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       REPORT
      Nº 62/01   I         
      SUMMARY  1.                
      On May 20, 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
      (hereinafter “the Commission” or “the IACHR”) received a petition
      filed by Corporación Colectivo de Abogados “José Alvear
      Restrepo” (hereinafter “the petitioners”) against the Republic
      of Colombia (hereinafter “the State”, “the State of Colombia”, or
      “Colombia”) alleging that on April 7, 1991, members of the army
      collaborated with a group of armed plain-clothesmen in the execution of
      Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez, María
      Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César
      Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino, Celso Mario
      Molina, Rita Edelia de Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, Luz Edelsy
      Tusarma Salazar, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano (hereinafter “the victims”)
      in the municipality of Riofrío, Department of Valle del Cauca, Colombia,
      and in the concealment of the massacre.  2.                
      The petitioners alleged that the State is responsible for
      violations of the rights to life, humane treatment, and a fair trial
      established in Articles 4, 5, 8, and 25 of the American Convention on
      Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention”). The State
      presented information on the investigation of the events and the
      proceedings instituted in domestic courts (mainly within military
      jurisdiction) against members of the army alleged to be responsible. As to
      the admissibility of the case, the petitioners alleged that judicial
      remedies made available by the State do not meet the standards established
      in the American Convention with respect to judicial protection and that
      therefore the exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies permitted
      pursuant to Article 46(2) of the American Convention apply. 3.                
      After analyzing the allegations of the parties, the Commission
      declared the case admissible and found that the State of Colombia was
      responsible for violating the right to life (Article 4) in the cases of
      Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez, María
      Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César
      Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Celso Mario Molina, Rita Edelia de
      Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano; the right
      to life in conjunction with the rights of the child (Article 19) in the
      case of Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino and Luz Edelsy Tusarma Salazar; the
      right to humane treatment (Article 5) in the case of Hugo Cedeño Lozano,
      Miguel Ladino, Cenaida Ladino, Ricardo Molina Solarte, and Celso Mario
      Molina Sauza, and the rights to a fair trial and judicial protection
      (Articles 8 and 25) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the American
      Convention in the case of the victims and their families.  II.
      PROCESSING BY THE COMMISSION
      4.                
      On July 26, 1996, the Commission opened case 11.654 and forwarded
      the relevant sections of the complaint to the State of Colombia, granting
      it a period of 90-days in which to present information. The State gave its
      response on September 26, 1996, and this was duly forwarded to the
      petitioners. On December 9, 1996, the petitioners presented their
      observations, and these in turn were conveyed to the State.  5.                
      On March 3, 1997, during the Commission’s 95th regular
      session, a hearing attended by both parties was held. During the hearing,
      the petitioners presented additional information, which was duly forwarded
      to the State and the possibility of seeking a friendly settlement was
      discussed.  6.                
      On August 7 and October 7, 1997, the petitioners furnished further
      information, which was duly forwarded to the State. In a note dated
      October 15, 1997, the Commission placed itself at the disposal of the
      parties with a view to finding a friendly settlement in accordance with
      Articles 48(1)(f) of the Convention and Articles 45(1) and (2) of its
      Regulations.  7.                
      On October 8, 1997, a second hearing attended by both parties was
      held during the Commission’s 97th regular session. At the
      hearing the petitioners furnished additional information in writing, which
      was forwarded to the State of Colombia. On November 11, 1997, the State
      requested an extension of 30 days to present its comments, and the
      extension was granted.  8.                
      On January 10, 1998, the petitioners gave their response to the
      Commission’s offer of a possible friendly settlement of the matter and
      their response was forwarded to the State. On March 31, 1998, the State
      requested an extension in which to prepare its response. The petitioners
      provided further information to the Commission that was forwarded to the
      State of Colombia on September 10, 1998. On September 28, 1998, the State
      furnished additional information. On October 7, 1998, the petitioners
      asked the Commission to consider the attempt to seek a friendly settlement
      concluded in light of the State’s failure to respond to their proposal.  III.
      POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 
      A.               
      Position of the petitioners 
      9.                
      The petitioners allege that agents of the State sponsored,
      permitted, and covered up with impunity the extrajudicial executions of
      Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez, María
      Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César
      Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino, Celso Mario
      Molina, Rita Edelia de Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, Luz Edelsy
      Tusarma Salazar, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano.  10.            
      Specifically, they allege that on October 5, 1993, at approximately
      5:30 in the morning, a group of armed men, some of whom were wearing
      military uniforms, appeared in the village of El Bosque, in the district
      of Portugal de Piedras, Municipality of Riofrío, Valle del Cauca.
      When they got there, they forcibly removed a number of residents from
      their homes and took them to the school in the village of San Juan
      Bosco for questioning on the whereabouts of the members of armed
      dissident groups that were supposed to frequent the area.  11.            
