OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CUBA
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man establishes, in
Article XX, the right to vote and to participate in government under the
Political rights, as they are considered by the Declaration, have two
clearly identifiable aspects: the
right to direct exercise of power and the right to elect those who exercise it.
This is founded upon a broad conception of representative democracy
which, by definition, rests on the
sovereignty of the people, and in which the functions through which power is
exercised are carried out by persons chosen in free and “genuine” elections.
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration and Article 23 of the American
Convention of Human Rights add no substantive elements to those contained in the
For its part, it is the doctrine of the IACHR that the exercise of the
right to political participation makes possible “the right to organize parties
and political associations, which through open discussion and ideological
struggle, can improve the social level and economic circumstances of the masses
and prevent a monopoly on power by any one group or individual.”
Furthermore, the Commission has maintained that “governments have, in
the face of political rights and
the right to political participation, the obligation to permit and guarantee:
the organization of all political parties and other associations, unless
they are constituted to violate human rights; open debate of the principal
themes of socioeconomic development; the celebration of general and free
elections with all the necessary guarantees so that the results represent the
It is now in order to attempt to discern how the institutional system
established in the Constitution functions in practice.
For that purpose, the forms under which the participation of the people
takes place will be studied; next, the forms in which political power is
exercised by the leadership group will be presented, and the last section will
specify the limits to political participation.
Participation of the People
In practice, the Cuban political system promotes broad political
participation of its citizens, which is nevertheless restricted to matters of a
local nature, and therefore, of limited competence; substantive political
activity is restricted to a limited group, as will be seen below.
Official figures indicate that in local elections, the number of voters
was extraordinarily high. In the
most recent municipal elections (1981), some 6 million people voted, or the
equivalent of 97.2% of those registered. The
number of voters was also high, reaching 93.6% in the run-off elections held one
week later in the districts were there were several candidates and none had
obtained 50% of the votes cast on the first ballot.
In addition, citizens have the right to submit public complaints with
respect to the quality of goods and services.
The mass organizations have even encouraged these “concrete”
criticisms. Citizens are urged to
present their complaints to the elected local authorities, who in turn should
report back to the community the results of steps they have taken to solve these
problems. These accountability
assemblies represent an important characteristic of the political system since
1976. In the Province of La Havana,
for example, in the course of six months in 1981-82, there were 1,407 assemblies
of this kind, at which 9,251 complaints or suggestions were presented to 833
delegates. Sixty percent of these
complaints was settled or received reply within six months, 16% was not solved
immediately, 7% was being processed and 17% remained pending in the third
quarter of 1982. In that same
period, 92,996 complaints or suggestions on specific goods and services were
presented in the country as a whole.
This is the positive result of the prompt reaction of local government,
bearing in mind standards of comparison. In
this way, citizens have mechanisms to make those who hold local public offices
accountable for the administration of governmental institutions, especially
local ones. Thus, in 1979, 40% of the authorities elected in 1976 at the
local level were not reelected.
Participation in the officially sponsored organizations of the people is
also very strong. At the beginning
of the sixties, approximately 80% of the adult population served on the Comities
de Defensa de la Revolución (CDR) (Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution) and a comparable proportion of adult women formed part of the
Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC) (Federation of Cuban Women).
These high rates of participation could be an indication of agreement
with the policies of the government and of the Party. Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate how much political
support they in fact represent for the regime.
In Cuba, membership in the people’s organizations—including the large
union and peasant associations—is practically a prerequisite for any routine
activity, since membership affects admission to universities, promotions, access
to certain kinds of vacation or recreational activities, the obtainment of
nonperishable products that require that a union certify that the buyer is an
“advanced worker”. It is this
that makes it difficult to distinguish when the decision to join a people’s
organization reflects a desire to support the regime, and when it is a response
to the material benefits that derive from it and which cannot be obtained
Given the substantial political and material incentives for joining the
people’s organizations, nonmembers find themselves in an unfavorable
situation. This can be the
consequence of an individual decision not to join, even though such a decision
entails a very high personal cost; nevertheless it is also probable that it is
the result of a decision of the people’s organization to refuse admission.
