end to arrests carried out in breach of law, and to the holding of detainees in incommunicado conditions, to mistreatment, and to other violations of due process that may arise during an arrest. The Commission also calls for the appropriate investigation of allegations of arbitrary arrests occurring in Venezuela and for the punishment of the perpetrators.

858.          The State has informed the IACHR that Venezuela is one of the countries with the fewest persons deprived of liberty in the world, since less that 10% of the total population is confined.[766] The Commission notes that the official figures for the total number of detainees in Venezuela given to it by the State in August 2009[767] are not entirely clear. The information refers to a total of 22,223 people imprisoned in Venezuela. According to those figures, 14,144 of these were awaiting trial and 7,333 had been sentenced, which would give a total of 21,477. On the other hand, adding the numbers given for each region yields the following result: in the capital region, 5,149 detainees (3,888 awaiting trial and 1,261 convicted); in the central region, 4,828 (3,014 awaiting trial and 1,814 convicted); in the Andean region, 3,736 (2,350 awaiting trial and 1,386 convicted); in the center-west region, 4,255 (2,261 awaiting trial and 1,944 convicted); and in the center-west region, 2,979 (2,631 awaiting trial and 982 convicted).  These figures give a grand total of 20,947 persons deprived of liberty.

859.          Notwithstanding the inconsistencies in the official figures for the country’s total prison population, it is clear that the number of people held without a conviction is a cause for concern. If 14,144 inmates are awaiting trial and 7,733 have been convicted, more than 65% of the country’s prison inmates have not received convictions. Also concerning are the figures given to the press by the Director of Inmate Custody and Rehabilitation in January 2009, according to which the prison population totaled 24,360, of whom 69% were awaiting trial and 31% had been convicted.[768]

860.          Similarly, in its 2008 annual report, PROVEA claimed that 60% of Venezuela’s prison population was being held in preventive custody.[769] Additionally, in March 2009 the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory informed the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that Venezuela’s total prison population numbered 23,457 individuals, of whom 14,461 (60%) were being detained pending trial.[770] In a later hearing, held in November of 2009, the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory informed the Commission that the prison population had increased to 32,820 persons, of which 22,328 (68%) were detained pending trial.[771]

861.          According to figures given by the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in early 2009, during 2008 there were a total of 24,360 persons held in prisons, representing an increase of almost 15% over the 2007 figure of 21,201.[772] According to these figures, 15,332 of these inmates were awaiting trial, representing 62.93% of the total. As noted by the Ombudsman’s Office, this figure indicates that the problem has grown worse since the previous period, when there were 10,972 inmates awaiting trial, giving an increase of 39.73%. In addition, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman states that the effort to update the country’s prison statistics could yield a higher percentage of inmates awaiting trial.[773]

862.          Since preventive custody is the harshest measure that can be imposed on a person accused of a crime, the Commission stresses that it must be applied on an exceptional basis and must be constrained by the principles of legality, presumption of innocence, need, and proportion that are indispensable in a democratic society.[774] The arbitrary prolonging of preventive custody becomes a punishment when it is imposed without demonstrating the criminal responsibility of the individual to whom it is applied.[775] In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission requests that the State urgently adopt all the necessary measures to address procedural delays and thus correct this serious situation that affects thousands of people in Venezuela.

863.          With reference to delays in trials, the Director of Inmate Custody and Rehabilitation has reported an improvement of the situation from the ratio of 9 to 1 that existed during the 1990s (nine inmates awaiting trial for every single convict), and he claimed that efforts were still being invested in the adoption of measures to tackle this problem, such as increased numbers of itinerant prosecutors and judges at detention centers.[776] Nevertheless, delays in court proceedings remain one of the main problems of the Venezuelan prison system and they have been the reason behind the main protests, including hunger strikes and autosecuestros (self-kidnappings), over recent years.

864.          In addition to delays in court proceedings, the information received by the Commission indicates that one of the main factors affecting the rights of Venezuelan detainees is the conditions in which they are held, most particularly overcrowding, a circumstance affecting both prisons and police jails.

865.          Although this problem has affected Venezuela’s prisons for several years, there can be little doubt that the 2005 amendment of the Penal Code whereby those convicted of certain crimes were denied access to alternative ways to serve their sentences led to an increase in the prison population. The Commission therefore applauded the Supreme Court’s decision to suspend those articles as a precautionary measure until final judgment is issued in the remedy for annulment lodged against the amendment. The Commission eagerly awaits the Supreme Court’s final decision on this matter.

866.          In addition to the relevant legislative reforms, the situation of Venezuela’s detainees demands specific, urgent measures to improve prison conditions. Although the state has made some progress with prison infrastructure, according to information from PROVEA, in spite of the Strategic Plan for Prison System Humanization being carried out by the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice – which provides for the creation of living space for an additional 15,000 inmates, 2,500 places for residents of Community Treatment Centers, and the refitting of 30 prisons – detention conditions are still characterized by overcrowding and collapsed sanitary infrastructure.[777]

867.          In connection with this, the Commission regrets that the State did not respond to its specific request for information on its prison capacity.[778] Unofficial figures, given to the IACHR by the Latin American Prisons Observatory, indicate that Venezuela’s total population is some 28 million and that prison inmates total around 22,000. There are estimated to be 79 prison inmates for every 100,000 inhabitants. The official capacity of the country’s prisons is 16,909, giving an overpopulation or overcrowding rate of 117.4%.[779] During a more recent hearing, the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory informed the Commission that the prison population had increased to 32,820 people, and that the established capacity was 12,000 people, which represents a 166.9% overcrowding rate.[780] If these statistics are certain, the IACHR considers the increase in the prison population of 10,000 people in approximately 7 months alarming, as well as the resulting deterioration in the overcrowding situation.

868.          As stated by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, an overcrowded prison is characterized by unhygienic and restricted accommodation, with a lack of privacy for basic activities such as washroom use; a reduction in activities outside of the cell since inmate numbers surpass the services available; overloaded health services; and increased internal tensions. Consequently, there is more violence between prisoners and prison staff, as well as other problems.[781]

869.          According to information provided by the representatives of the beneficiaries of provisional measures ordered by the Inter-American Court in cases involving Venezuelan prisons, in spite of the State’s efforts in building 15 prison communities in an attempt to resolve its serious overcrowding and infrastructure problems, Venezuela has still not taken adequate steps to attack the root problems at its prisons, such as inmate reeducation and rehabilitation, which in turn compromises the security of the prison population. They also reported that Venezuela’s prisons lack bathroom facilities, the water supply is generally restricted, and the prisoners are required to bathe in shared spaces without privacy, which affects their dignity. Similarly, they spoke of inadequate systems for waste collection, which provoke an accumulation of excrement and a permanent state of unhealthiness.[782]

