HONDURAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COUP D’ÉTAT
III. INTERRUPTION OF DEMOCRATIC ORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S REACTION
72. There is widespread debate surrounding the sequence of events leading up to the coup d´état. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed chronological analysis of the events surrounding the ousting of the constitutionally elected President of Honduras. There is also discussion of the process known as the “fourth ballot box” and the mechanisms that the de facto authorities employed in the wake of the interruption of democratic order.
A. The Ousting of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales
73. At 5:00 a.m. on June 28, 2009, heavily armed troops of the Honduran Army, acting on orders of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the then Vice Minister of Defense, stormed the presidential residence and took President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales into custody. Later, still in his pajamas, the President was taken to Hernán Acosta Mejía Air Base south of the city of Tegucigalpa and from there was flown, without his consent, to Costa Rica aboard a military aircraft.
74. During the on-site visit, the Commission heard testimony from one of President Zelaya’s daughters:
At 5:00 a.m., I was getting ready to leave for my home. My father was asleep. At 5:30 a.m. we started hearing the first shots. My father woke up and said: ‘they’re deposing me’. There had already been shooting in front of the residence. They beat up my father but he got away and went up on the roof. My security guard entered, closed the windows and told me to shut the door. Four troopers entered the residence. When they opened the door to my room, with their weapons loaded, my security guard shouted ‘don’t shoot.’ They didn’t find me because I had hidden under the bed. They broke down all the doors to my house. According to the record, they took my father away at 6:00 a.m. Approximately 200 soldiers were involved in his abduction. They did not have a search warrant. It was illegal … warrantless searches are only permissible when someone is caught in flagrante and only after 6:00 a.m. But my father was asleep. There was no district attorney. When my father tried to straighten things out, one of the presidential escorts told him, “Shut up, you’re a nobody now.” They took him away in his pajamas, with his feet and hands bound; they boarded him on an aircraft with three heavily armed men wearing hoods. They abducted him without observing constitutional guarantees. There was never any trial.
75. That same day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Patricia Rodas, was taken into custody by military forces at her residence and taken to a military air base, while the ambassadors of Venezuela, Armando Laguna Laguna, of Cuba, Juan Carlos Hernández, and of Nicaragua, Mario Duarte –who were with the Minister at the time- were beaten by hooded soldiers and then released. On June 29, it came to light that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been granted asylum in Mexico and was in good health.
76. On June 28, a power outage that lasted at least five hours made it impossible for radio and television stations to report that a coup d’état was underway. The lack of power also affected Internet access.
77. That same day, June 28, the National Congress held a morning session where the Secretary, José Alfredo Saavedra, read a supposed letter of resignation from President Zelaya citing as reasons “political erosion” and ill health. Then, by a supposedly unanimous vote, Congress adopted Legislative Decree 141-09 through which it ordered that “citizen Manuel Zelaya Rosales be removed from the office of President” and that “citizen Roberto Micheletti Bain be hereby constitutionally appointed […] to the office of Constitutional President of the Republic for the remainder of the current term.” From Costa Rica, President Zelaya told the media that he had not signed any letter of resignation. The de facto authorities never mentioned the supposed letter of resignation again.
78. Subsequently it was reported that on June 26, based on a request filed by the Public Prosecutor on June 25 seeking indictment of President Zelaya for crimes against “the form of government, treason, abuse of authority and usurpation of powers to the detriment of the government and State of Honduras,” the Supreme Court had allegedly ordered his arrest on the assumption that he was guilty of those crimes. One of the justices was designated to prosecute the case in secret. The designated justice had allegedly issued a warrant to search the residence and take President Zelaya into custody, whereupon the Armed Forces had allegedly apprehended and deported the President. The secrecy order had allegedly been lifted on June 30.
79. The IACHR has received no information concerning the source of the order to deport the President; it has even been said that no arrest warrant existed at the time the President was taken into custody and, in general, all the measures described above were patently unlawful. At the meeting held with the de facto Secretary of Defense, Adolfo Leonel Sevilla, the latter informed the IACHR that they detained President Zelaya by court order and took him out of the country for his own protection and to “avoid bloodshed”.
80. On June 30, a petition seeking amparo relief was filed with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court on behalf of President Zelaya, claiming a violation of Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic, which prohibits the expulsion of any Honduran citizen. That same day, a criminal complaint was filed with the Public Prosecutor’s Office against the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and the congressmen in the National Congress for their involvement in the coup d’état. On July 30, 2009, the Office of the Military Judge Advocate of the Armed Forces answered the complaint as follows:
Steps were taken to carry out the orders in question at the home of citizen JOSÉ MANUEL ZELAYA ROSALES; he was taken into custody, as ordered. Therefore, the act of entering that citizen’s home and his subsequent apprehension were done according to the Constitution and the law and thus perfectly legal. […B]ringing Mr. Manuel Zelaya Rosales before the competent authority would have put countless lives in danger, including that of the accused. Whether to protect the established legal order or out of a misguided belief in citizen Zelaya’s good faith, violent disturbances would have ensued, some to defend the public organs that have jurisdiction over the case and others to rescue and restore the unlawful government headed by the accused; had that been the case, the forces of law and order would have had to resort to the heaviest use of force, at gunpoint. […F]or that reason, before endangering the lives of many fellow citizens and after weighing the competing legal rights, the decision was made to remove citizen José Manuel Zelaya Rosales from the scene, leaving him in a place where he would have everything necessary to enjoy the guarantees and rights that the Constitution affords him, which is the system in Costa Rica’s democracy.
81. On July 20, 2009, the Judicial Branch informed the international community that: “[t]he Supreme Court confirms that its orders have been carried out and will continue to be carried out in accordance with the Constitution and the law; it therefore rejects any attempt to influence or intimidate for the purpose of compromising the independence of the Judicial Branch and to obstruct the proper and normal functioning of the various organs of the system of justice.”
B. The “fourth ballot box”
82. The de facto government publicly defended its conduct on the ground that President Zelaya had violated the Constitution through the process known as “the fourth ballot box.” This process began back in November 2008, when President Zelaya announced his intention to hold a referendum to consult citizens about the possibility of a fourth ballot box, which would run concurrently with the other three ballot boxes for the presidential, legislative and municipal elections scheduled for November 29, 2009. In the fourth ballot box, Honduran citizens would decide on the advisability of convening a National Constituent Assembly to amend the Constitution.
83. On March 23, the Executive Branch issued Executive Decree PCM 05-2009 in which it convened a popular consultation rather than a referendum so that the citizenry might cast its vote in favor of, or against, convening a National Constituent Assembly. The Chief Prosecutor, however, requested that judicial authorities suspend the consultation, arguing that President Zelaya’s objective was to convene a Constituent Assembly to change Constitutional clauses not subject to amendment. On May 27, the Contentious Administrative Court ordered the suspension of the consultation and on May 29 it clarified that its earlier decision covered any other general or specific administrative acts issued or that may be issued with the same purpose sought by the suspended administrative act. On June 24, the National Congress passed the “Special Law Regulating the Referendum and Plebiscite” which prohibited either mechanism from being used 180 days before or after general elections.
84. The Office of the President decided to press for the consultation arguing that it would not be binding as it would be neither a plebiscite nor a referendum. Therefore, President Zelaya ordered the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, to serve as custodian of the ballot boxes that would be used for the consultation. When General Vásquez Velázquez refused to obey the order, President Zelaya ordered that he be relieved of his command on June 24; that same day, he accepted the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Ángel Edmundo Orellana Mercado.
85. The first mobilizations of military forces in Honduran cities began on June 24, 2009. That same day, the Special Prosecutor to Defend the Constitution filed a petition seeking amparo relief on behalf of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the context of those proceedings, on June 25 the Supreme Court nullified the presidential order removing the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ordered the Executive Branch “to temporarily suspend the order being challenged.” The next day, President Zelaya publicly refused to comply with the Court’s order.
86. On June 25, the Executive Branch published Executive Decree PCM-020-2009 in the Official Gazette La Gaceta (hereinafter the “Official Gazette”). That Executive Decree entitled “Public Opinion Survey on the Convening of the National Constituent Assembly” ordered that the opinion survey be conducted on Sunday, June 28. That same day, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter, “TSE”) declared the survey called by the Executive Branch to be illegal. Acting jointly with the prosecutors appointed by the Attorney General of the Nation, it proceeded to confiscate the materials for the survey and had them stored in Armed Forces facilities. Given the circumstances, President Zelaya, escorted by his supporters, retrieved the confiscated material and designated the National Police and his supporters as its custodians.
87. On June 26, the Contentious Administrative Court ordered the Armed Forces to confiscate any documentation and materials to be used in the survey, as the survey would be a “flagrant violation of the order issued by [that] court.” In the early hours of June 28, the Army proceeded to confiscate the ballot boxes and the materials for the opinion survey while President Zelaya was being arrested and flown to Costa Rica, thereby completing the coup d’état.
C. Measures taken by the de facto government
88. The de facto authorities immediately adopted measures that had a negative impact on the human rights of the inhabitants of Honduras. One of the first m easures taken by the de facto government was the suspension of the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, not to be held incommunicado, association and assembly and freedom of movement. The state of emergency, adopted without legal basis and announced at a press conference, was enforced in an arbitrary and disproportionate manner and lacking in reasonableness. The de facto government’s lack of legitimacy ab initio and the absence of the procedural and substantive requisites to justify the state of emergency violate Article 27 of the American Convention.