      They maintain that most of the residents were released, but that
      the following individuals, Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio
      Ladino Ramírez, María Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez,
      Julio César Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino,
      Celso Mario Molina, Rita Edelia de Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina,
      Luz Edelsy Tusarma Salazar, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano were taken to the home
      of Mr. Javier Ladino at approximately 8:30 a.m. where they were tortured
      and, at approximately 10:00 a.m. that same day, were executed.  12.            
      The petitioners allege that the armed men remained in the vicinity
      until approximately 10:30 a.m. when members of the Urban Antiterrorist
      Squad (PAU) of the Palacé Battalion of the Third Army Brigade arrived.
      The army personnel are said to have simulated an armed engagement with the
      occupants of the house, who had by then been killed. To accomplish this,
      they fired several rounds of bullets and used explosive devices.
      Immediately afterwards, they changed the scene of the crime around, moving
      the bodies and placing different types of firearms next to the victims.  13.            
      The petitioners affirm that, after the mock engagement, Lt. Col.
      Luis Felipe Becerra Bohórquez, Commander of the Palacé Artillery
      Battalion, and Brigadier General Rafael Fernández López, Commander of
      the Third Brigade, released a statement through the media, reporting that,
      as part of operation “Destructor”,   Army
      units had killed in a skirmish 13 guerrillas known to belong to the
      “Luis Carlos Cárdenas” wing of the self-proclaimed National
      Liberation Army (ELN), and had seized weapons. The army suffered no
      casualties.[1]  The
      petitioners are of the view that these statements confirm the intention to
      cover up acts perpetrated by illegal groups acting with the consent of
      agents of the State.  14.            
      The petitioners allege that these events constitute violations of
      the right to life and humane treatment recognized in Articles 4 and 5 of
      the American Convention. Also, at the hearing held during the 95th
      regular session, they indicated that these acts contravene the provisions
      of common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Agreements and Article 2 of the
      Second Additional Protocol of these Treaties. 
      At that time, the petitioners also argued that Dora Estela Gaviria
      Ladino and Luz Edelsy Tusarma Salazar were minors and that their execution
      therefore violated Article 19 of the American Convention.  15.            
      The petitioners also maintain that the State has failed to fulfill
      its obligation to offer proper judicial protection to the families of the
      victims in accordance with Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.
      In this regard, they note that, on October 5, 1993, the Criminal
      Investigation Unit of the Buga Prosecutor’s Office removed the bodies
      and examined the scene of the crime. The bodies were taken to the Buga
      Forensic Medicine facility for autopsies to determine the cause of death.[2].
      At the same time, on October 6, 1993, the 106th Military
      Criminal Pretrial Court, attached to the Third Brigade, which sits in
      Bogota, opened an investigation and established the legal status of those
      implicated in the events--Major Eduardo Delgado Carrillo, Lt. Alfonso Vega
      Garzón, Capt. Leopoldo Moreno Rincón, Corporal Second Class Alexander Cañizalez
      Nuñez, and 30 soldiers. The Court did not impose any security measures
      against these individuals since no criminal conduct or cover up was
      considered to have occurred. The Commander of the Third Brigade, in his
      capacity as Judge of First Instance, ordered that the pretrial proceedings
      be moved to the 17th Military Criminal Pretrial Court sitting
      in the city of Cali. On August 4, 1994, the court issued preventive
      cautionary measures against Lt. Col. Becerra Bohórquez on suspicion of
      the crime of concealment. On March 30, 1995, the Court officially changed
      the preventive cautionary measures to recognizance.  16.            
      The Cali Prosecutor’s Office ordered a formal investigation to
      begin on November 4, 1994, following which warrants were issued for the
      arrest of members of the army[3]
      and a civilian, Arturo de Jesús Herrera Saldarriaga. In response, the
      Third Army Brigade filed a motion of conflict of jurisdiction, a motion
      that was upheld by the Superior Council of the Judiciary on March 30,
      1995, on grounds that the events under investigation were a military
      matter. Once the proceedings had been referred to military jurisdiction,
      on June 29, 1995, the Commander of the Third Brigade revoked the order for
      the arrest of Lt. Col. Becerra Bohórquez, with instructions that the
      investigation continue.  17.            
      On July 28, 1995, the Military Criminal Pretrial Court, at the
      request of counsel for the defense, changed the charge from multiple
      homicide to concealment and accordingly decided to impose recognizance
      only, and ordered that those charged be released. On September 4, 1995,
      the Military Criminal Pretrial Court closed the investigation.  18.            
      On September 25, 1995, the agent of the Attorney General's Office (Ministerio
      Público) asked that proceedings against all of the military personnel
      implicated in the case be dismissed because they were not considered to be
      responsible for concealment of a crime. On November 24, 1995, the
      Commander of the Third Brigade in his capacity as Judge of First Instance
      denied the petition filed by the agent of the Attorney General’s Office.
      This decision was appealed by the accused and on November 27, 1996, the
      Superior Military Court declared the proceedings null and void because the
      courts had previously ordered the investigation closed on grounds that
      there were “serious gaps in the investigations” in the pretrial
      discovery proceedings.  19.            