870.          Indeed, the IACHR notes with concern that 2008 and 2009 have seen several hunger strikes and autosecuestros (self-kidnappings) of thousands of visiting family members of inmates. The Venezuelan Prisons Observatory has informed the Commission that in 2008 alone, Venezuela’s prisons reported 22 autosecuestros, 48 hunger strikes, one blood strike (self-mutilation), and 61 inmates who sewed their mouths shut.[783] These protests were in support of, inter alia, greater dispatch in court proceedings, alternative ways of serving sentences, improved infrastructure and living conditions, improvements to the prisons’ basic services, an end to mistreatment by members of the Bolivarian National Guard, visitor access for children, and respect for inmates’ relatives, who on occasions have been humiliated by security personnel.[784]

871.          Regarding detention conditions, the Inter-American Court has specified that under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 5 of the American Convention, everybody who is imprisoned has the right to live in a situation of detention compatible with their personal dignity, which must be guaranteed by the State since it is in a special position of guarantor with regard to such persons, because the penitentiary authorities exercise total control over them.[785] Detention in conditions of overcrowding, without adequate conditions of hygiene, and with unjustified restrictions to the regime of visits, is a violation of personal integrity.[786] Moreover, injuries, suffering, and harm to health endured by a person while in prison can constitute a form of cruel treatment when, by reason of the detention conditions, there is a decline in his or her physical, mental, and moral integrity, which is expressly prohibited under Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Convention.[787]

872.          States are also obliged to ensure the economic, social, and cultural rights of prison inmates. In this regard, PROVEA has noted that some 30% of the prison population is involved in the educational system through the Robinson I and II and Ribas Missions. This organization also reports an effort among the prison authorities to enhance job training, with a view to facilitating social reincorporation. It is concerned, however, that violations of inmates’ labor rights continue, along with violations of their right to health.[788]

873.          The IACHR is particularly concerned by the information it has received about violence inside Venezuelan prisons, which has claimed the lives of thousands of people in recent years and injured thousands more. In imprisoning a person, the State’s obligation is not limited to refraining from actions that could harm the detainee’s life and person; on the contrary, the State must work to ensure, through every means available to it, that detainees enjoy their basic rights and, in particular, the right to life and to humane treatment. The Commission rejects the State’s refusal, on the grounds that the investigations are confidential, to respond to the IACHR’s request for official figures on the number of people who have lost their lives at the country’s prisons over the past five years.[789]

874.          In any event, according to the figures given to the press by the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice in January 2009, the murder rate in Venezuelan prisons fell by 22% in 2008 compared to the 2007 figure, and, in general, acts of violence decreased by 25% in comparison with the previous year. According to this source, the number of injured inmates fell from 1,091 in 2007 to 854 in 2008, while the number of deaths decreased from 447 in 2007 to 368 in 2008.[790] The same figures were cited in the annual report of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which also states that in 2008 alone, a total of 1,224 acts of violence were committed in Venezuelan prisons.[791]

875.          The Commission also takes note of the statistics submitted by the State to the Inter-American Court in January 2009.[792] The State emphasizes that upon analyzing the different violent acts that occurred between 1999 and 2008 in the Venezuelan penitentiaries one can observe a significant reduction in the number of deaths and injuries between 2008 and 2007. The official statistics presented by the State are the following:

876.          In turn, the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory[793] has informed the Commission that 412 people died at Venezuelan prisons in 2006, 498 in 2007, and 422 in 2008. At the same time, those same facilities recorded 982 cases of injured inmates in 2006, compared to 1,023 in 2007 and 854 in 2008.

877.          The total number of deaths and injuries at Venezuela’s detention centers over the past ten years, as indicated by figures from PROVEA (for 1999 to 2003) and from the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory (for 2003 to 2008) is, in the Commission’s view, alarming. As detailed below, between 1999 and 2008, a total of 3,664 people were killed and 11,401 were injured at Venezuelan prisons:

878.          According to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and figures gathered between January and September 2008, the most violent prison facilities were the following: the Capital Region’s Rodeo I Judicial Prison, with 18 inmates killed and 46 injured; Rodeo II, with 14 inmates killed and 28 injured; Maracaibo National Prison, with 35 killed and 69 injured; Aragua Prison Center, with 27 killed and 8 injured; the Capital Region’s Yare Prison, with 36 killed and 20 injured; the Carabobo Judicial Prison, with 21 killed and 73 injured; the Center-West Region Prison, with 19 killed and 33 injured; and the Monagas Judicial Prison, with 11 killed and 17 injured.[794] Most of these acts of violence were committed with firearms or bladed weapons, which presumably come into inmates’ possession through the internal and external complicity of prison officers and visiting family members. In this regard, information from the Ombudsman’s Office states that in 2008, 102 search operations were conducted, leading to the confiscation of 2,191 bladed weapons, 704 firearms, and 60 fragmentation grenades; 15,150 doses of narcotics and psychotropic substances were also seized.[795]

879.          Regarding the country’s most dangerous prison facilities, the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory informed the Commission that in 2008, more than half the total number of violent acts – that is, 72.5% of the deaths and 52% of the injuries – occurred in the following prisons: Yare I and II (44 deaths and 40 injuries); Sabaneta (44 deaths and 55 injuries); Rodeo I and II (41 deaths and 87 injuries); Uribana (29 deaths and 53 injuries); Barinas (23 deaths and 42 injuries); Apure (19 deaths and 27 injuries); Tocuyito (33 deaths and 85 injuries); La Pica (13 deaths and 25 injuries); Tocoron (28 deaths and 2 injuries); P.G.V. (16 deaths and 20 injuries); and various police stations (16 deaths and 8 injuries).[796]

880.          In connection with this, the State has noted that if the 2008 increase of 12% in the prison population is taken into account, the result is a fall of 25.65% in the number violent incidents compared to the previous year, which is due to the steps that have been taken. The State also claims that observing the different violent acts, and the differential from one year to the next between 1999 and 2008, there was a significant reduction of 27.45% in injuries and of 21.47% in deaths in comparison to 2007.[797] The State therefore believes that significant progress has been made with addressing violence in Venezuelan prisons.

881.          The Commission notes that the State has made efforts to implement measures for reducing violence in Venezuela’s prisons. However, the State has failed to adopt an effective policy to prevent violence within its detention centers, and as a result, the figures for inmates killed and injured at Venezuelan prisons are still disturbing. In comparative terms, Venezuelan prisons are the most violent in the region.