89. At a press conference held on the premises of the National Congress on June 28, 2009, Mr. Micheletti announced that a curfew was being imposed. No information is available as to the legal instrument upon which the curfew was based. The nighttime curfew was to run from 9:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. for a period of 48 hours.
90. On June 30, as the first 48-hour period was coming to a close, a new nighttime curfew was imposed for a 72-hour period, to run from 10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. That curfew was established by Executive Decree 011-2009, which stipulated that the suspension of civil liberties during the specified periods was to be governed by the State of Siege Law. While the curfew was in effect, the following rights were restricted:
- The right to personal liberty (recognized in Article 69 of the National Constitution);
- The right not to be held without cause or incommunicado for more than 24 hours (recognized in Article 71 of the Constitution);
- Freedom of association and assembly (recognized in Article 78 of the Constitution), and
- The right to freedom of movement (recognized in Article 81 of the Constitution); the exceptions were patrol cars, ambulances, fire trucks, fuel trucks and trucks carrying daily newspapers with nationwide circulations.
91. Having declared a state of emergency by means of an illegitimate decree, thereafter the de facto authorities arbitrarily extended it and used it as a means to control and prevent demonstrations in support of the return of President Zelaya.
92. On July 5, President Zelaya failed in his attempt to return to the country by air. The curfew originally imposed began at 10:00 p.m. and ended at 5:00 a.m. the following day. However, at 6:00 p.m., a national radio and television chain reported that the curfew would begin half an hour later and would remain in effect until 5:00 a.m., for the next 48 hours. That day, after evading a number of roadblocks that military and police had set up on the highways, thousands of President Zelaya’s supporters gathered in the area outside Toncontín airport, to receive him upon his announced arrival. At around 3:30 p.m., with the multitude of persons clamoring for President Zelaya’s imminent arrival up against the electric fence that separated the airport from the adjacent streets, Army troops fired tear gas and pepper spray. When this happened, some of the demonstrators picked up the canisters and hurled them back at the security forces, which then fired on the crowd. Snipers that the Armed Forces had stationed on nearby buildings also fired shots. This resulted in the death of a youth, Isis Obed Murillo.
93. On July 12, the curfew was suspended. The de facto government’s contention was that the goal of restoring calm within the population had been achieved. However, on July 15, a national radio and television network announced that the curfew was being reimposed. It was said that the curfew’s reinstatement was necessitated by “[…] the constant, flagrant threats being made by groups bent upon causing disruption and disorder […]”; the curfew was to begin at midnight on July 15 and continue until 5:00 a.m. on July 16.
94. After July 16, the curfew was extended on a daily basis at the discretion of the de facto authorities and announced via a national broadcasting network.
95. The arbitrary use of the state of emergency was coupled with the militarization of Honduran territory and the establishment of military and police roadblocks on the country’s main roads, to prevent demonstrators supporting President Zelaya from mobilizing. Between 4000 and 5000 persons were trapped at the military and police roadblocks, unable to travel because the curfew established along the border with Nicaragua remained in effect, without interruption, from noon on July 23 until at least 6:00 p.m. on July 28.
96. On July 24, the President’s wife, her daughter Ortencia Xiomara Zelaya Castro, her mother Olga Doris Sarmiento and her mother-in-law Ortencia Rosales, escorted by a convoy of vehicles, headed toward the border with Nicaragua for a reunion with President Zelaya. En route, an announcement came over a radio and television network to the effect that the curfew was to take effect at 12:00 p.m. in the border areas of the departments of El Paraíso, Olancho, Valle and Choluteca, even though the curfew along the border was to be imposed at 6:00 p.m. 
97. The President’s wife and more than 4,000 Hondurans were trapped between the Army’s roadblocks on the highways for a number of days, until a judge granted a writ of habeas corpus and authorized them to proceed as far as the city of El Paraíso.
98. Another mechanism that the de facto government used was to actively engage Army personnel in the control and dispersal of public demonstrations. Starting on June 28, numerous demonstrations were held in various places throughout the country and were violently suppressed by agents of the National Police, members of the Army and the Cobra Command Strike Force, using tear gas grenades, water tanks, bullets and police truncheons. The excessive use of force by security forces left at least seven persons dead, hundreds injured, some seriously. Specifically, the Commission was told that measures of this type were used to break up the following demonstrations: i) June 28 and 29, July 1, 3, 5 and 29, and August 5, 11 and 12 in Tegucigalpa; ii) June 30 in El Progreso; iii) July 2 and August 12 in San Pedro Sula; iv) July 3 in Olancho; v) July 30 in Comayagua; vi) July 30 in Comayagüela, vii) July 30 in El Lolo, viii) July 31 in Santa Rosa de Copán, and ix) August 14 in Choloma. The Commission also received complaints of property damage caused during the course of some of these demonstrations.
99. Finally, the security forces detained thousands of people in the demonstrations held on June 29; July 2, 4, 8, 12, 29, 30 and 31; August 3, 11, 12 and 14, and for violation of the curfew. These arrests were not carried out according to the law, as there was no warrant from a competent authority; detainees were not read their rights and were not told of the reasons for their arrest. The massive detentions contributed to creating a climate of insecurity and uncertainty among the population and a fear that the detainees would become disappeared.
100. The de facto government ordered these measures at its discretion, making them even more forceful in certain circumstances, for example, on President Zelaya’s return to Honduras.
D. President Zelaya Enters the Brazilian Embassy
101. Unknown to the de facto authorities, on September 21, 2009 President Zelaya returned to Honduras and entered the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Once the news spread, a crowd of some 3000 converged upon the area and the Teachers Union of Honduras ordered an indefinite work stoppage nationwide in a show of support for President Zelaya.
102. For its part, the de facto government resorted again to declaring a state of emergency. On September 21, it was announced that a curfew would take effect at 4:00 p.m. that day and remain in effect until 7:00 a.m. the next day. However, with successive extensions, the curfew remained in effect for the entire 48 hours.
103. At around 4:00 a.m. on September 22, Police and Army members arrived at the Brazilian Embassy to disperse the persons gathered there. They did so on the pretext of enforcing the curfew. The security forces launched tear gas grenades and fired bullets and rubber bullets at the premises of the Embassy and at the demonstrators, whom they also beat with batons. A total of 26 individuals –including a child- were taken to the Escuela Hospital and one of the injured died from inhaling the tear gas. In that incident, the security forces arrested approximately 300 demonstrators for violation of the curfew. The arrested demonstrators were held in the Chochi Sosa Stadium-José Simon Azona Sports Complex, where they were subjected to physical and psychological abuse. The de facto government reported that the detainees were released once the curfew was over, except for 6 persons who were charged with the crime of damaging private property. The Commission also received information from human rights defenders who complained of the obstacles they encountered in trying to do their work and their fear of being detained.
104. From the information reported, the Commission learned that at that time, the private cell phone company TIGO-CELTEL was cut off for 12 hours, a number of radio and television stations that opposed the de facto government were unable to broadcast, and Radio Globo, Channel 36 and Cholusat were shut down. Also, journalists and leaders of the resistance movement were allegedly brutally repressed.
105. On September 22, the de facto government closed down the four international airports: Toncontín (Tegucigalpa), Ramón Villeda Morales (San Pedro Sula), Golosón (La Ceiba) and Juan Manuel Gálvez (Roatán). The closure of these airports prevented OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza from arriving in Tegucigalpa that day to move the political negotiations forward.
106. That same day, as the violence intensified, and given the steady stream of complaints the Commission was receiving claiming human rights violations, the Commission asked the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the President of the National Congress for another urgent on-site visit to verify the observance of human rights in Honduras and issued two press releases on the situation in Honduras. In the first, the Commission urged the de facto government of Honduras to respect public demonstrations and everyone’s right to freedom of expression, to refrain from the excessive use of force that the Commission had confirmed during its on-site visit in August, and to take urgent measures to guarantee the rights to life, to humane treatment, personal liberty, freedom of expression, assembly and political participation.
107. In the second press release, the Commission condemned the excessive use of force in suppressing the demonstrations that took place near the Brazilian Embassy, where tear gas grenades and rubber bullets were used. The Commission also issued an urgent appeal to the de facto government to take all measures necessary to guarantee the rights to life, to humane treatment and the security of all persons, and reiterated its deep concern over the continuation of the state of emergency in Honduras, and the uninterrupted enforcement of the curfew since September 21.
108. On Friday, September 25, the IACHR received news of an operation conducted in the vicinity of the Brazilian Embassy in which unidentified noxious gases had been used causing poisonings, bleeding, vomiting and dizziness among the people who were there. That same day, the IACHR issued another press release in which it called upon the de facto government to put an immediate end to the operation and to adopt all measures necessary to guarantee the rights to life and to humane treatment, and the security and safety of all persons who were there.
109. The Commission also received information about the difficulties getting food and medication into the Brazilian Embassy, the lack of cleaning materials, articles of personal hygiene, and appliances to preserve foodstuffs. There were also problems with waste disposal.
110. On September 26, the de facto government published Executive Decree PCM-M-016-2009 which suspended constitutional guarantees related to personal liberty, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of expression and also stipulated that the Armed Forces would be participating in operations “to maintain the order and security of the Republic” and to take audiovisual media off the air. The measure prohibited public assemblies or meetings not authorized by the Police or the military authorities; freedom of movement was restricted as it was stipulated that the de facto authorities would “announce how long the curfews will last and where in the national territory they will apply.” Any person on the streets after the curfew took effect was to be arrested.