      On July 30, 1997, the 17th Military Criminal Pretrial
      Court issued a provisional ruling on the legal status of Lt. Col. Becerra
      Bohórquez and Major Delgado Carrillo, ordering that they be held in
      preventive detention on suspicion of falsifying public documents in
      conjunction with charges of concealment. It did not issue preventive
      cautionary measures against Lt. Col. Becerra Bohórquez on the charges of
      extortion, bribery, and homicide on grounds that the charges were without
      merit. This decision was appealed unsuccessfully by the civil parties to
      the proceedings.[4]  20.            
      On October 8, 1998, Lt. Col. Becerra Bohórquez was sentenced by
      the Court of First Instance to 12 months of detention for the crime of
      concealment but was acquitted of the charges of homicide, extortion, and
      bribery. Major Delgado Carrillo was sentenced to nine months of detention
      for the same crime, and all charges of concealment against the other
      accused were dismissed.  21.            
      On the basis of these proceedings, the petitioners consider that
      the State has failed to fulfill its obligation to provide due judicial
      protection to the families of the victims in accordance with the standards
      of the Convention.[5]
      They allege that the decision of the Superior Council of the Judiciary to
      transfer the investigation of the incident and proceedings against the
      accused to military criminal jurisdiction contravenes the Convention and
      the Commission’s jurisprudence. They therefore request that the present
      case be declared to have violated Articles 8 and 25 of the American
      Convention.  22.            
      As to the admissibility of the case, the petitioners alleged that
      the workings of the domestic justice system have proven ineffective for
      prosecuting and punishing those responsible for executing the victims and
      covering up the act. Furthermore, they note that the military courts are
      not an appropriate forum for investigating the matter and trying those
      responsible since they lack the independence and impartiality that are
      required in accordance with the guidelines of the Convention.[6]
      They therefore requested that the Commission declare the case admissible
      on the basis of the exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies
      requirement contained in Article 48(2) of the Convention.[7]  B.                
      The State’s position  23.            
      The State produced information on the proceedings conducted through
      domestic military criminal jurisdiction, without expressly challenging the
      petitioners’ allegations.[8]
      Also, it reported that on December 27, 1993, the Attorney Delegate for the
      Defense of Human Rights had begun disciplinary proceedings against members
      of the Third Army Brigade in connection with the events in the present
      case.  24.            
      In the hearing held during the 95th regular session, the
      State indicated that because of the seriousness and importance of the
      case, special agents from the Attorney General’s Office (Ministerio Público)
      had been dispatched to monitor the investigation and the proceedings
      against the accused.  IV.             
      ANALYSIS OF COMPETENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY 
      A.               
      Competence 
      25.            
      The Commission is competent prima facie to examine the complaint filed by the petitioner. The
      alleged facts adversely affected individuals within the State’s
      jurisdiction and they occurred at a time when the State effectively had
      obligation to respect and guarantee the rights established in the
      Convention.[9]
      The Commission then turns to determining whether the present case
      satisfies the requirements established in Articles 46 and 47 of the
      American Convention.  
 1.                
      Exhaustion of domestic remedies and time period for submission  26.            
      In its communication dated September 16, 1996, the State reported
      that the facts of the case were under investigation by the Cali
      Prosecutor’s Office as well as by the military criminal justice system.
      It also furnished information on the disciplinary proceedings being
      conducted by the Attorney Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights. As
      noted earlier, the petitioners alleged that domestic remedies had been
      inadequate and ineffective in trying and punishing those responsible for
      the crime.  27.            
      According to the positions presented by the parties, the case was
      initially investigated by Regional Prosecutor’s Office in Cali and the
      military criminal justice system. However, on March 30, 1995, the Superior
      Council of the Judiciary upheld motion on the conflict of jurisdiction
      filed by the Third Army Brigade. The matter was therefore investigated by
      the military courts and tried before the Third Brigade’s Council of War,
      which handed down a decision of first instance.[10]
      The sentence was appealed and reviewed by the Superior Military Court.[11]  28.            
      The Commission has ruled repeatedly that military jurisdiction is
      not an appropriate forum and therefore does not offer adequate remedies
      for investigating, prosecuting, and punishing violations of human rights
      established in the American Convention, allegedly committed by members of
      the armed forces or with their collaboration or acquiescence.[12]
      Also, the Inter-American Court recently reaffirmed that this jurisdiction
      is a suitable forum only for prosecution of members of the military for
      the crimes or misdemeanors that by their very nature pose a threat to
      judicial property belonging to the military.[13]  29.            
      According to the Inter-American Court, whenever a State alleges
      that domestic remedies have not been exhausted by the petitioner it bears
      the burden of demonstrating that the remedies not exhausted are
      “adequate” enough to rectify the alleged violation, that is that the
      functioning of such remedies within the domestic justice system are
      suitable to address an infringement of a legal right.[14]
      In the present case, the Commission feels that military criminal justice
      does not provide a suitable remedy for investigating, prosecuting, and
      punishing conduct of the type involved in the instant case, and therefore
      the requirements set out in Article 46(1)(a) and (b) do not apply.  30.            