882.          Thus, according to figures from the Latin American Prisons Observatory, some 2,200 violent deaths per 100,000 inmates take place each year in Venezuelan prisons, which means that 2.2% of all prison inmates are killed by acts of violence. The Observatory has also pointed out that, bearing in mind that in Venezuela approximately 50 out of 100,000 citizens die violent deaths, the fatality rate in the country’s prisons is 44 times higher than among the general population. The data given to the Commission by the Latin American Prisons Observatory also indicates that in comparison with the rest of the region, in 2008 Venezuela’s prisons reported five times more violent deaths (422 people) than those of Mexico (24), Brazil (59), Colombia (7), and Argentina (10).[798]

883.          It should be noted that the right to life of prison detainees in Venezuela has been affected not only by violence among inmates, with or without the acquiescence of state authorities, but that Venezuelan prisoners have also lost their lives during irregular transfers carried out by state agents. For example, on July 29, 2008, one inmate was killed and another three were injured during the transfer of nine prisoners from the Rodeo I and Rodeo II Judicial Prisons in the Capital Region. The driver of the public transport vehicle used for the irregular transfer – for which prison system vehicles should have been used – was also injured. The Commission notes with extreme concern that, according to the version of events given by the members of the Bolivarian National Guard involved, the incident arose from an escape attempt. After expert testing was conducted, however, the Attorney General’s Office determined that the members of the National Guard were responsible, and so three of them were accused of the crimes of homicide, simulation of punishable action, and undue firearm use.[799]

884.          The Commission also received with grave concern information about the case of Mr. Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez, who was being held in the General Penitentiary of Venezuela.[800] According to what was reported to the IACHR in the context of its hearings, Mr. Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez has been missing since September 7, 2009, and the Director of that establishment had not given his family members information about his whereabouts. The victim’s father informed the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory that the Major of the National Guard had communicated with him by telephone on the night of September 8, 2009 that his son’s body would be given to him in the next several days. Additionally, he received anonymous calls from persons held in the same center informing him that his son was buried in the penitentiary. According to what the Commission was informed, in spite of the actions and denunciations before the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice, the Attorney General of the Republic, the Sixth Criminal Tribunal in the first instance for Functions of Execution of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, the Office of the Deputy Human Rights Ombudsman of the state of Guarico, and the Regional Command No. 2 Detachment 28 Second Company San Juan de los Morros, the whereabouts of Mr. Francisco Dionel Guerrero remain unknown.

885.          On November 4, 2009, in accordance with the foregoing and with the provisions of Article XIV of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, the Commission sent an urgent request for information to the State asking that it provide, within a period of 48 hours, information about the whereabouts of Mr. Guerrero Larez and his physical state, indicating the reasons that it has not been possible for his relatives to contact or visit him, and any other information related to his whereabouts and situation. On November 6, 2009, the State requested a “reasonable extension” to present the requested information. Through a communication dated November 9, 2009, the Commission granted the State an extension of 72 hours. Due to the lack of a response from the State, on November 13, 2009, the IACHR submitted a request for provisional measures to the Inter-American Court with the objective that the State protect the life and personal integrity of Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez. On November 17, 2009, the Court decided to grant provisional measures[801] and require the State to adopt immediately the measures necessary to determine the situation and whereabouts of Francisco Dionel Guerrero Larez and to protect his life and personal integrity. In its observations on the present report, the State emphasized that the Attorney General’s Office had initiated the relevant investigation.[802] As of the time this report was approved, the whereabouts of Mr. Guerrero Larez, who was in the custody of the State, remain unknown. 

886.          Weeks later, on November 28, 2009, the Inter-American Commission submitted a new request for provisional measures to the Court, this time for the State to protect the life and personal integrity of Eduardo José Natera Balboa. According to the information received by the Commission, Mr. Natera Balboa was incarcerated in the “El Dorado” Penitentiary Center of the Eastern Region, in the state of Bolívar, and his whereabouts had been unknown since November 8, 2009, when several members of the National Guard had forced him violently into a black Ford car. Since that date, his family members have tried unsuccessfully to contact him and have carried out various actions, without being able to obtain information about his situation or whereabouts.

887.          On November 20, 2009, in light of the foregoing and of that established in Article XIV of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, the Commission sent an urgent request for information to the State asking it to provide, within a period of 48 hours, information about the whereabouts of Mr. Eduardo Natera and his physical state, indicating the reasons why it has not been possible for his relatives to contact or visit him, and any other information related to his whereabouts and situation. On the same day, the State requested a “reasonable extension” to present the requested information. Through a communication of November 23, 2009, the Commission granted an extension of 24 hours. On November 23, 2009, the State reported on some internal investigations with respect to the situation of Mr. Natera, but did not provide documentation of the measures taken. The IACHR decided to request provisional measures taking into account that Mr. Natera Balboa was in State custody the last time there was any news about him and that the investigations carried out by the State did not produce the immediate results required in this type of situation. On December 1, 2009, the Court granted provisional measures[803] and ordered the State to adopt immediately the measures necessary to determine the situation and whereabouts of Mr. Eduardo José Natera Balboa and to protect his life and personal integrity. As of the date of this report, the whereabouts of Mr. Natera Balboa, who was in State custody, remained unknown.

888.          The IACHR has been closely monitoring the prison situation in Venezuela and it has made use of the measures available to it to protect the detainees affected thereby. The Commission has adopted precautionary measures, asked the Court to order provisional measures, referred cases to the Court, and asked the State for information under the authority given by Article 41 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

889.          Among other steps, in 2008, the IACHR asked the State for information, pursuant to Article 41(d) of the Convention, regarding the occurrence of violent incidents at Sabaneta Prison in the state of Zulia.[804] According to the information received by the Commission, on August 29, 2008, at least ten inmates died and 16 were injured when a fragmentation grenade belonging to a group of detainees at that prison exploded. Later, some prisoners opened up holes in the walls and entered other cells, and an exchange of gunfire took place. The Commission asked the State of Venezuela to furnish information on the outbreak of violence. The State, under an extension granted by the Commission, returned that information on October 7, 2008.[805]

890.          The State reported that on August 29, 2008, “an incident occurred at Maracaibo National Prison, also known as Sabaneta Prison, when a group of inmates were handling a fragmentation grenade in an area known as the ‘Procemil Yard,’ where members of the military awaiting trial are housed. The grenade exploded and caused the instant death of several inmates [who] were immediately taken to the Southern General Hospital in the municipality of San Francisco of the aforementioned state.” The State added that the Attorney General’s Office proceeded to verify the situation and began the pertinent investigations to cast light on the incident and identify the guilty.

891.          The IACHR’s actions to ensure the rights of Venezuelan prison inmates have also included the adoption of precautionary measures. For example, on October 31, 2005, the Commission granted precautionary measures on behalf of Raúl José Díaz Peña, regarding whom the information available indicated that he was being held at the Investigations Division of the headquarters of the Intelligence and Prevention Services Directorate (DISIP, by its Spanish acronym), El Helicode facility, in Caracas, since February 25, 2004, in cells with no natural ventilation and no natural air or light.