111. Acting on the de facto government’s decree, on September 28, at 5:20 a.m. members of the Army took over the offices of Channel 36 and Radio Globo and disconnected and confiscated their equipment, thereby stopping broadcast operations. On September 30 the police and military drove out some 60 campesinos who had seized the Instituto Nacional Agrario [National Agrarian Institute] after the coup d’état. According to information supplied by the de facto authorities, the campesinos inside the Institute had been removed by court order; a judge and 4 prosecutors from the Common Crimes Prosecution Office were present for the operation. It was also reported that 55 persons were detained, including two minors and six women. Except for the children, all of those detained were taken to the Metropolitan Police Station No. 1 in Barrio Dolores. Of those 53 persons, four were released as they were staff members of the INA; bail was granted in the case of 11 others. On October 7 a hearing was held at police headquarters where a preventive detention order was issued against the 38 detainees that remained in custody. These individuals were charged with the crime of sedition against the domestic security of the Honduran state. On the question of the physical condition of the persons detained, the de facto authorities reported that forensic examinations found that none of the persons showed any evidence of “temporary disability or impairment.”
112. At a press conference held on the same day, the de facto authorities reported that diplomatic relations with Brazil had been severed. They demanded that within ten days the Brazilian government clarify President Zelaya’s diplomatic status.
113. On September 29, the IACHR sent another communication to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to the President of the National Congress, concerning another urgent on-site visit to confirm the human rights situation in the country. That same day, the IACHR issued another press release in which it expressed deep concern over the content of the decree, whose provisions arbitrarily restricted fundamental human rights and contained vague regulations that granted absolute discretion to the authorities, especially the Army and the Police forces.
115. A decree of the de facto government dated October 5 and published in the Official Gazette of October 7, ordered CONATEL to revoke “the use of permits and licenses that CONATEL granted to operators of radio and television stations that broadcast messages that seek to generate hatred against the nation and violation of protected rights and claims, and that defend a system of social anarchy against the democratic State.”
116. On October 9, the IACHR received information of new attacks on the Brazilian Embassy, this time involving a mechanical platform manned with heavily armed police and military and the stationing of two snipers.
117. On October 22, the IACHR sent another communication to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to the President of the Congress, emphasizing the need for another on-site visit, given the open invitation that Honduras had extended to the Commission. No reply was received.
118. On October 30, during the Guaymuras dialogue held to settle the political crisis in the country, representatives of President Zelaya and the de facto authorities signed the Tegucigalpa/San José Agreement for national reconciliation and for strengthening democracy in Honduras. The terms of that agreement were as follows: a National Unity and Reconciliation Government was to be formed, composed of representatives of the various political parties and social organizations; any call for a National Constituent Assembly or to amend the Constitution was to be explicitly renounced; the Honduran people were called upon to participate in the upcoming elections, in which electoral observation missions would also participate; the Armed Forces were to be at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal starting one month before the elections; a Verification Commission was to be created –composed of two members of the international community and two members of the national community and coordinated by the Organization of American States- to ensure that the commitments undertaken in the Agreement were carried out; and, finally, a Truth Commission was to be established in the first half of 2010.
119. On the question of President Zelaya’s return, the Agreement stipulated that, “in exercise of its authority and in consultation with such other bodies as it deems appropriate -such as the Supreme Court- and in accordance with the law, Congress shall decide the appropriate course of action regarding the matter of restoring the incumbency of the Executive Branch to its status prior to June 28, until the current term of presidential office ends on January 27, 2010.”
120. The Agreement also provided a timetable for the commitments: the Verification Commission was to be formed by November 2; the “National Unity and Reconciliation Government [was to be formed] no later than November 5.”
121. However, the timetable was not followed. The Verification Commission, composed of former Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, United States Secretary of Labor Hilda Solís, and Hondurans Arturo Corrales and Jorge Arturo Reina, was formed on November 3. Prior to that, however, Mr. Micheletti sent President Zelaya a memorandum in which he requested that in order to comply with the obligation to form a National Reconciliation Government, President Zelaya should provide him with a list of citizens who would meet the requirements prescribed by law and who could be elected to serve in that government. Also, contrary to the agreements, the National Congress did not receive the Verification Commission.
122. On November 3, the Congress sent questions to the Supreme Court, to the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic, to the National Commissioner of Human Rights, and to the Public Prosecutor’s Office to decide the question of President Zelaya’s return to office. On Monday, November 9, the Supreme Court indicated that it would abstain from pronouncing on the issue of returning President Zelaya to office. As of the date of preparation of this report, the Congress has not yet set a date for the debate on the issue of President Zelaya’s return to office.
123. On November 5, Mr. Micheletti issued a press communiqué in which he asked his cabinet to resign in order to form the National Unity Government. He also indicated that President Zelaya would not be part of that government, because he had not sent the list requested from him.
124. Because the timetable was not observed and the National Congress did not take any decision, on November 8 President Zelaya called off the talks. Also, on November 14, President Zelaya allegedly sent a letter to the President of the United States, Barack Obama, in which, inter alia, he reiterated his resolve not to accept any agreement of return to the Presidency that might legitimize the coup d’état.
E. The International Community’s Reaction
125. The international community has unanimously rejected the coup d’état in Honduras. The de facto authorities who emerged when the democratically elected president was deposed have never been recognized. International forums have repeatedly and categorically condemned the interruption of the constitutional order and have insisted that President Zelaya be restored to office.
1. The Organization of American States (OAS)
126. With their adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the States of this Hemisphere not only confirmed their commitment to democracy but also established precise courses of action to be followed if democratic government were threatened. In effect, Article 20 of the Inter-American Charter provides that in the event of an alteration of the constitutional regime seriously impairing the democratic order in a member state, any member state, or the Secretary General, may convene the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate. That article also provides that if such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the General Assembly to adopt the decisions it deems appropriate, including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Charter of the Organization, international law, and the provisions of the Democratic Charter.
127. Furthermore, under Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, when the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states and any suspension shall take effect immediately. The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its obligations to the Organization, in particular its human rights obligations.
128. With the interruption of the democratic order and in keeping with the provisions of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the OAS Permanent Council convened a special meeting on June 28 and adopted resolution CP/RES. 953 (1700/09) “Current Situation in Honduras.” In that resolution, the Council condemned the coup d’état and the expulsion from the country of President Zelaya. It also demanded that the President be returned to office and declared that no government arising from this unconstitutional interruption would be recognized. The Council has continued to monitor the situation in Honduras and has convened a number of meetings to discuss the matter.
129. On June 30, the OAS General Assembly held a special session at which President Zelaya was present. That special session discussed and –in the early hours of the following day- approved resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) “Resolution on the political crisis in Honduras.” In that resolution, the de facto government was given 72 hours in which to restore President Zelaya and was warned that its status as an OAS member state could be suspended.
130. On July 3, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza traveled to Tegucigalpa, where he met with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Jorge Alberto Rivera Avilés, and three other justices. At that meeting the Secretary General officially advised them of the resolution that the special session of the OAS General Assembly had adopted on July 1 and the possible consequences. He also told them of the Assembly’s decision not to recognize the authorities who emerged in the wake of the June 28 coup d’état, and of the request that democratic order be restored and that President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales be returned to his constitutional functions.
131. On July 4, the Secretary General stated at a press conference that given the intransigence of the de facto regime, the only alternative appeared to be that of pursuing the position taken by the General Assembly: the enforcement of Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter as a means to exert pressure on the de facto government. Article 21 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter reads as follows:
When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with the Charter of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect immediately.
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its obligations to the Organization, in particular its human rights obligations.
Notwithstanding the suspension of the member state, the Organization will maintain diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in that state.
132. On July 4, once the deadline for restoring democratic order had expired without the de facto government responding accordingly, the special session of the OAS General Assembly went back into session, with President Zelaya present, and approved resolution AG/RES. 2 (XXXVII-E/09) wherein it resolved to suspend the Honduran state from the exercise of its right to participate in the Organization of American States.
133. In that same resolution, the General Assembly resolved “(t)o reaffirm that the Republic of Honduras must continue to fulfill its obligations as a member of the Organization, in particular with regard to human rights; and to urge the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to continue to take all necessary measures to protect and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms in Honduras.”
134. On August 24, a delegation -composed of the ministers of foreign affairs of Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico and Panama and Secretary General José Miguel Insulza- visited Honduras to meet with various public and private groups in order to promote the signing of the San José Agreement. However, the de facto government insisted that it would not allow President Zelaya to be returned to office.
135. On September 21, the OAS Permanent Council held a special meeting where it approved a declaration demanding full guarantees from the de facto authorities in order to ensure the life and physical integrity of President Zelaya, calling for the immediate signing of the San José Agreement and calling on all sectors of Honduran society to act responsibly and prudently. At that meeting, it was also decided that the following day the OAS Secretary General would travel with a group of foreign ministers to Honduras to further the process of dialogue.
136. On September 27, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza criticized the de facto government’s decision not to allow a visit by an advance delegation whose purpose was to pave the way for a visit to Tegucigalpa by a mission composed of the Secretary General and ministers of foreign affairs of various countries to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the crisis.
137. On October 3, the OAS Secretary General issued a press released in which he confirmed that in recent days he had met in Honduras with the head of the de facto government with the idea of promoting the dialogue. On October 5, the OAS announced which foreign ministers would be part of the Mission that would travel to Honduras to continue the negotiations.