      Undoubtedly, invoking the exceptions to the rule for exhaustion of
      domestic remedies provided for in Article 46(2) of the American Convention
      is closely linked to determining possible violations of certain rights
      established in the Treaty such as the guarantees of a fair trial and
      judicial protection. However, Article 46(2), by its nature and purpose, is
      a standard that stands alone vis-à-vis
      the substantive standards of the Convention. Therefore, ascertaining
      whether or not exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies
      apply in the instant case has been carried out previously, separate from
      the analysis of the alleged violations of Articles 8 and 25 since it
      depends on a standard of evaluation other than the one used to determine
      violations of substantive provisions of the Convention. It is important to
      clarify that the causes and effects that impeded exhaustion of domestic
      remedies will be analyzed below in the analysis of the merits in order to
      determine whether they effectively constitute violations of the American
      Convention.  2.                
      Duplication of procedures and res judicata  31.            
      There is nothing in the case file to indicate that the subject of
      the petition is pending in another international proceeding for settlement
      or that the petition is substantially the same as one previously studied
      by the Commission or another international organization. Therefore the
      requirements established in Articles 46(1)(c) and 47(d) of the Convention
      must be considered to have been fulfilled. 3.                   
      Characterization of the alleged facts   32.            
      The Commission is of the view that the petitioners’ allegations
      concerning the alleged violations of the rights to life and humane
      treatment against the victims, and lack of effective prosecution and
      punishment of the guilty parties could be characterized as a violation of
      the rights recognized in Articles 4, 5, 8, 19, 25, and 1(1) of the
      American Convention and therefore satisfy the requirements contained in
      Articles 47(b) and (c) of the American Convention.  C.            Conclusions
      on competence and admissibility 
      33.            
      The Commission considers that it is competent to analyze the
      petitioners’ complaint and that the present case is admissible in
      accordance with the requirements established in Articles 46 and 47 of the
      American Convention.  V.            
      ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS 
      34.            
      The Commission now turns to analyzing alleged points of fact and of
      law in order to determine whether the State is responsible for violating
      the rights to life, humane treatment, and judicial guarantees and
      protection against Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez,
      María Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César
      Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino, Celso Mario
      Molina, Rita Edelia de Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, Luz Edelsy
      Tusarma Salazar, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano.  35.            
      First, the Commission will refer to the questions of fact. In this
      regard, it will cover separately the facts surrounding the deaths of the
      victims, the perpetration of these events, and their concealment by
      members of the army. Second, the Commission will refer to responsibility
      in the facts proven and whether they constitute violations of the rights
      protected under the American Convention.  A.               
      Analysis of the facts
      1.                
      The massacre  36.            
      According to the evidence produced by both parties in the
      proceedings held in military criminal jurisdiction and disciplinary
      jurisdiction, on October 5, 1993, at approximately 5:30 a.m. a group of
      armed men, some of whom were wearing military uniforms, appeared in the
      village of El Bosque, in the district of Portugal de Piedras, Municipality
      of Riofrío, Valle del Cauca.  37.            
      The armed men identified the members of the Ladino and Molina
      families and took them to the home of Mr. Javier Ladino. The Commission
      feels that the testimony given by Mrs. Aurora de Ladino, who was 75 at the
      time of the events and who survived the massacre, should be cited. A
      summary of her testimony with respect to the killing of three of the
      victims, María Cenaida Ladino, Carmen Emilia Ladino, and Dora Estela
      Gaviria Ladino, reproduced by the Prosecutor General of Colombia, is as
      follows:  She
      heard the first shots at 5:00 in the morning. Going into the hall, she
      found her daughters lying face down, and she was ordered to do the same.
      She asserts that María Cenaida was then beaten. Next, she and her
      daughters María Cenaida, Dora Estela, and Carmen and four children were
      taken into a room. They began to be taken out one by one. She heard shots
      and did not see them again. She says the gunfire lasted from 5:30 a.m. to
      11:00 a.m. […] she said that she did not see how her sons were taken.[15]  38.            
      The paramilitary group remained in the vicinity until approximately
      10:30 a.m., at which time members of the Third Army Brigade's Palacé
      Battalion arrived.  2.                
      The perpetrators of the crime  39.           
      The evidence contained in the case file indicates that a group of
      six to eleven armed men (hereinafter “the paramilitaries”), some of
      whom were in uniform carried out the execution of the victims. According
      to the summary of María Aurora de Ladino’s testimony:  As
      to the perpetrators, she indicated that she did not know the exact number
      but saw approximately six men “some in civilian clothes and others
      dressed as soldiers…” who insulted them verbally and “…the only
      thing I remember them saying was why did we continue helping the
      guerrillas...” and they said they were looking for weapons.[16]  The
      decision of the Military Superior Court of November 1996 confirms that   Several
      people were seen being taken from the Molina's house and screams were
      heard coming from the community hall (Caseta Comunal), as a result of the
      actions of a group comprising individuals in green uniforms and civilian
      personnel, facts that further reinforce the hypothesis that the Commander
      of the Third Tactical Unit at least was not totally unaware of the
      outrage.[17]   It
      adds that  Between
      9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., before the arrival of the Palacé Battalion at
      the scene, a green colored official vehicle left the area, a circumstance
      that highlights the fact that one or more members of the military were
      fully aware of the situation and goes some way to supporting the charge
      that has the Battalion Commander having agreed to the perpetration of
      these acts with individuals acting outside the law.[18]  These
      facts suggest the presence and even the direct participation of agents of
      the State in perpetrating the massacre.  40.           