892.          Given the situation of the beneficiary, the IACHR asked the Venezuelan State to instruct the competent authorities to carry out medical examinations in order to assess Mr. Díaz’s health and provide him with the specialized treatment he required; to transfer Mr. Díaz to a preventive detention center, where he would be guaranteed access to decent living conditions, natural light, fresh air, and exercise; until Mr. Díaz was effectively transferred from the DISIP to a preventive custody facility, to ensure him the guarantees necessary to preserve his physical, mental, and moral integrity; and to guarantee that Mr. Díaz would face no reprisals whatsoever in connection with the remedies pursued before the inter-American human rights system.

893.          In 2008, a conviction was handed down against him. The most recent information was received on September 15, 2009, indicating that Mr. Díaz Peña remained in custody at the DISIP and, for strictly political reasons, he had been denied the prerelease benefits due to him. The information received by the IACHR also indicates that he continues to suffer from the same health conditions for which the precautionary measures were granted in October 2005. Since his arrest, Mr. Díaz Peña has lost hearing in one ear and is losing it in the other, in addition to other health problems. Consequently, as of the date of this report’s adoption, the precautionary measures extended on his behalf remain in effect. Additionally, on March 20, 2009, the Commission issued its Report No. 23/09, declaring the admissibility of the petition related to the alleged violation of Articles 5, 7, 8, and 25 of the Convention with prejudice to Mr. Díaz Peña.[806] In its observations on the present report, the State considered it opportune to note that Mr. Díaz Peña has been convicted of placing bombs in the Colombian and Spanish consulates during the events of the coup d’état of 2002.[807]

894.          In connection with prison conditions in Venezuela, on February 24, 2005, the IACHR presented the Court with an application against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on behalf of the victims of the 1992 events at the “Los Flores de Catia” Judicial Prison and Detention Center,[808] when 37 prisoners were extrajudicially executed. The Commission’s claims also dealt with the detention conditions in which the victims were held and the lack of assistance from the police, military, and prison authorities that characterized the investigation of the incident. In April 2006, the State acknowledged its international responsibility in the matter and accepted the claims put forward by the Inter-American Commission in its application and by the victims’ representatives in their requests and arguments brief. In addition, the State extended a public apology to families of the victims, a gesture that the IACHR applauded.

895.          In its judgment, the Court underscored, inter alia, the State’s obligation of preventing the recurrence of such human rights violations and, consequently, of adopting all the legal, administrative, and other measures necessary to keep similar events from occurring in the future, in compliance with its duty of prevention and of upholding the basic rights enshrined in the American Convention. The Court also ruled that the State was to adopt, within a reasonable time, the measures necessary to bring prison conditions into line with the applicable international standards.

896.          The Court also repeated to the State of Venezuela what it had ordered in a previous case:

The State must take all necessary steps […] to educate and train all members of its armed forces and its security agencies regarding principles and provisions on protection of human rights and the limits to which the use of weapons by law enforcement officials is subject, even under a state of emergency. Right to life cannot be violated to support maintenance of public order. Furthermore, the State must adjust operational plans regarding public disturbances to requirements of respect for and protection of said rights, and to this end take among other steps those required to control actions by all members of security forces in the field of operations to avoid excess. And, the State must ensure that, if it is necessary to resort to physical means to face public disturbances, members of the armed forces and security agencies will use only those strictly required to control such situations in a rational and proportional manner, respecting the right to life and to humane treatment.

897.          In August 2009, the Court noted that more than three years after it had issued judgment, it had to discover what steps had been taken by the State to comply with it, in order to assess its actual implementation, and resolved to convene a hearing.[809]

898.          In addition to its judgment in this case, at the request of the IACHR the Inter-American Court has adopted a series of provisional measures on behalf of four detention centers in Venezuela, requesting that the State take steps to avoid irreparable harm to inmates held at those facilities. All those measures were in response to violent incidents in which hundreds of people lost their lives and hundreds of others were injured.

899.          Thus, on December 29, 2005, the Commission asked the Court to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of detainees at the Monagas Judicial Prison, known as “La Pica.” The request was based on information indicating that in 2005, La Pica accounted for more than 10% of the deaths recorded in Venezuela arising from gunshot wounds, stabbings, hangings, decapitations, and dismemberments in a series of incidents that, according to the information received, involved prison personnel as well as outbreaks of violence between prisoners. On February 9, 2006, the Court resolved to order the State to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of the detainees at the Monagas Judicial Prison, “La Pica.” In subsequent orders related to these provisional measures, the Court has said that although it appreciates the actions taken by the State under the measures ordered, a situation of extreme gravity and urgency continues to exist, together with the possibility of irreparable harm to the lives and persons of inmates at the Monagas Judicial Prison.

900.          On March 28, 2006, the IACHR asked the Court to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of detainees at the Capital Region’s Yare I and Yare II Prisons. The request was based on information indicating that between January 2005 and the date of the request, a series of violent incidents had occurred at Yare Prison, with a total of 59 violent deaths from gunshot wounds, injuries caused by bladed weapons, hangings, and decapitations, along with at least 67 cases of serious injuries. The request also spoke of the failure to separate inmates awaiting trial from convicts, the lack of security and control measures, and the unacceptable conditions, which create or aggravate tension among prisoners. On March 30, 2006, the Court resolved to require the State to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of the detainees at Yare I and II. In subsequent orders related to these provisional measures, the Court has said that although it appreciates the actions taken by the State, a situation of extreme gravity and urgency continues to exist, together with the possibility of irreparable harm to the lives and persons of inmates at the Capital Region’s Yare I and Yare II Prisons.

901.          In addition, on February 1, 2007, the Commission sent the Court a request for provisional measures in order for Venezuela to protect the lives and persons of detainees at the Center-West Region Prison, known as “Uribana,” and of people entering that facility, including inmates’ families and other visitors. The request was on account of information according to which between January 2006 and January 2007, outbreaks of violence at Uribana Prison led to a total of 80 violent deaths and 213 injuries, mostly caused by bladed weapons and firearms. The IACHR also noted that it was clear that the establishment lacked a proper security control system and that an atmosphere of violence prevailed, since the prison population was being watched by eight officers, giving a ratio of 181 inmates per guard. It also stressed the unacceptable conditions in which the prisoners were living. On February 2, 2007, the Court resolved to order the State to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of the detainees at the Center-West Region Prison, of any future inmates upon admission to that facility, of the people who work there, and of those afforded entry as visitors. It additionally ordered the State to adopt the relevant measures to bring conditions at Uribana Prison into line with the international provisions governing the treatment of prison inmates.