138. On October 21, the OAS Permanent Council issued a declaration in which it “strongly condemned the hostile action by the de facto regime against the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa and the harassment of its occupants through deliberate actions that affect them physically and psychologically and violate their human rights.” It demanded an immediate end to these actions and observance of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and international instruments on human rights; it appealed for guarantees for the right to life, integrity, and security of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales and of all persons in and around the Brazilian Embassy, and urged the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to follow up on this situation.
139. On November 10, the Permanent Council convened another special meeting to discuss the situation in Honduras. There, the Secretary General reported on the status of compliance with the Tegucigalpa/San José Agreement and observed that the Verification Commission was not functioning because of stalling tactics and noncompliance on the part of the de facto regime. Given the circumstances and based on the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and the earlier resolutions adopted both by the Permanent Council and the General Assembly of the OAS, the majority of the delegations present reiterated that the return of President Zelaya was a condition sine qua non for recognition of the elections that were to be held on November 29.
a. The San José Agreement
140. On July 6, the President of Costa Rica, Óscar Arias Sánchez, offered to serve as a mediator of the political conflict and to try to reconcile the positions of President Zelaya and the de facto regime.
142. The first round of negotiations took place on July 9 and 10 and ended without the parties reaching any agreement.
143. The second round of negotiations was on July 18 and 19. There, the delegation representing the de facto regime was headed by former Foreign Minister Carlos López, while President Zelaya’s delegation was led by the former manager of the National Electric Power Company [Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica] (ENEE), Rixi Moncada. On the first day of this second round of negotiations, President Arias presented the parties with a proposal for settling the crisis.
parties’ reactions to the proposal were very different: President
Zelaya approved of the content of the proposal and said he was in
agreement “provided all three branches of government are integrated
under the new Government.”
For their part, the representatives of the de facto regime
rejected the proposal on the grounds that President Zelaya’s return to
effective exercise of the office of the presidency was unacceptable.
They presented a counter-proposal
145. On July 22, President Arias announced the “San José Agreement.” The document consisted of the 7 points that were in the first proposal –with observations made by the delegation representing the de facto government- and contained a timetable for fulfilling the terms of the agreement.
146. President Zelaya’s delegation did not accept the proposed agreement and blamed the de facto government for the failure of the negotiations. The de facto government, for its part, said that the proposal would have to be evaluated by all branches of government, which would make it impossible to meet the proposed timetable.
2. The United Nations
147. On June 30, and with President Zelaya in attendance, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, Resolution 63/301: “The situation in Honduras: democracy breakdown.” In that resolution, it condemned the coup d’état, demanded the immediate and unconditional restoration of the legitimate Government, and called firmly and unequivocally upon States to recognize no Government other than that of the Constitutional President, Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales.
148. On August 3 and 4, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mr. Frank La Rue, made a visit to Tegucigalpa to meet with media outlets, journalists, representatives of community-based radio stations, and defenders of human rights to assess the situation of freedom of expression in Honduras one month after the coup d’état.
149. On September 14, the ambassador of the de facto government was removed from a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council because the other nations present maintained that he did not represent the democratically elected government of President Zelaya.
150. On September 23, during the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon decided to suspend technical assistance for elections in Honduras, owing to the instability in the country. At its meeting of September 25, the United Nations Security Council called upon the de facto government to stop attacking the Brazilian Embassy.
151. On October 10, a group of United Nations human rights experts expressed concern over reports that Honduran landowners had recruited approximately 40 former paramilitaries who had been members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). It was alleged that, among other activities, these paramilitaries employed long-range listening devices against President Zelaya and those inside the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa.
152. On October 14, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a press communiqué in which he confirmed the position taken by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 63/301 of July 1 and supported the work being done by the OAS to find a solution to the political crisis in Honduras.
153. On October 16, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights announced that it would begin a three-week official visit to Honduras on November 7. The purpose of the visit would be to examine human rights violations in the context of the coup d’état.
3. The European Union
154. On July 24, 2009, the European Union called upon the parties to find a rapid solution to the crisis and to refrain from measures that might result in increasing violence and tension. It stated that until a peaceful negotiated solution had been found, the EU would continue to restrict contacts at the political level with representatives of the de facto government and suspend member states' bilateral development co-operation with government institutions, other than humanitarian assistance and emergency relief. Lastly, the EU underlined the importance of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Honduras, and its own readiness to contribute to the restoration of the constitutional order and a democratic process.
155. On October 6, during the European Union-Brazil Summit, the EU condemned the “violation of the constitutional order” in Honduras, called for guaranteeing the inviolability of the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa, and urged that the physical integrity of President Zelaya, his family and the members of his government be respected.
4. Other Intergovernmental Organizations
156. On July 29, the Central American Integration System (SICA) issued a statement on “immediate political measures to be taken to deal with the situation in Honduras.” That same day, the Special Presidential Council of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America] (ALBA) condemned the coup d’état in Honduras. Later, during its VII Summit, it reiterated that condemnation.
157. For their part, on November 6, during two summits held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, the countries in the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean foreign ministers demanded that President Zelaya be immediately returned to the presidency. They also demanded compliance with the Tegucigalpa/San José Agreement and condemned the strategy of the de facto government of unilaterally forming the National Unity and Reconciliation Government.
5. International Civil Society
158. An International Observation Mission for the Human Rights Situation in Honduras, composed of 15 human rights organizations from various countries in the world visited Honduras from July 14 through 24, to verify the human rights situation in the wake of the coup d’état. According to the International Mission’s preliminary report, published on July 23, the delegation identified serious violations of human rights committed since the coup d’état and said that the persons affected were not being protected, in part due to inaction on the part of the Office of the National Commissioner of Human Rights. According to this report, a significant number of extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and threats had occurred and undue restrictions had been placed on freedom of expression and movement. Those most severely affected were the political leaders, labor leaders, human rights defenders, community leaders, journalists and foreign nationals. A second press communiqué was issued by this Mission on July 21, at a time when the number of warrantless arrests of foreign nationals were said to have significantly increased, particularly among those of Nicaraguan origin, who had purportedly not been afforded consular assistance and had been locked in the same cells as common criminals.
159. A delegation of human rights organizations from Guatemala also visited the country from July 3 to 6, and made public their preliminary observations on the situation in the country. The delegation was composed of representatives of 8 civil society organizations in Guatemala and was headed by Rigoberta Menchú, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. The delegation compiled information on extrajudicial executions, repression of public demonstrations protesting against the coup d’état, and arbitrary detentions. It also received information related to the closure of media outlets and persecution of human rights defenders.
 On June 28, 2009, Adolfo Lionel Sevilla was Vice Minister of Defense and was appointed as Minister of Defense by the de facto authorities.
 Informe de la Delegación por la Democracia y los Derechos Humanos Guatemala-Honduras, Informe Final de la Visita realizada entre el 3 y el 6 de julio de 2009 a Honduras (Report of the Guatemalan-Honduran Delegation for Democracy and Human Rights. Final Report of the Visit made to Honduras from July 3 to 6, 2009), p. 5. “Mel llega a Costa Rica” [Mel Arrives in Costa Rica], La Tribuna, June 29, 2009; “Honduran Leader Forced into Exile”, BBC News, June 28, 2009; “Manuel Zelaya: aún estoy en ropa de dormir” [Manuel Zelaya, I’m still in my pajamas], El País (Spain), June 28, 2009.
 Testimony from one of President Zelaya’s daughters, received by the IACHR in Tegucigalpa on August 18, 2009.
 “Detienen a Canciller hondureña frente a embajadores” [Honduran Foreign Minister detained in the presence of ambassadors], La Tribuna, June 28, 2009; “Canciller hondureña Patricia Rodas fue secuestrada y llevada a la base aérea militar” [Honduran Minister of Foreign Affairs Patricia Rodas was abducted and taken to a military air base], VTV, June 28, 2009; “Militares golpistas mantienen secuestrada a canciller hondureña” [Military perpetrators of the coup sill have Honduran Foreign Minister in custody], TeleSUR, June 28, 2009.
 Press communiqué 169 of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, June 29, 2009; “Ex Canciller Patricia Rodas llega a México” [Former Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas Arrives in Mexico], La Tribuna, June 29, 2009.
 IACHR, Rapporteurship for Freedom of Expression, Press Release No. 44/09: Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Condemns Limitations on Freedom of Expression in Honduras, June 29, 2009. Available at: http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=753&lID=1. Comité por la Libertad de Expresión [Committee for Freedom of Expression], June 29: Alert: Blockade of the Media in Honduras. Available at: http://conexihon.com/blog/archives/324. Reporters Without Borders, News blackout after Army ousts President, June 29, 2009. Available at http://www.rsf.org/News-blackout-after-army-ousts.html. Inter-American Press Association, June 29, 2009. IAPA censures acts against journalists and media in Honduras. Available at: http://www.sipiapa.org/v4/index.php?page=cont_comunicados&seccion =detalles&id=4208&idioma=us. El apagón de los medios [Media blackout in Honduras], BBC, June 30, 2009. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2009/06/090630_1030_honduras_medios_sao.shtml.
 “Congreso destituye a Zelaya” [Congress removes Zelaya from office], La Tribuna, June 29, 2009; “Congreso separa a Zelaya y nombra a Micheletti como nuevo Presidente de Honduras” [Congress removes Zelaya and names Micheletti as new President of Honduras], La Prensa (Nicaragua), June 28, 2009.