      There is also evidence to establish that a coordinated action took
      place between the Palacé Battalion and the paramilitary group through an
      individual who acted as an informant for the army. In its decision, the
      Attorney Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights reports 
      that:  moments before when it was decided to take the lives of the victims, Mr. HOLMES MOTATO CIFUENTES an informant for the army who was at the scene with the victims went to the municipality of Buga and telephoned the Palacé Battalion and reported to Col. LUIS FELIPE BECERRA BOHÓRQUEZ of what the assassins were doing, thus carrying out his mission to report when the members of the subversive group were in the house previously identified as the guerrillas retreat. The Colonel gave orders for the operation and instructed Major DELGADO CARRILLO to fetch the informant and bring him back to base. When Major DELGADO found Mr. MOTATO and was informed about the events then taking place, he delayed his return to base to allow the perpetrators enough time to finish their task.[19] The
      testimony of María Aurora de Ladino further corroborates evidence that a
      certain individual was present during the massacre and what was called
      “Operation Destructor”:  It
      seems to me that amongst the soldiers who arrived afterwards was one who
      had been there in the morning and that’s why I felt so afraid and
      didn’t want to say any more […] he was different from the soldiers so
      I looked at him. […] He was with them, with the army as if he were a
      member of the group.[20]  In
      analyzing this part of the testimony, the Attorney Delegate was of the
      view that it was an informant who had been at the scene at dawn, when the
      executions took place, and again later with the army.[21]  41.           
      There is also evidence to show that before the Palacé Battalion
      arrived on the scene, the Commander of “Operation Destructor” knew for
      certain that the victims had already been executed. Specifically, the way
      in which the battalion approached the home of Mr. Javier Ladino indicates
      that it was not on the alert for a possible attack from that quarter. To
      this end, the Attorney General of the Nation has stated:  Numerous
      factors show that the operation was poorly planned and improperly
      executed, thus confirming that in normal circumstances the troops would
      undoubtedly have been ambushed, suffering many casualties, possibly even
      the loss of their entire number. Such a situation seems to suggest that
      based on experience, given the fact that the people planning the operation
      were extremely capable, they knew very well right from the outset that
      there would be no armed confrontation at the site of the operation.[22]   This
      confirms that the perpetrators of the massacre coordinated their attack
      with the arrival of the Palacé Battalion, whose mission was to hide all
      traces of the massacre.  42.           
      In view of the foregoing, the Commission feels that there is
      sufficient evidence to conclude that agents of the State acted jointly and
      in coordination with a paramilitary group in planning and carrying out the
      massacre of the thirteen victims.  3.                
      The cover up  43.            
       According to the
      evidence contained in the case file, when the paramilitary group withdrew
      from the scene, apparently with the exception of the individual who was
      acting as an informant, members of the Palacé Battalion simulated an
      armed encounter with the victims. To achieve this effect, they fired
      several rounds towards and away from Mr. Ladino’s house and changed the
      scene of the crime around.  44.            
      The occurrence of fighting has been discredited by the expert
      investigation conducted at the scene of the crime and by the autopsies
      performed on the bodies. Here, the expert report of the Technical Unit of
      the Cali Regional Investigation Unit indicates inter
      alia discrepancies between the shots fired by the army and the impact
      of the bullets found at the scene and their trajectories and the fatal
      wounds found on the victims’ bodies.[23]  45.            
      The petitioners alleged that after the simulation of a skirmish,
      Lt. Col. Luis Felipe Becerra Bohórquez, Commander of the Palacé
      Artillery Battalion and Brigadier General Rafael Fernández López,
      Commander of the Third Brigade, claimed in news reports that thirteen
      members of an armed dissident group known as the ELN had been killed in a
      confrontation with troops, and that no casualties had been sustained by
      the army. This claim led to an investigation that culminated with the
      decision on December 1, 1999, of the Military Superior Court rendered
      after the death of Col. Becerra Bohórquez, in which Major Delgado
      Carrillo was sentenced to three years and one month in prison as
      principally responsible for falsifying evidence in the performance of his
      duties through concealment but was acquitted of the charges of homicide,
      extortion, and bribery.  46.            
      The claim also led to the aforementioned investigation by the
      Attorney Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights which prepared an
      indictment against certain officers that included disciplinary proceedings
      against Lt. Col. Becerra Bohórquez and Major Delgado Carrillo for
      concealment of irregular conduct by members of the national army and the
      perpetrators of the massacre, simulating an armed encounter, and claiming
      credit for the guerrillas killed, tampering with the scene of the crime,
      and destroying evidence, amongst other things.[24] On October 2, 1998, the
      Prosecutor General in an appeal changed the sentences against Lt. Col.