902.          Similarly, on December 17, 2007, the IACHR asked the Court to adopt provisional measures to protect the lives and persons of the detainees being held at the El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Prisons in the Capital Region. The request arose from observations of the IACHR indicating that during 2006, 86 inmates had been killed and 198 had been injured in various outbreaks of violence, together with 51 inmates killed and 101 injured in 2007, indicating to the Commission the existence of a most serious situation of insecurity and violence inside the facility. On February 8, 2008, the Inter-American Court resolved to order the Venezuelan State to adopt provisional measures on behalf of all the inmates being held at the Capital Region’s El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Prison, along with other people entering that facility, including inmates’ families and other visitors, to protect their lives and persons and, in particular, to prevent injuries and violent deaths. Since the provisional measures were ordered, the Commission has been keeping the Court apprised of continued outbreaks of violence at the facility that have led to additional deaths and injuries.[810]

903.          The Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court will continue to conduct regular monitoring of the situation at these four prisons. The Commission notes with alarm that in spite of the provisional measures ordered by the Court, the prisons continue to report outbreaks of violence leading to losses of life and violations of physical integrity.[811] Thus, according to the Venezuelan Prisons Observatory, figures for violent deaths and injuries at those facilities remain high even after the Inter-American Court’s adoption of provisional measures:[812]

904.          In the IACHR’s opinion, the continuing acts of violence, together with the ongoing absence of security and control mechanisms, indicate that the Venezuelan State has not fully complied with its obligation of preventing attacks on the lives and persons of prison inmates and that it has failed to adopt the security measures needed to prevent new outbreaks of violence from affecting prisoners. In addition, the Commission notes that prison inmates in Venezuela are often forced to live in conditions that constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, affecting their physical and mental integrity. Moreover, the alarming figures for deaths and injuries affecting hundreds of inmates indicate the State’s negligence in meeting its obligations as the guarantor of the rights of people held in its custody.

905.          The Commission believes that the urgency and imminence of the situation at Venezuela’s prisons requires the Venezuelan State to take actions with an immediate impact on the dangers faced by detainees held in state custody. In consideration of this, the IACHR urges the State to immediately adopt the measures necessary to bring detention conditions at Venezuelan prison facilities into line with international standards, and to take immediate actions, in addition to its plans for the medium or long term, to ensure the lives and persons of prison inmates in Venezuela.

906.           The Commission records its concern over the situation of insecurity and violence in Venezuelan prisons and at the failure to ensure the rights of persons held at those facilities, and it will therefore continue to closely monitor the situation and the actions taken by the State to resolve it.

3.         Impunity in Cases of Prison Violence

907.          In addition to the violence itself, the IACHR is concerned about the impunity that surrounds outbreaks of violence in Venezuela’s prisons. The Commission disapproves of the State’s refusal, arguing the confidential nature of the investigations,[813] to respond to the Commission’s inquiry regarding how many cases of prison violence involving losses of inmates’ lives it has resolved through the courts.[814]

908.          The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman has also expressed its concern about this impunity and about the absence of information on investigations conducted into outbreaks of violence within prisons. As an example of this, the Ombudsman’s Office reported that during 2008, two videos were published on the Internet, showing how one inmate was mistreated and sexually abused, and how another had one of his arms chopped off; the incidents allegedly took place at the Vista Hermosa Judicial Prison in Bolívar, and there is no information about any investigations having been opened to examine them.[815]

909.          In fact, the Commission has received no information indicating that any of the thousands of deaths and injuries that have taken place inside Venezuela’s prisons have been cleared up by the courts, which indicates that the actions of the authorities charged with investigating such incidents have been inadequate in properly clarifying the historical truth, identifying responsibilities, and convicting the guilty.

910.          As the Inter-American Court has said, states must adopt all necessary measures to establish an effective legal system to investigate, punish, and redress deprivation of life by state officials or private individuals.[816] Similarly, upon learning that members of the security forces have used firearms with lethal consequences, the State must immediately initiate a rigorous, impartial, and effective investigation on an ex officio basis.^[817]

911.          In the Commission’s view, when the State fails to combat such situations with all means at its disposal, it is encouraging the chronic repetition of human rights violations. In all those cases in which the authorities’ failure to conduct investigations has meant that the causes of a prison inmate’s death have not been clearly established and the perpetrators or masterminds have not been identified, the State has failed in its obligation of protecting the right to life of the people affected.

912.          The Commission therefore emphatically calls on the State to take all the steps available to it to conduct a serious and effective investigation of the violent incidents that have taken place within Venezuelan prisons, as part of its obligation of preventing similar incidents from continuing to occur and violating the rights of prisoners.

913.          Finally, the IACHR reiterates that the State is obliged to guarantee the unrestricted respect for the human rights of all persons deprived of liberty in detention centers throughout the country. In order to orient the public policies on this matter, the Commission recommends the State to take particularly into account the “Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas,” adopted by the IACHR in March 2008.^[818]

C.         Violence against women

914.          Regarding the situation of women in general, the State has stressed that the Venezuelan Constitution enshrines the equal rights of men and women in all walks of life: within the family; at work; in political, social, community, and economic participation; and other areas. The State also maintains that the Constitution sees women as social subjects using gender-aware language from its preamble to its final provisions and that it recognizes both the economic and social worth of work in the home and women’s sexual and reproductive rights.[819] Likewise, the Commission has received information indicating significant progress in promoting political participation by women in public affairs in Venezuela.

915.          Based on the information received, however, the IACHR sees that women are still victims of violence in Venezuela and that the laws and policies introduced by the State in this area have not been effective in ensuring the rights of women, particularly their right to a life free from violence.

1.                  Legal Framework for the Protection of Women from Violence

916.          The State has told the Commission that in Venezuela, both the Constitution and the nation’s laws “have adopted a view of equality between men and women, in which women are made visible through non-sexist language and by guaranteeing their rights.” The State also maintains that the Venezuelan legal framework recognizes, promotes, and protects women’s human rights through different legal instruments.[820]

917.          The State told the IACHR that as part of a resolved policy to include women in roles of leadership and joint responsibility in the country’s economic, cultural, political, and social development, over the period 2004 to 2008 it enacted a series of legal instruments with provisions that strengthen the full development and progress of women, and that also ensure their access to justice when at risk of discrimination at work, within society, and in all areas in which they are active, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution and the applicable international conventions.[821]

918.          The State pointed to the passage of the Organic Law on Prevention and Working Conditions and Environment, which protects maternity, health, and security at work, together with leaves of absence to protect the health of workers of both sexes in situations that could affect their physical integrity.