 It was alleged that during the June 28, 2009 legislative session various congressmen allied with President Zelaya were removed from their seats. See Preliminary Report of the Delegation of Guatemalan Human Rights Organizations in Honduras, July 3 to 6, 2009; Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), Report on Human Rights Violations in the wake of the military coup of June 28, 2009, July 17, 2009, delivered at the headquarters of the IACHR.
 “Congreso destituye a Zelaya” [Congress removes Zelaya from office], La Tribuna, June 29, 2009; “Congreso separa a Zelaya y nombra a Micheleti como nuevo Presidente de Honduras” [Congress removes Zelaya and names Micheletti as new President of Honduras], La Prensa, June 28, 2009.
 National Congressional Decree No. 141 issued on June 28, 2009, Article 1.b).
 National Congressional Decree No. 141 issued on June 28, 2009, Article 2.
 “Zelaya niega haber renunciado” [Zelaya denies having resigned], BBC World, June 29, 2009.
 Article 2 of the Constitution of Honduras reads as follows: “Sovereignty belongs to the people, from whom emanate all powers of the State, which are exercised by representation. Supplanting popular sovereignty and usurping the powers conferred constitute the crimes of treason of treason against the Nation. Such crimes are not subject to statute of limitations and criminal proceedings can be initiated by public authority or by petition of any citizen.
Article 328, paragraph 3 of the Honduran Criminal Code provides that: “Those who perform acts directly aimed at accomplishing the following, either by force or outside legal channels, shall have committed a crime against the form of government and shall be punished with a sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) to twelve (12) years: 3) stripping the National Congress, the Executive Branch or the Supreme Court of all or some of the prerogatives and authorities that the Constitution invests in them.”
 Article 349 of that Code provides that: “Any public official or employee shall face punishment of three (3) to six (6) years in prison and a special disqualification for double the period of his or her imprisonment for: 1. Refusing to fully carry out orders, rulings, measures, decisions, agreements or decrees issued by the judicial or government authorities within the limits of their respective authorities and in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.”
Finally, Article 354 stipulates that: “Any public official who usurps the functions of another office shall face imprisonment for a period of two (2) to five (5) years, plus a fine of five thousand (L 5,000.00) to ten thousand (L10,000.00) lempiras and special disqualification for double the period of his or her incarceration.”
 Supreme Court of Justice. Memorandum sent to the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Division General Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, July 26, 2009.
 Supreme Court of Justice of Honduras, Special Communiqué of June 30, 2009.
 Supreme Court of Justice of Honduras, Special Communiqué of June 30, 2009.
 Preliminary Report of the Delegation of Guatemalan Human Rights Organizations in Honduras, July 3 to 6, 2009. See also, Inter-American Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development, International Observation Mission on the Human Rights Situation in Honduras, Tegucigalpa, July 23, 2009. Available at http://www.pidhdd.org/content/section/30/165/.
 Documentation received during the IACHR’s visit, supplied by Osman Antonio Fajardo Morel, Public Defender of San Pedro Sula, Guillermo Lopez Lone, Judge of the Trial Court of San Pedro Sula, and Tirza Flores Lanza, Magistrate on the San Pedro Sula Appellate Court.
 Reply from Herberth Bayardo Inestroza Membreño, Military Judge Advocate, in connection with petitions 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901 and 902/09. Information received by the IACHR in San Pedro Sula on August 19, 2009 (No. 124).
 Supreme Court of Justice, Special Communiqué, July 20, 2009. In its observations, the Supreme Court wrote the following: “As for the June 24, 2009 consultation, which the competent organs declared illegal by a court ruling, said consultation was prohibited inasmuch as the action taken by the Armed Forces was deemed to be in strict adherence and compliance with articles 321 and 323 of the Constitution of the Republic; the materials for the consultation were lawfully confiscated and then forcibly retrieved by Mr. Zelaya Rosales and his followers, violating the security of Hernán Acosta Mejía Air Base and jeopardizing the Honduran State’s national security.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, p. 18, paragraph 48.
 The IACHR has no information regarding which clauses of the Constitution were to be considered for amendment.
Article 373 of the Constitution of Honduras provides that: “Amendment of this Constitution shall be ordered by the National Congress, in regular session, by a vote of two thirds (2/3) of all its members. The decree shall spell out which article or articles of the Constitution are to be amended; in order to enter into force, the amendment must be ratified by the next regular legislature, and by the same number of votes.”
 Executive Decree PCM 05-2009, Article 1.
 “Juzgado de Letras suspende encuesta de junio” [Court suspends June survey], El Heraldo, April 27, 2009. Position of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, May 11 2009, signed by the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor.
Article 374 of the Constitution of Honduras provides that: “Under no circumstances shall amendments be introduced to the preceding article, the present article, the articles of the Constitution that concern the form of government, the national territory, the presidential term, the article prohibiting re-election of the person who served as President of the Republic, regardless of the title of the office, and the article referring to those persons who are disqualified from running for the office of President in the following term.”
 Ruling of the Contentious Administrative Court, May 27, 2009, Operative Paragraph 2. ‘Juzgado de Letras suspende encuesta de junio” [Court suspends June survey], El Heraldo, April 27, 2009; Special Communiqué from the Supreme Court of Honduras, June 30, 2009.
 Judgment clarifying the ruling delivered by the Contentious Administrative Court on May 29, 2009, explanatory paragraph 1.
 “Congreso frena la reelección” [Congress puts a stop to re-election], BBC, June 24, 2009; “El Legislativo ratifica plebiscito y referendum” [Congress ratifies special law regulating plebiscite and referendum], La Prensa, June 24, 2009.
 Article 16 of the Special Law regulating the Plebiscite and Referendum.
 Statements made by the Presidential Private Secretary, Enrique Reina, to EFE news agency: “Zelaya is insisting on a consultation to amend the Constitution.” Prensa Libre (Costa Rica), June 24, 2009.
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Honduras provides that: “To strengthen participatory democracy and enable it to function, the referendum and plebiscite are hereby instituted as mechanisms for consulting the public on issues of vital importance to the national life. A Special Law approved by two thirds (2/3) of all congressmen in the National Congress shall determine the procedures, requirements and other matters necessary to conduct the public consultations.” The final paragraph of that article reads as follows: “Drafts intended to amend Article 374 of this Constitution shall not be put to a referendum or plebiscite. Nor can such mechanisms be used for issues related to taxation, public credit, amnesties, the national currency, budgets, international treaties and conventions and social conquests.”
 "Destituyen a Jefe del Estado Mayor y renuncia el Ministro de Defensa" [Head of the Joint Chiefs removed and Minister of Defense resigns], La Tribuna, June 25, 2009.
 “Pulso en Honduras entre los poderes del Estado por destitución de Jefe militar” [Tension in Honduras among the branches of government over the dismissal of the Head of the Joint Staff], El Mundo (Spain), June 25, 2009.
 June 25, 2009 resolution of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Honduras, operative paragraph 1. “Office of the Public Prosecutor asks that the dismissed Head of Military in Honduras be reinstated,” Associated Press, June 25, 2009.
 June 25, 2009 resolution of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Honduras, operative paragraph 3. “Supreme Court overturns dismissal of military chief in Honduras,” Associated Press, El Universal (Venezuela), June 25, 2009; “Political crisis in Honduras intensifies,” BBC World, June 26, 2009; “Honduran court orders head of Joint Staff reinstated,”, AFP, June 25, 2009.
 Executive Decree PCM-020-2009, Article 1.
 Resolution of the Contentious Administrative Court, June 26, 2009, operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. The first operative paragraph reads as follows: “RESOLVED: ONE: To order the Honduran Armed Forces, through the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to IMMEDIATELY CONFISCATE all documentation and materials necessary for and related to the OPINION SURVEY THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THIS COURT’S ORDER, IS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT ON SUNDAY, JUNE 28, 2009.”
 “Honduras, dividida tras el golpe de Estado entre el toque de queda y la huelga” [Honduras, divided after the coup d’état divided between curfew and strike], El Mundo (Spain), June 29, 2009. “Interim president declares curfew for two days,” El Universal, June 28, 2009. “Micheletti decreta toque de queda” [Micheletti decrees curfew], El Universo (Ecuador), June 28, 2009.
 Under Article 2 of Executive Decree 011-2009, the time period is to be computed from the date of approval of the Decree, which was July 1, 2009
 Executive Decree 011-2009, Article 2.
 Executive Decree 011-2009, Article 1.
 No specific information is available concerning enforcement of the curfew from July 3 to 5, 2009. However, the articles in the press suggest that the enforcement of the curfew was uninterrupted from June 28 to July 12, 2009. As of July 7, 2009, the period during which rights were restricted gradually decreased (generally, the first and last hours of the curfew were cut back by half-hour intervals) so that by the end the curfew started at 11:00 p.m. and ended at 4:00 a.m.
 “Amplian toque de queda en Honduras” [Curfew extended in Honduras], El Heraldo, July 5, 2009.
 “El gobierno hondureño aplica toque de queda” [Honduran government enforces curfew], La Tribuna, July 5, 2009; “Amplian toque de queda en Honduras” [Curfew extended in Honduras], El Heraldo, July 5, 2009.
 CIPRODEH, Reporte de Violaciones a Derechos Humanos [Report on Human Rights Violations], op. cit.
 Testimony of J.E.N., taken by the IACHR in Tegucigalpa on August 21, 2009 (No. 226).