      Becerra Bohórquez and Major Delgado Carrillo agreed on with the Attorney
      Delegate for the Defense of Human Rights from discharge from the army to a
      severe reprimand. 47.            
      It is important to notes in an internal hearing it was established
      that agents of the State were responsible for concealment of the massacre
      that took place on April 7, 1991, that involved a simulated armed
      encounter to justify the killing of the victims and also to claim an
      alleged victory by the military over an armed group of dissidents. The
      concealment of the killings by members of the army as the final touch to
      the massacre reflects the close ties between the paramilitary group
      responsible for perpetrating the incident and the agents of the State
      implicated.  B.                
      Analysis of law 
      48.            
      Before turning to the analysis of the alleged violations of the
      standards of the American Convention, it must be ascertained whether the
      acts of the individuals implicated in the incident in violating such
      fundamental rights as the rights to life and humane treatment are
      attributable to the State of Colombia and therefore call into question its
      responsibility in accordance with international law. In this regard, the
      Inter-American Court has noted that it is sufficient to show that the
      infringement of the rights recognized in the Convention has been supported
      or tolerated by the government.[25]  49.            
      First, it should be said that, as noted by the IACHR in its Third
      Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, the State has played
      a leading role in developing the paramilitary or self-defense groups, that
      it allowed them to act legitimately with the protection of the law during
      the 1970s and 1980s[26],
      and that it is generally responsible for their existence and for
      strengthening them.[27]  50.            
      These groups sponsored or accepted by branches of the armed forces
      were created mainly to combat armed groups of dissidents.[28]
      As a result of their counterinsurgency purposes, the paramilitaries
      established links with the Colombian army that became stronger over a
      period of more than twenty years. Eventually, on May 25, 1989, the Supreme
      Court of Justice declared Decree 3398 unconstitutional, thereby removing
      all legal support for their ties to national defense. In the wake of this
      action, the State passed a number of laws to criminalize the activities of
      these groups and of those that supported them.[29]
      Despite these measures, the State did little to dismantle the structure it
      had created and promoted, particularly in the case of groups that carried
      out counterinsurgency activities and, in fact, the ties remained in place
      at different levels, which in some instances requested or permitted
      paramilitary groups to carry out certain illegal acts on the understanding
      that they would not be investigated, prosecuted, or punished.[30]
      The toleration of these groups by certain branches of the army has been
      denounced by agencies within the State itself.[31]  51.            
      As a result of this situation, the Commission has established, for
      the purposes of determining the international responsibility of the State
      in accordance with the American Convention, that in cases in which members
      of paramilitary groups and the army carry out joint operations with the
      knowledge of superior officers, the members of the paramilitary groups act
      as agents of the State.[32]  52.            
      In the present case, according to analysis of the facts mentioned
      above, there is evidence to show that agents of the State helped to
      coordinate the massacre, to carry it out, and, as discovered by domestic
      courts, to cover it up. Therefore, the only conclusion is that the State
      is liable for the violations of the American Convention resulting from the
      acts of commission or omission by its own agents and by private
      individuals involved in the execution of the victims. 1.                
      The right to life  53.            
      As noted earlier, the petitioners allege that an illegal armed
      group, with the complicity of agents of the State, executed the victims,
      two of whom were minors, on October 5, 1993, in the municipality of Riofrío,
      in the Valle del Cauca. They allege that to conceal all evidence of the
      executions members of the army forced the victims to put on combat
      uniforms and, when they had been executed, placed arms next to their
      lifeless bodies and simulated a scene of combat. They allege therefore
      that the State is responsible for violating Articles 4 and 19 of the
      American Convention as well as common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
      Conventions and Article 2 of its Second Additional Protocol. The State has
      not accepted or expressly disputed the facts alleged by the petitioners
      but has limited itself to presenting additional information on the
      proceedings of the case before courts within the country.[33]
      It must now be determined whether the State is responsible for violating
      the right to life established in the American Convention.  54.            
      Article 4 of the American Convention establishes that every person
      has the right to have his life respected and no one shall be arbitrarily
      deprived of his life. It is also important to note that intentional
      mistreatment, and particularly extrajudicial execution of civilians under
      the control of one of the parties in any kind of armed conflict is
      absolutely prohibited in all circumstances in light of the basic
      considerations of humanity reflected in common Article 3 of the Geneva
      Conventions.[34]  55.            
      In the present case, the available evidence shows that the victims
      were defenseless and under the effective control of individuals who were
      acting in coordination with agents of the State at the time of their death
      and that there was no justification whatsoever to deprive them of their
      lives in light of the standards of present international law. The
      testimony and expert evidence gathered in the course of the disciplinary
      proceedings, and even in the military courts, clearly indicates that the
      victims put up no resistance to the actions of their executioners.  56.            