919.          The State also reported on the amendments to the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents. According to the information received, these amendments included the enshrining of decent treatment as a human right, which covers a violence-free upbringing and education; principles of gender equality were also incorporated, in addition to reforms intended to balance the rights and duties of fathers and mothers vis-à-vis their children.[822]

920.          With particular reference to violence against women, the State spoke of the enactment of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free from Violence.[823] The State believes that this law is the most advanced legislation on the topic in Latin America, and that it breaks with the view whereby violence against women is seen as a private matter to make it a matter of public concern (res publica). According to the State, the law criminalizes all forms of gender-based violence, regardless of where they take place, including: psychological violence, harassment, threats, physical violence, domestic violence, sexual violence, violent sexual access, forced prostitution, sexual slavery, sexual harassment, violence in the workplace, violence against property, economic violence, obstetric violence, forced sterilization, media violence, institutional violence, symbolic violence, the smuggling of women, girls, and adolescents, and trafficking in women, girls, and adolescents.

921.          According the State, the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free from Violence ensures women access to justice and it enshrines comprehensive protection for women who are victims of violence in the public and private arenas, equal rights between men and women, the protection of women who are particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence, and the right of women victims of violence to receive full information and counseling appropriate to their personal situations through the services, agencies, or offices that the federal, state, and municipal administrations are obliged to set up. The State also reports that this law establishes joint social responsibility in reporting and eradicating violence against women.[824] It also establishes specific functions for the National Women’s Institute and for the National Ombudsman’s Office for Women’s Rights.

922.          The Commission values the fact that the Venezuelan legislation contains a prohibition on corporal punishment of children, included in the Law on Partial Reform of the Organic Law on the Protection of Children and Adolescents,[825] making it one of the three OAS Member States that have adopted laws that specifically prohibit corporal punishment of children and adolescents.

923.          At the same time, the Commission notes with concern that the Penal Code of Venezuela still contains some norms that affect women’s right to equality and, even worse, that permit violent crimes committed against women to remain in impunity when the offender marries the woman. For example, Article 395 of the Venezuelan Penal Code establishes that “[o]ne who is guilty of one of the crimes defined in Articles 375, 376, 377, 379, 388, 389 and 390 will be exempt from punishment if before the conviction he marries the offended person, and the trial will cease in relation to everything related to the corresponding penalty for these punishable acts. If the marriage takes place after the conviction, the execution of the penalties and their criminal law consequences will cease. Those guilty of seduction, rape, or abduction shall be sentenced, by civil indemnization, if they do not get married, to endow the offended party if she was single or widowed and, in any event, honest.  […].”  

924.          Among the crimes referred to in Article 395 of the Penal Code are rape; seduction; prostitution or corruption of minors; offenses against modesty; committing a sexual act with a person over twelve and under sixteen years of age; and inducing, facilitating, or assisting prostitution or corruption of a minor. The Commission considers norms such as this one severely prejudice the enjoyment of women’s human rights and permits acts of violence against them to remain in impunity. For this reason, the IACHR recommends that these regulations be eliminated from the Penal Code and that the legislation be adapted to the international human rights standards on the rights of women. 

2.         State policies and programs to prevent violence against women

925.            Asked about its plans and programs adopted to prevent and punish violence against women, the State informed the Commission that women have several mechanisms available for asserting their rights in Venezuela. One of those mechanisms, in the State’s view, is the National Women’s Institute, which is a permanent body tasked with determining, overseeing, and evaluating policies and other matters related to the situation and condition of women.[826]

926.          Another mechanism is the National Ombudsman’s Office for Women, the creation of which was ordered by the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women. This agency’s functions include representing women before judicial and nonjudicial bodies, researching and drafting legislative bills to ensure full exercise of their capacities and full enjoyment of their citizenship, drafting legislation to ensure the full democratic exercise of rights and duties within the family, proposing amendments to laws in force that discriminate against women, proposing positive measures to enable authentic and effective social conduct without discrimination, supporting women in filing reports of violence, and guiding women in asserting their rights before the competent bodies.[827]

927.          One additional mechanism, according to the State, is the Women’s Development Bank, the aims of which include strengthening the social economy with a gender perspective and incorporating women into economic development and its benefits in order to improve their quality of life by providing them with tools for developing their productive capacities. According to the information submitted to the IACHR by the State, this institution has promoted women’s empowerment, has encouraged and strengthened grassroots organizations and networks for women, and has also bolstered their participation in the development of public policies at the local level.[828]

928.          Similarly, among its mechanisms for enforcing the rights of women, the State noted that the National Women’s Institute has worked for the creation of 16 State Women’s Institutes, 29 Municipal Institutes, and 63 Women’s Homes, the functions of which are similar to those of the National Women’s Institute. The State also added that nationwide, it has created 29 courts – 20 control courts and nine trial courts – in addition to 52 Special Prosecutors’ Offices for matters affecting women. In addition, the State spoke of the creation of the Permanent Commission on the Family, Women, and Youth, attached to the National Assembly.[829]

929.          According to the State’s information, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman also created the Special Ombudsman’s Office for Women,[830] which is responsible for designing, promoting, programming, coordinating, and executing actions and policies to assist in eradicating all forms of discrimination and violence against women and in protecting and defending women’s human rights [831]

930.          Another mechanism for protecting the rights of women, according to the information furnished by the State, was the March 2008 creation of the Office of the Minister of State for Women’s Affairs. The creation of this office was a decision of the President of the Republic “in response to the demands of women who, for a long time, had been requesting the existence of a ministry of women’s affairs.”[832] According to the information received, this office was restyled the Ministry of Popular Power for Women and Gender Equality on April 2, 2009.[833]

931.          At the same, regarding the mechanisms that exist to ensure at-risk women access to justice, the State reported that the Supreme Court of Justice has created first-instance courts that are responsible for dealing with cases of violence against women. In addition, 52 prosecutors’ offices with jurisdiction over gender violence at the national level were created. According to the State, the National Ombudsman’s Office for Women’s Rights, attached to the National Women’s Institute, provides free legal assistance to women who are victims of violence, assisting them in the process from the filing of their complaints up to the conclusion of legal proceedings.[834]

932.          The State also reported that the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free from Violence expands the mechanisms whereby complaints can be filed, to include family members, health system personnel, community councils, and any person or agency that learns that punishable acts of violence against women have been committed.[835]

933.          The State also reported the implementation of a toll-free, confidential telephone service for women (0800Mujeres). Using that telephone line, the State attends to women, men, children, adolescents, the elderly, and members of any family group or socioeconomic level who become victims of violence; it provides them with psychological assistance and answers their queries about their rights and the laws that protect them.[836] The Report on the Administration of the National Women’s Institute states that between January and October 2008, this telephone hotline attended to 22,500 people.

934.          In addition, the State also said that at the national level, it has two Shelter Homes, intended to provide refuge to women who cannot remain in their homes on account of imminent threats to their persons. The Report on the Administration of the National Women’s Institute indicates that between January and October 2008, the lives of 77 at-risk women and children of both sexes were saved by affording them protection at these Shelter Homes.