 Because firearms were used against the civilian population demonstrating in the vicinity of Toncontin Airport, attorneys from the CPRTR reportedly filed a complaint with the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights concerning the death of Isis Obed Murillo and 9 people injured by firearms. The IACHR has no information as to the progress made in the investigations. Information the IACHR received in Tegucigalpa during its meeting with human rights defenders, August 17, 2009 (No. 471). The IACHR granted precautionary measures for certain persons who had allegedly been seriously wounded.
 CIPRODEH, Reporte de Violaciones a Derechos Humanos [Report on Human Rights Violations], op. cit.
 “Enfrentamiento entre Ejército y manifestantes deja un muerto” [Clash between Army and demonstrators leaves one dead], Tiempo, July 6, 2009. (No. 124)
 “Suspendido el toque de queda” [Curfew suspended], El Heraldo, July 12, 2009; “”Curfew lifted”, BBC World, July 12, 2009.
 Starting on July 16, the area covered by the curfew was announced each day via a national radio and television chain, and the curfew time for each specific day was also announced: on July 16, 17 and 18, 2009, the curfew started at 11:30 p.m. and ended at 4:30 a.m. the following day; then, on July 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009, the curfew began at midnight and ended at 4:30 a.m. On July 23, 2009, the schedule was changed for certain zones: in border areas the curfew took effect at 6:00 p.m. and remained in effect until 6:00 a.m. the next day, while in the rest of the country the schedules were the same as they had been on the four previous nights. Elsewhere in the country, the curfew periods were reduced again, so that eventually, by July 27, 2009, the curfew took effect at 1:00 a.m. and lasted until 4:30 a.m. During its visit, the IACHR confirmed that curfews continued to be enforced in some parts of the country.
 Information supplied by CIPRODEH and the media. Also, testimony of M.O.V., taken by the IACHR in Tegucigalpa on August 21, 2009 (No. 232) and from C.E. in El Paraíso on August 20, 2009.
 Testimony of C.A.Z.S., taken by the IACHR in Tegucigalpa on August 20, 2009 (No. 53). Testimony of A.A., taken by the IACHR in El Paraíso on August 20, 2009.
 Testimony of L.C.G, taken by the IACHR on August 17, 2009 (No. 129). According to information received, young A.L. and L.E.C., were apprehended by security forces of the de facto government and taken to a police post in the department of El Paraíso. In a communication dated July 30, 2009, the IACHR requested information, pursuant to Article 41 of the American Convention. Communication from the Alternate Ambassador of Honduras to the OAS, dated July 27, 2009. De facto Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Memorandum 596-DGAE-09 dated August 3, 2009.
 “Toque de queda no ha disminuido presencia de cientos de hondureños en embajada de Brasil” [Despite curfew, hundreds of Hondurans gather at the Brazilian embassy], TeleSUR, September 22, 2009.
 “Magisterio a paro en apoyo a Manuel Zelaya” [Teachers in work stoppage in a show of support for Manuel Zelaya], El Heraldo, September 21, 2009.
 “Gobierno de facto decreta nuevo toque de queda en Honduras” [De facto government orders another curfew in Honduras], TeleSUR, September 21, 2009.
 Police and Army were allegedly posted at the entrance points into Tegucigalpa to prevent President Zelaya’s sympathizers from entering the city. FIAN Honduras, e-mail received by the IACHR on September 22, 2009.
 Testimony of A.S., taken by the IACHR on September 23, 2009.
 De facto Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Memorandum 712-DGAE-09 dated October 13, 2009.
 “Violento desalojo en las afueras de la embajada de Brasil” [Violent dispersal outside the Brazilian embassy], El Heraldo, September 22, 2009; “Policía reprime a manifestantes al frente de la embajada brasileña en Tegucigalpa” [Police repress demonstrators outside Brazilian embassy], TeleSUR, September 22, 2009.
 FIAN Honduras, e-mail received by the IACHR on September 22, 2009; G.G., e-mail received by the IACHR on September 22, 2009. In its observations, the Supreme Court stated that: “No foreign national was identified among those moved to the Chochi Sosa Sports Complex; however, there were a total of nine children, who were handed over to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Children.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, p. 17, paragraph 41.
 Information that B.O. supplied to the IACHR on September 22, 2009.
 De facto Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Memorandum 712-DGAE-09 dated October 13, 2009.
 G.B.J., e-mail received by the IACHR on September 22, 2009.
 “Policía reprime a manifestantes al frente de la embajada brasileña en Tegucigalpa” [Police repress demonstrators outside Brazilian embassy], TeleSUR, September 22, 2009; “Gobierno hondureño anunció el cierre de todos los aeropuertos” [Honduran government announced closing of all airports”, La Tribuna, September 22, 2009.
 In its observations the Supreme Court wrote the following: “In keeping with the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the government of the Republic of Honduras has always and unreservedly respected the integrity of the Brazilian Embassy and the citizens who entered the Brazilian Diplomatic Mission in Tegucigalpa illegally and by violent means. Honduras maintains that under International Law, no country is required to allow the premises of a foreign mission to be used to foster violence and disrupt domestic tranquility and national security, as this situation is a violation of the provisions of Article 41(3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The measures taken by the National Police and other security forces in response to this illegal action have been professional at all times and have been conducted with the utmost care in order to guarantee the right to life, the right to personal integrity, the safety and security of all those inside the Embassy premises, the residential grounds and its real estate. The Government of Honduras has and will always respect the human rights of those inside that Mission. The proof is that former President José Manual Zelaya Rosales has always received and continues to receive visits from the OAS Foreign Ministers, Latin American parliamentarians, members of the Diplomatic Corps, the International Press, churches, prosecutors and forensic physicians with the Office of the Public Prosecutor, presidential candidates, maintenance personnel for public and private services, former President Zelaya Rosales’ representatives on the Negotiating Commission (Guaymuras-Tegucigalpa/San José Agreement) and members of his family. As for the hostile acts that national authorities are alleged to have committed against the Brazilian Embassy, the Government of Honduras has always abided by the provisions of Article 45(a) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, as evidenced by the fact that the Government of Brazil has made no claim whatever as regards any property damages to its Mission’s premises, nor has it claimed that any searches were conducted of the premises in question.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, pp. 5-6, paragraphs 1-4.
 L.M., e-mail that the IACHR received on September 26, 2009. The de facto authorities stated that “national organizations and human rights defenders have been permitted to go inside; they were to provide water, food, medications and various supplies and essentials for their subsistence.” They also reported that 158 “supporters of former President Zelaya” left the Embassy voluntarily.
 Executive Decree PCM-M-016-2009 dated September 26, 2009; “State of emergency in Honduras,” El Heraldo, September 27, 2009; “Virtual estado de sitio en Honduras” [Virtual State of Siege in Honduras], La Nación, September 28, 2009. A circular issued nationwide stated that in fulfillment of Executive Decree PCM-M-016-2009, “(f)or any public gathering, prior authorization must be requested from the Secretariat of State of Security. The application must be filed in writing at least 24 hours beforehand, at Metropolian, Departmental or Municipal Police Headquarters, and shall specify the following: a) the reason for the public gathering, indicating the person or persons responsible for calling the requested gathering; b) the schedule for the public gathering, specifying the time the gathering would begin and end; c) the place of the public gathering and which streets will be used if people will have to move through the streets for the gathering; the applicant party must pledge that the assembly will not obstruct the freedom of movement of third parties; d) the approximate number of persons who will attend the public gathering; e) The Secretariat of State of Security, by way of the National Police, will issue the decision giving the applicant authorization for the gathering or denying authorization, based on the law; f) gatherings in closed places like churches, stadiums, parks, hotels, large assembly halls, rooms, which includes parties in private homes and elsewhere, are to be reported to the nearest police stations.”
 “Gobierno de Micheletti saca del aire a Canal 36 y Radio Globo” [Micheletti Government takes Channel 36 and Radio Globo off the air], TeleSUR, September 28, 2009.
 “El gobierno de Micheletti detuvo a 60 seguidores de Zelaya” [Micheletti government detained 60 Zelaya supporters], La Nación, September 30, 2009. Observatorio Internacional sobre la Situación de Derechos Humanos en Honduras [International Observatory on the Human Rights Situation in Honduras] (OISDHHN), International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL), Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico (CIFCA), FIAN International, Hemispheric Social Alliance ‘Linking Alternatives’, Inter-American Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development (PIDHDD), Federación de Derechos Humanos de España, Suedwind – Austria, IBIS – Denmark, Instituto de Estudios Políticos sobre América Latina y África [Institute of Policy Studies on Latin America and Africa (IEPALA-Spain)], Servicio Paz y Justicia [Peace and Justice Service] (SERPAJ-Uruguay), World Solidarity Movement – Belgium, Human Rights Institute of the Universidad CentroAmericana “José Simeón Cañas” (IDHUCA-El Salvador), Comité de Familiares de Detenidos – Desaparecidos de Honduras [Committee of Relatives of Detainees-Disappeared of Honduras] (COFADEH - Honduras), Centro para la investigación y promoción de Derechos Humanos [Center for Research and Promotion of Human Rights] (CIPRODEH - Honduras), Centro de Derechos de Mujeres [Women’s Rights Center] (CDM-Honduras), FIAN Honduras, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos [Pro Human Rights Association] (APRODEH-Peru), Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [National Human Rights Coordinator] (Peru), Centro de Políticas Públicas y Derechos Humanos [Center for Public Policy and Human Rights, Peru], and EQUIDAD, e-mail dated October 2, 2009.