      The Commission therefore considers that there are sufficient
      grounds to conclude that the victims in the present case were executed
      extrajudicially by a group of armed men who acted in collaboration with
      agents of the State and that subsequently members of the army attempted to
      cover up the executions by manipulating and manufacturing evidence.  57.            
      In the present case, the Commission is of the view that the State
      is responsible for the acts of its agents as well as for those perpetrated
      by individuals who acted with their complicity to make it possible to
      carry out and cover up the execution of the victims in violation of their
      right not to be arbitrarily deprived of their lives, as established in
      Article 4 of the American Convention. Also, as indicated by the
      petitioners, amongst the victims were two minors, Dora Estela Gaviria
      Ladino and Luz Edelsy Tusarma Salazar, who were 16 years of age. The
      evidence shows that Luz Edelsy was pregnant at the time of her death. The
      Commission is of the view that the State is not only responsible for
      violating the right to life of these two victims but also failed to
      fulfill its obligation to provide them special protection as minors in
      accordance with Article 19 of the American Convention.  58.            
      Based on the foregoing considerations of fact and of law, the
      Commission finds that on October 5, 1993, a group of armed men, acting in
      complicity with agents of the State, arbitrarily deprived Miguel Enrique
      Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez, María Cenaida Ladino Ramírez,
      Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César Ladino Ramírez, Lucely
      Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino, Celso Mario Molina, Rita Edelia de
      Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, Luz Edelsy Tusarma Salazar, and
      Hugo Cedeño Lozano of their right to life in violation of the obligations
      established in Article 4(1) of the American Convention. Moreover, the
      State is responsible for failing to fulfill its special duty to provide
      protection to the minors Dora Estella Gaviria Ladino and Luz Edelsy
      Tusarma Salazar pursuant to Article 19 of the American Convention.  2.                
      The right to humane treatment  59.           
      The petitioners allege that prior to their execution the victims
      were subjected to acts of torture that violated their right to humane
      treatment. In their allegations, the petitioners do not specify the nature
      of the lesions inflicted or whether some or all of the victims were
      affected.  60.           
      Article 5 of the American Convention states that   1.
      Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral
      integrity respected.   2.
      No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or
      degrading punishment or treatment. […]   61.           
      In the instant case, statements taken from neighbors in the village
      as well as from Mrs. María Aurora Ladino who was in the dwelling where
      the executions took place, confirm that the sounds of blows to the victims
      and their screams were heard before they were killed.[35]
      The testimony does not confirm whether all of the victims were tortured
      before they were executed.  62.           
      However, the autopsies conducted by the Attorney Delegate for the
      Defense of Human Rights effectively confirm that “lesions caused by
      blunt objects before death” were found on the bodies of Hugo Cedeño
      Lozano, Miguel Ladino, Cenaida Ladino, Ricardo Molina Solarte, and Celso
      Mario Molina Sauza.[36]  63.           
      Therefore, the Commission is of the view that in the present case
      there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the State is responsible for
      violating the right to humane treatment of Hugo Cedeño Lozano, Miguel
      Ladino, Cenaida Ladino, Ricardo Molina Solarte, and Celso Mario Molina
      Sauza before they were executed.  C.      The right to judicial protection and
      the obligation of the State to respect and guarantee the rights protected
      under the Convention 
      64.           
      The petitioners allege that the State failed to fulfill its
      obligation to investigate the facts of the case and to bring to trial and
      punish those responsible in accordance with Articles 8 and 25 of the
      American Convention. In their view, the State deprived the families of the
      victims of access to an impartial court when the Superior Council of the
      Judiciary transferred the case to the jurisdiction of military courts.  65.           
      Therefore, it falls to the Commission to determine whether the
      judicial proceedings instituted by the State, which have lasted for more
      than seven years now and taken place largely in military jurisdiction,
      meet the standards established by the American Convention for access to a
      fair trial and judicial protection.  66.           
      Article 8(1) of the American Convention states that:  Every
      person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
      reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal,
      previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of
      a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights
      and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.   According
      to Article 25 of the Convention:  Everyone
      has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
      recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts
      that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws
      of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation
      may have been committed by persons acting in the course of their official
      duties.   The
      States Parties undertake:   a.
      to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights
      determined by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of
      the state;   b.
      to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and   c.
      to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
      remedies when granted.  67.           
      These standards set out the obligation of the State to ensure
      access to a fair trial with the guarantee that it be legal, independent,
      and impartial within a reasonable period as well as the general obligation
      to provide effective judicial remedy in the face of the violation of the
      fundamental rights, incorporating the principle of the efficiency of the
      procedural instruments or mechanisms. The Inter-American Court of Human
      Rights has ruled that:  States
      Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to
      victims of human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be
      substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Art. 8
      (1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to
      guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the
      Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction.[37]  68.           
      In the present case, although an investigation of the members of
      the army implicated in the massacre was opened, the case was transferred
      to the military criminal justice system when a motion on a conflict of
      jurisdiction was filed.  69.           