935.          The State also reported that a project prepared by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is training officials from the agencies responsible for receiving complaints, to strengthen their understanding of the legal and institutional framework governing women’s rights. The Supreme Court of Justice, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the prefectures are collaborating on this project. The Community Councils are also involved, as correspondents for the reporting of cases of violence.[837]

936.          It also reported that the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps has a Division of Investigations and Protection for Children, Adolescents, Women, and the Family, which receives, plans, and coordinates allegations of crimes against the physical, mental, and moral integrity of children, adolescents, women, and families in order to uphold their rights set out in the Constitution and in the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents.[838]

937.          Finally, the State reported that through a social program called the “Misión Madres del Barrio” (“Neighborhood Mothers Mission”), it has recognized the worth of work done in the home and has provided comprehensive attention to women and families living in conditions of extreme poverty by providing them with economic benefits equal to the minimum national wage and by giving them training. It explained that the financial benefits are turned off once the beneficiaries have been duly trained.

3.         Situation of Violence against Women and Domestic Violence

938.          In response to the request that the IACHR sent to the State in July 2009, asking it to return statistical data covering violence against women and domestic violence over the past five years,[839] the State submitted statistics covering the year 2002. In reply to a later question, the State briefly noted that the courts for violence against women had received 66,000 complaints, although it did not specify over what period of time.[840] In connection with this, the IACHR notes that the figures provided by the State clearly do not reflect the current situation in Venezuela, and they cannot be used to assess the effectiveness of its laws and the programs it has implemented for preventing violence against women.

939.          Thus, the information submitted by the State to the IACHR merely indicates that in 2002, the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps processed 8,411 cases of violence against women, and the 0800Mujeres hotline received 3,119 calls reporting various manifestations of violence. Since this service was launched, most of the complaints it has received deal with acts of physical violence against women. The State’s information also indicates that 38% of the women attended to by the National Ombudsman’s Office for Women’s Rights were seeking consultations related to acts of violence. Similarly, the Capital District’s Civic Bureaus dealt with 30,671 consultations involving different forms of domestic violence.[841]

940.          The only more recent statistics provided by the State indicate that from 1999 to December 2007, the 0800Mujeres telephone service received a total of 29,168 calls involving cases of violence, of which 4,484 were made during 2007. Of these cases, 42.34% involved allegations of physical violence, 14.41% involved legal inquiries, 5.92% were seeking primary psychological attention, and 7.75% received general information. The State also reported that 87.51% of these cases involved domestic violence and 12.49% involved violence originating outside the family.[842]

941.          At the same time, the IACHR was also informed that during 2007, the Shelter Houses attended to 100 women and their dependents who had received death threats.[843] The Report on the Administration of the National Women’s Institute also indicates that between January and October 2008, the National Ombudsman’s Office dealt with 4,172 cases involving the different forms of violence provided for in the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free from Violence. Similarly, during 2008, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman attended to a total of 752 cases related to the right of women to a life free from violence; of these, 509 involved domestic violence, 115 dealt with the right to psychological integrity, and 60 dealt with the right to physical integrity, among other issues.[844]

942.          In contrast, according to information from the Venezuelan Observatory on the Rights of Women, around 100 cases involving gender violence take place in Venezuela every day.[845] According to this organization, although Venezuelan women have attained moderate and high levels of education, those achievements are not reflected in their participation in the work force, since they either remain outside it or are engaged in the poorest paying jobs. It also claims that the low coverage of child-care services for children under four years of age, violence outside the family, and the burgeoning levels of violence on the streets of the country’s main cities keep women at home, where they do unskilled work and jobs traditionally seen as “feminine.” According to the Venezuelan Observatory on the Rights of Women, in spite of the government’s equality discourse, there are large numbers of women at the lower levels of the public administration, and this percentage decreases upwards into high-level decision-making positions and candidacies for popularly-elected office. All these factors contribute to the situation of insecurity and violence that affects women.

943.          It should be noted that violence against women is not limited to the domestic arena. According to information received by the IACHR at its hearings, murders of women in Venezuela are on the increase. Thus, during the first quarter of 2008, 37 women were murdered in the city of Caracas. Less than half of those were a result of domestic violence.[846]

944.          Nongovernmental organizations working with gender violence in Venezuela report that in 2005 there were 36,777 cases of violence against women, but they underscore the lack of available official figures on this problem.[847] According to these organizations, in addition to the problems in obtaining figures on violence against women, those statistics are ultimately worthless, not because they are wrong, but because they are not reliable, in that they change from agency to agency and repeat figures from previous years. Moreover, the organizations claim that in some states, such as Lara, publishing information with qualitative or quantitative data on violence against women is expressly prohibited. These organizations agree on the need to facilitate access to centralized figures that enable the dimensions of the problem to be perceived.

945.          The IACHR notes that the State has taken action to establish a legal framework that respects and guarantees the equality of women and their right to a life free from violence, and it acknowledges that the State has created plans and programs to prevent violence against women in Venezuela. However, the absence of official information prevents the Commission from analyzing whether the laws are being effectively enforced by the authorities or whether the programs in place are having a real impact on the right of women to a life free from violence, and so the IACHR is unable to assess the steps taken by the State to address this topic.

4.                  Impunity in cases of violence against women

946.          From the information on investigations into cases of violence against women and on the punishments imposed on the perpetrators, the IACHR notes that according to information furnished by the State, judgments have been handed down in only a third of such cases brought before the courts: the State informed the Commission that of the 66,000 complaints of violence against women received by the courts, sentences have been imposed in only 22,000.[848]

947.          At the same time, information from the Venezuelan Attorney General’s Office indicates that its prosecutors’ offices have admitted a total of 58,421 cases of violence against women, of which they have concluded only 2,165.[849] This information agrees with the claims made by the nongovernmental organizations attached to the Venezuelan Observatory on the Human Rights of Women, whereby only a small fraction of the cases reported to the Attorney General’s Office make it to the courts and, of that number, only a minority are punished.

948.          Even more troubling is the information received by the Commission at its hearings, stating that trials have not begun in more than 98% of cases involving violence against women, and that almost 70% of the women who attempt to fight this impunity encounter harassment and threats.[850] Finally, the information from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman regarding the agencies responsible for receiving complaints is also discouraging. According to information from that agency, “there are numerous complaints from victims alleging a reluctance to receive them, and even cases of mistreatment, because of insensitivity or apathy in the attention given, which is often the result of particular considerations. This takes place both in the administrative agencies and in the prosecutors’ offices of the Attorney General’s Office.”[851] This violates the victims’ right to have their complaints heard and investigated but, in addition, it has the effect of discouraging or even intimidating other victims from reporting acts of violence to the authorities.

949.          In consideration of the foregoing, the IACHR calls upon the State to adopt the legal and institutional mechanisms suitable for preventing, investigating, punishing, and making amends for complaints of violence against women in Venezuela. The IACHR also urges the State to publish statistical data to enable a serious assessment of the situation of violence against women in Venezuela to be carried out.