 Information supplied by COFADEH to the IACHR on November 5, 2009.
 Article 337 of the Honduran Criminal Code reads as follows: “Any persons who, although not implicated in the crime of rebellion, stage a public and turbulent uprising, either by force or outside legal channels, for the purpose of achieving any of the following ends shall be deemed guilty of sedition: 1) Impeding elections for national, departmental or municipal authorities; 2) impeding lawfully elected or appointed officials from taking office; 3) impeding any authority from lawfully performing the functions of his or her office or carrying out his or her decisions; 4) impeding the approval, passage, enactment, publication or enforcement of any law; 5) engaging in any act of hatred or revenge against private parties or against servants of the State or against their property to achieve some political or social end; and 6) entering penal institutions or attacking the prison guards, whether to rescue or mistreat them.”
 De facto Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Honduras, Memorandum 731-DGAE-09 dated October 20, 2009.
 "Ultimátum a Brasil para definir destino de Mel" [Brazil given ultimatum to decide Mel’s fate], El Heraldo, September 7, 2009. Previously, the First Secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in Honduras had reported that on July 22, 2009, the de facto government had given the staff of the Venezuelan Embassy in Honduras 72 hours in which to leave the country on the grounds of alleged meddling in Honduran affairs. He also pointed out that when the Venezuelan Embassy personnel refused to leave, the de facto government proceeded to withdraw the diplomatic status of Embassy personnel and that on July 24, eight members of the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation –four of them wearing hoods and carrying rifles- showed up at the Ambassador’s residence to evict and deport him. The attempt was thwarted thanks to the support of social movements and a group of friends of the Venezuelan Embassy. Since that day, vehicles with tinted window glass have allegedly been posted in front of the residence.
 Communication that the IACHR sent on September 29, 2009. On October 19, 2009, the IACHR repeated its request to conduct another on-site visit.
 IACHR, Press Release 69/09: IACHR condemns suspension of guarantees in Honduras, September 29, 2009. Available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/English/2009/69-09eng.htm.
 “Micheletti levanta estado de excepción” [Micheletti lifts state of emergency], BBC World, October 5, 2009; “Ejecutivo suspende el estado de sitio” [Chief Executive suspends state of siege], El Heraldo, October 5, 2009.
 “Gobierno publica decreto que revoca restricciones” [Government publishes decree revoking restrictions], El Heraldo, October 19, 2009.
 Executive Agreement No. 124-2009.
 L.M., e-mail that the IACHR received on October 9, 2009.
 “Principio de acuerdo en Honduras para que Zelaya retorne al poder” [The makings of an agreement in Honduras for Zelaya to return to power], La Nación (Argentina), October 14, 2009; “Delegación de Zelaya espera contrapropuesta de Micheletti para reabrir diálogo” [Zelaya’s delegation awaits Micheletti’s counterproposal for reopening dialogue], TeleSUR, October 19, 2009. The Supreme Court of Justice wrote the following in its observations: “The Guaymuras Tegucigalpa-San José Agreement was signed on October 30 of this year. Participating were representatives of the Government of the Republic and of Mr. Zelaya Rosales. National and international recognition have been obtained as a result of the negotiations between the parties, which is an important step toward a definitive resolution of the crisis and has created optimism in various countries of the Americas and Europe.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, p. 6, paragraph 7.
 Tegucigalpa-San José Agreement, point 5.
 “CSJ rechazaría solicitud del CN sobre restitución” [Supreme Court would not respond to Congressional questions concerning reinstatement of incumbency], El Heraldo, November 9, 2009.
 “Manuel Zelaya da por fracasado acuerdo” [Manuel Zelaya calls the agreement a failure], El Heraldo, November 6, 2009; “Acuerdo Tegucigalpa – San José es ‘letra muerta”[Tegucigalpa-San José Agreement is dead], El Heraldo, November 8, 2009.
 “Zelaya anuncia que no retorna a la presidencia” [Zelaya announces that he is not returning to the presidency], El Heraldo, November 15, 2009. Letter from President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, dated November 14, 2009.
 In its observations, the Supreme Court of Justice stated that: “Similarly, and as a result of the events of June 28, 2009, the International Community acted in haste and inaccurately portrayed the Presidential Succession, which was in fact done in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Honduras and secondary laws, all for the sake of strengthening the rule of law and protecting and preserving democracy in a climate of peace and tranquility.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, p. 6, paragraph 6.
 Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter provides that in the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate. The article also states that if such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the decisions it deems appropriate, including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the Charter of the Organization, international law, and the provisions of this Democratic Charter.
 OAS, Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, Resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09) of June 30, 2009. Available at: http://www.oas.org/CONSEJO/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/37SGA.asp.
 OAS, Press Release C-219: OAS suspends membership of Honduras, July 5, 2009. Available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09. That same day, the Secretary General met with the following persons: the Cardinal Primate of the Catholic Church in Honduras, Oscar Andrés Rodríguez Maradiaga;.the National Party’s presidential candidate, Porfirio Lobo, accompanied by the Party Chairman and Mayor of Tegucigalpa, Ricardo Álvarez; the Liberal Party’s presidential candidate, Elvin Santos; the independent presidential candidate of Bloque Popular and leader of the National Front against the coup d’état, Carlos Reyes, and a group of leaders of that movement. He also met in Tegucigalpa that same day with members of the diplomatic corps and representatives of international organizations. The following were among those attending the meeting: representatives of Canada, the United States, Ecuador, Mexico, Chile, Germany, Spain, France, Japan, Sweden, as well as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations System, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the European Commission, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (COSUDE).
 OAS, Press Release C-219: OAS suspends membership of Honduras, July 5, 2009. Available at: http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09. In its observations, the Supreme Court stated the following: “The Organization of American States acted hastily in condemning the Government of Honduras, thereby denying its right of legitimate self-defense and its right to explain to the American Community the legal grounds for the June 28 Presidential Succession. (…). By their biased conduct, the members of the Organization of American States violated Article 1 of the Charter of the Organization, the second paragraph of which reads as follows: ‘The Organization of American States has no powers other than those expressly conferred upon it by this Charter, none of whose provisions authorizes it to intervene in matters that are within the internal jurisdiction of the Member States.’ Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, pp. 6-7, paragraphs 5 and 8.
 In its observations, the Supreme Court stated the following: “Albeit the suspension of Honduras form the OAS, it continues supervising the full compliance with the human rights instruments that have been ratified by the State, particularly in protection of the life and physical integrity of the persons that have precautionary measures or that have been subjected to detention". Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, pp. 6-7, paragraph 9.
 OAS, Special Session of the General Assembly, resolution AG/RES 2 (XXXVII-E/09) of July 4, 2009, operative paragraphs 1 and 2. Available at: http://www.oas.org/CONSEJO/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY /37SGA.asp#inf.
 “OEA pide respeto a la vida de Manuel Zelaya” [OAS asks that Manuel Zelaya’s right to life be respected], El Heraldo, September 21, 2009; “OEA pide reconciliación y evitar actos de violencia” [OAS seeks reconciliation and end to violence], El Heraldo, September 22, 2009; “OEA aprueba resolución en solidaridad al retorno de Zelaya” [OAS approves resolution expressing support for Zelaya’s return], TeleSUR, September 22, 2009.
 OAS, General Secretariat, Press Release C-311/09, OAS Secretary General Condemns Honduran Authorities’ Decision to Forbid Entrance of OAS High Officials into the Country, September 27, 2009.
 OAS, General Secretariat, Press Release C-321/09, OAS Secretary General Confirms Recent Meeting with Micheletti, October 3, 2009.
 OAS, General Secretariat, Press Release C-322/09, OAS Mission Will Arrive in Honduras This Wednesday, October 7, October 5, 2009.
 OAS, Permanent Council, declaration CP/DEC. 43 (1723/09) of October 21, 2009.
 “Arias se ofrece como mediador en conflicto político hondureño” [Arias offers to mediate Honduran political conflict], La Tribuna, July 6, 2009.
 “Zelaya acepta mediación de Arias” [Zelaya agrees to Arias’ mediation], El Tiempo, July 7, 2009; “Honduras rivals back peace moves,” BBC Americas, July 8, 2009; “Micheletti acepta mediación de Arias” [Micheletti agrees to Arias’ mediation], La Tribuna, July 7, 2009; “Arias mediará en conflicto hondureño si acepta Zelaya” [Arias will mediate Honduran conflict if Zelaya agrees], La Nación (Costa Rica), July 7, 2009.
 “Arias iniciará mediación sobre Honduras el jueves en su propia casa” [Arias to begin mediation of Honduran conflict at his own home on Thursday], La Nación (Costa Rica), July 7, 2009.
 The delegation representing President Zelaya was composed of his Foreign Minister, Patricia Rodas; a Congresswoman with the Partido Unificación Democrática [Democratic Unification Party], Silvia Ayala; the coordinator of grassroots organizations, Salvador Zúniga; and the chairman of the Banking and Insurance Commission, Milton Jiménez. The delegation appointed by Mr. Micheletti was composed of former Foreign Minister Carlos López, advisors Arturo Corrales and Mauricio Villega, and Vilma Morales, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. ““Comisiones designadas por Zelaya y Micheletti se reúnen en Costa Rica” [Delegations appointed by Zelaya and Micheletti meet in Costa Rica], La Tribuna, July 10, 2009.