      In fact, the Commission notes, that after the security measures
      were imposed by the Cali Regional Prosecutor’s Office against members of
      the Third Army Brigade, the latter claimed a conflict of jurisdiction. The
      Superior Council of the Judiciary resolved the dispute on March 30, 1995,
      with the decision that the case be transferred to the military criminal
      justice system because it was considered that the “events under
      investigation occurred in connection with a military operation conducted
      by members of the military on active service".[38]  70.           
      In this regard, the Commission should reiterate again that, given
      its nature and structure, military criminal jurisdiction does not meet the
      standards of independence and impartiality required pursuant to Article
      8(1) of the American Convention, which are fully applicable in the present
      case. The unsuitable nature of military criminal courts in Colombia as a
      forum for examining, prosecuting, and punishing cases that involve
      violations of human rights has been expressly mentioned by the Commission
      in the past:  The
      military criminal justice system has several unique characteristics which
      prevent access to an effective and impartial judicial remedy in this
      jurisdiction. First, the military justice system may not even be properly
      referred to as a true judicial forum. The military justice system does not
      form part of the judicial branch of the Colombian State. Rather, this
      jurisdiction is operated by the public security forces and, as such, falls
      within the executive branch. The decision-makers are not trained judges,
      and the Office of the Prosecutor General does not fulfill its accusatory
      role in the military justice system.[39] 71.           
      The Inter-american
      Court recently confirmed that:  In
      a democratic State of law military criminal jurisdiction necessarily has a
      restrictive and special scope and is designed to protect special judicial
      interests linked to the functions that the law assigns to military forces.
      Thus, civil proceedings must be excluded from the context of military
      jurisdiction which should only try members of the military for the
      commission of crimes or misdemeanors that by their very nature have to do
      solely with judicial property of a military nature.[40]  In
      previous decisions, the IACHR has indicated that the Constitutional Court
      of Colombia itself has ruled on the jurisdiction of military courts in
      examining cases of human rights violations. In this regard, it has noted
      that:  For
      the military criminal justice system to have competence over a crime,
      there must be from the onset an evident link between the crime and the
      inherent activities of military service. In other words, the punishable
      action must constitute an excess or abuse of power occurring within the
      context of an activity that is directly related to a legitimate function
      of the armed forces. The link between the criminal action and the activity
      related to military service breaks down when the crime is extremely
      serious, such as is the case with crimes against humanity. In such
      circumstances, the case must be referred to the civilian courts.[41]  72.           
      The Commission considers that the execution of the victims in the
      present case as a result of coordinated activities between the army and
      the paramilitaries and the subsequent cover up is not a legitimate
      activity of the service that justifies the use of that forum to bring
      those responsible to trial. Consequently, the fact that the accused have
      been tried in military criminal jurisdiction contravenes the right of the
      victims’ families to have access to an independent and impartial
      tribunal, as well as due judicial protection established in Articles 8(1)
      and 25 of the American Convention.  73.           
      The American Convention imposes on the States the obligation to
      prevent, investigate, identify, and punish the perpetrators and those that
      conceal human rights violations. The Inter-American Court has ruled that  Article
      25 in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention obliges the
      State to guarantee to every individual access to the administration of
      justice and, in particular, to simple and prompt recourse, so that, inter
      alia, those responsible for human rights violations may be prosecuted and
      reparations obtained or the damages suffered. 
      As this court has ruled, Article 25 "is one of the fundamental
      pillars not only of the American Convention, but of the very rule of law
      in a democratic society in the terms of the Convention.".[42]  74.           
      To this end, Article 25 bears a close relation to Article 8(1)
      which establishes the right of every person to a hearing with due
      guarantees within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial judge
      or court and confers on the victims’ families the right that the deaths
      of their loved ones be effectively investigated by the authorities, that
      judicial proceedings be instituted against those responsible, that the
      appropriate penalties be imposed, and that they be compensated for the
      injuries suffered.[43]  75.           
      In the present case, the State has not ruled on the necessary means
      of fulfilling its obligation to investigate the extrajudicial killing of
      the victims, to prosecute and punish those responsible, and to provide
      reparations to the victims’ families. To this end, the execution of
      Miguel Enrique Ladino Largo, Miguel Antonio Ladino Ramírez, María
      Cenaida Ladino Ramírez, Carmen Emilia Ladino Ramírez, Julio César
      Ladino Ramírez, Lucely Colorado, Dora Estela Gaviria Ladino, Celso Mario
      Molina, Rita Edelia de Molina, Ricardo Molina, Freddy Molina, Luz Edelsy
      Tusarma Salazar, and Hugo Cedeño Lozano has gone unpunished, a fact that
      according to the Court “fosters chronic recidivism of human rights
      violations, and total defenselessness of victims and their relatives”.[44]  76.           
      Based on the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes
      that the State has not fulfilled its obligation to offer proper judicial
      protection in accordance with Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention
      to the victims in the present case and to their families.  D.         
      Obligation to respect and guarantee the rights protected by the
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