D.         Recommendations

950.          To effectively enforce the State’s duty of guaranteeing the rights to life and to humane treatment, the Commission recommends that Venezuela:

1.         Implement appropriate mechanisms to prevent crime and violations of the right to life and humane treatment, thereby ensuring citizen security for all the inhabitants of Venezuela.

2.                  Establish coherent and preventive state public policies that study the structural causes of violence and high crime rates and that aim at combating them.

3.                  Provide the police agencies charged with law enforcement with the resources and capacities necessary for maintaining public order within the constraints of full respect for human rights.

4.                  Ensure that the use of force by state security forces is determined by considerations of exceptionality and proportionality.

5.                  Take urgent and necessary steps to dismantle the violent groups operating beyond the law, and punish the illegal actions of those groups to prevent the reoccurrence of similar incidents in the future.

6.                  Introduce the legislative amendments necessary to ensure that the Armed Forces do not participate in public security activities and that when they do so, in exceptional circumstances, they are subordinated to civilian authorities. In particular, amend Articles 328 and 329 of the Constitution, Article 3 of the Organic Law of the National Armed Forces, and Article 20 of the Organic National Security Law.

7.                  Also, amend all those provisions that enable the Bolivarian National Militia to participate in matters of domestic security.

8.                  Properly criminalize the offense of torture in its domestic law in accordance with the terms of the Fourth Transitory Provision of the Constitution, through either a specific law or an amendment of the Penal Code.

9.                  Adopt all the measures necessary to ensure due diligence and effectiveness in investigations as well as in imposing the corresponding administrative, disciplinary, and criminal sanctions, both against persons accused of committing common crimes that affect the safety of citizens and against members of state security forces who abuse their authority to the detriment of the population.

10.              Step up efforts to investigate and punish human rights violations committed by state agents, and, consequently, dismiss those who participate in such incidents and prohibit them from rejoining the public security forces or from assuming any other public position.

11.              Step up efforts to train the members of state security forces in human rights issues, and implement mechanisms for punishing and dismissing any members thereof involved in human rights violations during the performance of their duties.

12.              Implement the corrective measures necessary to separate the Scientific, Criminal, and Criminalistic Investigations Corps from the hierarchy and administrative structure of the Ministry of Popular Power for the Interior and Justice.

13.              Take the steps necessary to combat the structural impunity that affects the Venezuelan justice system, using all available methods to overcome the obstacles that have previously kept it from establishing the truth and identifying the physical perpetrators and the masterminds, to impose the applicable sanctions, and to provide reparations for the victims and/or their families, as appropriate.

951.          To ensure the rights to life and humane treatment of people deprived of their liberty in Venezuela, the Commission recommends that the State:

1.         Take the steps necessary to halt illegal arrests, together with the mistreatment of detainees, holding them incommunicado, and other violations of due process that may arise during detention.

2.         Properly investigate complaints of arbitrary arrests in Venezuela, and punish the guilty.

3.         Adopt the judicial, legislative, and other measures needed to correct the excessive use of preventive custody, thereby ensuring that this measure is used only on an exceptional basis and is constrained by the principles of legality, presumption of innocence, need, and proportionality.

4.         Adopt, on an urgent basis, the measures necessary to correct delays at trial and address the high percentage of people without convictions held in prisons. Among other measures that the State deems relevant, rules should be introduced whereby all detainees not sentenced within a reasonable time must be released, without prejudice to the continuation of the prosecution.

5.         Take steps to reduce overcrowding in prisons and to bring detention conditions into line with the applicable international standards.

6.         Ensure that detention conditions are effectively controlled by criminal execution judges or by trial judges, as appropriate.

7.         Implement suitable and effective judicial remedies of an individual and collective nature for judicial oversight of overcrowding and violence at prisons, and facilitate access to those remedies by inmates, their families, their private or court-appointed attorneys, nongovernmental organizations, and other state agencies with competence in the area.

8.         Establish effective systems to ensure that inmates awaiting trial are separated from convicts, and create mechanisms to classify inmates by sex, age, reason for imprisonment, special needs, and the treatment they are to receive.

9.         Take the steps necessary to prevent attacks on the lives and persons of people held in prisons, including confiscating weapons and illicit substances in the possession of inmates and separating remand prisoners from convicts.

10.       Adopt the measures necessary to guarantee that personnel in detention facilities do not use force and other coercive measures except under exceptional circumstances and in a proportional manner in serious cases of urgency and necessity, as a last resort after having exhausted other available means and for the time and to the extent necessary to guarantee safety, internal order, and the protection of the fundamental rights of the prison population, the personnel, and the visitors. 

11.       Conduct serious and effective investigations into outbreaks of violence occurring within Venezuelan prisons and punish the guilty, to break the cycle of impunity. In addition, study the structural causes of violence inside prisons and adopt the measures necessary to address them.

12.       Establish specialized recruitment and training programs for all personnel responsible for the administration, supervision, operation, and security of prisons and other detention centers, including instruction in the international human rights provisions applicable to maintaining security and to ensuring the proportionate use of force and the humane treatment of people deprived of their freedom.

13.       Ensure, through all means available to it, the enjoyment of all basic rights by people held in detention.

14.       Guide its public policies on this matter in light of the “Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas”.

952.          To guarantee the rights to life and humane treatment of women and, in particular, their right to a life without violence, the Commission recommends that the State:

1.         Effectively enforce the current national laws and the public policies in existence for protecting women against acts of violence and discrimination.

2.         Implement the measures necessary to ensure women victims of violence full access to adequate judicial protection, and adopt the legal, judicial, and other mechanisms necessary to investigate, punish, and provide redress for reports of violence against women in Venezuela.

3.         Strengthen the institutional capacity of its judicial agencies in addressing the cycle of impunity surrounding cases of violence against women, through effective criminal investigations with due judicial follow-up and guarantees of appropriate punishments and redress.

4.         Step up efforts to train all public officials, particularly those responsible for receiving complaints, on the rights of women and on the causes and consequences of domestic and gender-based violence, to ensure that they apply national and international provisions in duly prosecuting those offenses and that they respect the integrity and dignity of the victims and their families in reporting such incidents and during their participation in the legal proceedings.

5.         Implement publicity campaigns, targeting the general population, on the duty of respecting the rights of women in the civil, political, economic, social, cultural, sexual, and reproductive fields; on the services and judicial remedies available to women whose rights have been violated; and on the legal consequences applicable to the perpetrators.

6.         Create and improve systems for recording statistical and qualitative data on incidents involving violence against women within its systems for the administration of justice, ensuring their uniformity, reliability, and transparency.

7.         Bring Article 395 of the Penal Code into compliance with the standards of the inter-American human rights system with respect to women’s rights.