 The proposal consisted of the following points: 1) the return of President Zelaya to the Office of the President of the Republic until the end of the term for which he was elected, which would be January 27, 2010; 2) formation of a National Unity and Reconciliation Government composed of representatives of the major Honduran political parties; 3) a general amnesty, to apply exclusively to political crimes committed in connection with the conflict, before and after June 28; 4) President Zelaya’s express commitment not to pursue his plan to place a fourth ballot box or conduct a public consultation, which is not expressly authorized by the National Constitution; 5) a speeding up of the national elections originally set down for November 29, 2009, so that they are held instead on the last Sunday in October of this year; 6) command of the Armed Forces, which are ordinarily under the Executive Branch, would be transferred to the Supreme Electoral Council one month before the elections; and 7) formation of a verification commission composed of Honduran citizens and members of international organizations –especially representatives of the OAS- which would be in charge of overseeing compliance with the agreement.
 “Zelaya acepta propuesta de Arias, Micheletti no” [Zelaya accepts Arias proposal; Micheletti does not], La Tribuna, July 18, 2009; “Zelaya acepta encabezar un Gobierno de concentración como propone Arias” [Zelaya agrees to head up a reconciliation government, as Arias proposes], El País (Spain), July 19, 2009.
 “Lo siento mucho, responde canciller ante propuesta de restituir a Zelaya en el poder” [‘I’m very sorry’ is the foreign minister’s answer to the proposal to return Zelaya to power], El Heraldo, June 18, 2009; “Gobierno de Micheletti rechaza acuerdo inmediato para reinstalar a Zelaya” [Micheletti government rejects agreement to reinstate Zelaya], La Tribuna, July 18, 2009.
 The counterproposal also consisted of 7 points, namely: 1) President Zelaya’s return to Honduras as an ordinary citizen, without his office, with full guarantees that his rights to due process of law would be respected; 2) formation of a national unity and reconciliation government composed of members of different political parties and social sectors; 3) the guarantee of the effective enforcement of the rule of law, thereby ensuring that the professionalism of the police will be respected, the public finances will be preserved intact, and that the budget recently approved by Congress will be observed; 4) formation of a Truth Commission; 5) the possibility of moving up the elections set down for November 29, which will depend on the reaction of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the presidential candidates; 6) transfer of command of the Armed Forces from the Executive branch to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal four months before the date of the elections; and 7) formation of a Truth Commission –composed only of Honduran citizens- whose mission would be to verify compliance with the agreement and report on the matter to international organizations.
 “Oscar Arias da 72 horas para buscar acuerdo sobre la crisis” [Oscar Arias gives 72 hours to reach an agreement on the crisis], La Tribuna, July 19, 2009. “Fracaso de la segunda ronda de diálogo para resolver la crisis política en Honduras. Arias pide 72 horas para evitar un derramamiento de sangre” [Second round of dialogue to settle political crisis in Honduras fails. Arias asks for 72 hours to avoid bloodshed], El País, July 20, 2009.
 “Arias presentó el Acuerdo de San José para buscar reconciliación en Honduras” [Arias presented the San José Agreement for reconciliation in Honduras], La Nación, July 22, 2009; “Arias propone que Mel regrese el viernes” [Arias proposes that Mel return on Friday], La Prensa, July 22, 2009.
 San José Agreement, Article 11: Timetable for complying with the agreements; “Acuerdo de San José, clave para poner fin a la crisis política de Honduras” [San José Agreement, key to putting the Honduran political crisis to an end], El Heraldo, July 27, 2009.
 “Acuerdo de San José ha fracasado” [San José Agreement has failed], TeleSUR, July 22, 2007; “Honduras sigue abierta al diálogo” [Honduras remains open to dialogue], La Tribuna, July 23, 2009.
 United Nations, General Assembly, 93rd plenary meeting, 63rd session, Resolution 63/301. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4a535f4a2.pdf. The Supreme Court of Honduras wrote the following in its observations: “Concerning Resolution 63/301, “The situation in Honduras: democracy breakdown,”’ which the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights cites in its draft report, the State of Honduras again attests: That it is and always has been respectful of the principle of the right to self-determination of peoples, in keeping with the major international instruments, among them the United Nations Charter, Article 2, paragraph 7 of which provides that: ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.’ The conclusion, then, is that the very resolution issued by the United Nations against the State of Honduras concerning the latter’s internal affairs is a violation of the principle of the self-determination of peoples and of the United Nations Charter itself. At the session held on June 30, with Mr. Zelaya Rosales in attendance, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, by consensus, Resolution 63/301 ‘The situation in Honduras: democracy breakdown.’ In that resolution, the United Nations demanded that former President José Manuel Zelaya be immediately restored to office. At the request of Mr. Zelaya Rosales’ Commission, the decision in the Guaymas Agreement was that the National Congress would decide whether or not to restore the former president to office; under that Agreement, the parties agreed to accept the decision taken by Congress. Before issuing its decision, the National Congress heard from the Supreme Court, the Office of the Attorney General, the National Human Rights Commission and the Public Prosecutor’s Office regarding Mr. Zelaya Rosales’ legal situation.” Observations made by the State of Honduras to the IACHR’s Report, dated December 22, 2009 and signed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, pp. 7-8, paras. 10-13.
 Office of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Press Release on visit to Honduras by the Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, August 10, 2009.
 “ONU excluye de nuevo a representante de Honduras” [UN again ejects Honduras’ representative], El Heraldo, September 15, 2009.
 U.N., General Secretariat, Secretary-General suspends technical assistance for elections in Honduras, September 23, 2009, Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sgsm12482.doc.htm.
 “’Cesar acoso’ pide Consejo de Seguridad” [Security Council: “Stop Harassing”], El Heraldo, September 25, 2009.
 “La ONU, alarmada por la presencia de paramilitares en Honduras” [UN alarmed by the presence of paramilitaries in Honduras], El País, October 10, 2009.
 ONU, Secretary General, Honduran president’s ouster is ‘coup d’état,’ UN Secretariat reaffirms, 14 October 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32543&Cr=honduras&Cr1=.
 “Honduras: UN sends team to examine human rights violations after coup”, UN News Centre, October 16, 2009. Available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32582&Cr=honduras&Crl=.
European Union, Press Release 12255/09 (Presse 222). Available at:
 “La UE y Brasil condenan la violación del orden constitucional en Honduras” [The EU and Brazil condemn breach of the constitutional order in Honduras], TeleSUR, October 6, 2009.
 The measures that SICA agreed upon include the following: 1) to instruct the directors of the SICA countries to the Central American Bank of Economic Integration to immediately suspend all loans and disbursements to Honduras; 2) to suspend any type of meetings with the “coup regime” in Honduras; 3) to ban any representatives not accredited by President Zelaya from participating in SICA meetings; 4) to support the OAS’ June 28, 2009 resolution on Honduras and to ask for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to “issue a resolution of condemnation and adopt the appropriate coercive measures”; 5) to take all necessary measures against the coup regime in Honduras, until President Zelaya is returned to office. Document available at: http://www.sica.int/busqueda/documentos_recientes.aspx.
 Proclamation of the Special Presidential Council, June 29, 2009, Managua, Nicaragua.
 Declaration of the VII Summit of ALBA, concerning the coup d’état in Honduras, adopted on October 17, 2009 in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
 “Grupo de Río y cancilleres de LA reclaman la restitución de Zelaya” [Rio Group and LA foreign ministers demand Zelaya’s return to office], El Tiempo, November 10, 2009.
 Organizations in the International Observation Mission for the Human Rights Situation in Honduras: the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH); the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL); the Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico (CIFCA); FIAN International; the Inter-American Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development (PIDHDD); the Consultancy on Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES-Colombia); Suedwind- Austria; Human Rights Institute of the Universidad CentroAmericana “José Simeón Cañas” (IDHUCA-El Salvador); the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos [Pro Human Rights Association] (APRODEH-Peru); the Alianza Social Continental [Hemispheric Social Alliance] Linking Alternatives; the Instituto de Estudios Políticos sobre América Latina y África [Institute of Policy Studies on Latin America and Africa (IEPALA-Spain)]; the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [National Human Rights Coordinator] (Peru); Servicio Paz y Justicia [Peace and Justice Service] (SERPAJ-Uruguay); World Solidarity Movement – Belgium; IBIS and the Center of Tricontinental Studies.
The preliminary report is available [in Spanish] at:
 On this last point, the Mission lists the following Nicaraguan nationals as victims of arbitrary detentions: J.M.T.T., N.E.A.R, T.R.B.M, A.J.G.O., P.Y.B., J.D.F., F.I.C., C.D.B.M., J.G., D.A.R.L., M.A.A.F., H.G.M.L and D.J.
 The other members of the delegation were: Eduardo de León of the Rigoberta Menchú Tum Foundation; Carmela Curup of the Asociación de Abogados Mayas de Guatemala por la Convergencia de los Derechos Humanos [Association of Mayan Attorneys of Guatemala for the Convergence of Human Rights]; Iduvina Hernández of Seguridad en Democracia –SEDEM- [Security in Democracy]; Claudia Samayoa of the Unidad de Protección de Defensores y Defensoras de Derechos Humanos –UDEFEGUA- [Unit for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders]; Mario Domingo from the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala –ODHAG-; Arturo Albizures from the Asociación COMUNICARTE; Graham Russel and Rosa Martínez, from Derechos en Acción [Rights in Action].