The proportion of the adult population that belongs to the CDRs or the
FMC has remained constant over a decade. The
new members of each of these organizations, for the most part, are the
consequence of normal demographic growth and not of other recruitment efforts
aimed at the adult population. As
President Fidel Castro explained, the only reason that there are not more
members is that in recent years the organization has taken special care in the
selection of its new members. The
Statutes of the CDRs, ratified at their Second Congress held in October, 1981,
demonstrate how centralized political controls operate with respect to members.
If the CDR of a zone wishes to admit someone over 18 years of age, it may
only do so with the express approval of the Executive Secretary of the CDR of
the next highest level. Those who
do not join these organizations truly remain outside the mainstream of Cuban
political life. This may be of
their own choice, but it is certainly also a result of government policy.
It is likely that those who are not members of these associations are
represented disproportionately among those who chose to emigrate.
Preliminary data suggest that the rate of those not belonging to these
organizations among those who emigrated in 1980 to the United States, was twice
as high as the rate of members in the entire adult population of Cuba; in other
demographic respects the majority of these emigrants were representative of the
Cuban population and belonged to the labor force.
Although participation in the people’s organizations is quite high, it
is of a predominantly consultative rather than decision-making nature.
The principal task of the people’s organizations consists of
transmitting the messages of the government to the people, socializing citizens,
performing the services requested by the Party and the Government and, more
recently, transmitting the citizens’ practical criticisms, in accordance with
the new municipal policies. The
impact of the people’s organizations of the decisions that affect them is
probably less in the case of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution
and greater in the Asociacion Nacional de Pequenos Agricultores (ANAP) (National
Association of Small Farmers). The
Federacion de Mujeres (Federation of Women) and the Confederacion del Trabajo
(labor Confederation) occupy an intermediate position.
It is difficult to determine in a reliable way if the CDRs have permitted
effective participation in the decision-making process.
On the contrary, they appear to be essentially an instrument of control.
Their principal task continues to be revolutionary “vigilance”
against the enemies of the regime, which include common criminals.
The CDRs have other tasks for neighborhood improvement and progress; they
call on the citizens to participate in local activities that are important for
their existence, but the national government has successfully focused their
attention on the long-standing commitment to “vigilance”.
This was the fundamental motive behind their foundation and today it
continues to be their chief task. Between
1977 and 1981 the committees sent an average of 123 daily reports to the
Ministry of the Interior.
The data on participation in labor matters is more complex.
Laws on planning and budget should presumably be discussed by the workers
of the enterprises, so that they may exercise the principal function of the
proletariat. In 1978, 34% of all
enterprises did not discuss the 1979 plan with the workers and 58% of them
submitted the programs to the workers’ assemblies but introduced no changes in
the plan as a result of Suggestions made. In
only 8% of the enterprises did the workers participate in discussion of the
plan, with inclusion of some suggestions. Even in this minority, participation was characterized by
emphasis on the role of the manager, the labor and party leaders, and others
holding leadership positions.
Some progress was made with respect to consideration of the 1980 Plan.
Approximately 59% of the enterprises held assemblies and introduced
certain changes in the Plan in accordance with proposals that were received.
Nevertheless, when the 1980 Plan was submitted to the National Assembly,
Jorge Riquet, member of the party Secretariat, successfully deleted from the
bill the reference to the previous participation of the workers in the plan,
alleging that this was incorrect.
In sum, the participation of the workers is of a consultative nature in
the best of cases.
Most of the work of the provincial assemblies on matters of importance is
also chiefly consultative rather than effective participation in
decision-making. Although budgetary
legislation provides that the provincial assemblies consider the budget bill
before it is submitted to the National Assembly, in practice this was never done
in the entire course of the seventies. On
the other hand, the budgetary law has been considered by the executive
committees of the provincial assemblies and not by the assemblies themselves,
and although there is information that it was recently presented to the
provincial assemblies, the example of the national Assembly would suggest that
it is unlikely that the budget has been actually discusses.
The extent of consultation and its possible impact on the decision-making
process is greater for a subordinate national elite, despite the imposition of
important restrictions. The Cuban
national Assembly, constituted overwhelmingly of members of the Communist Party,
has a very limited normative role, although not an unimportant one.
It meets for only five days each year, and the deputies have permanent
The number of people in the National Assembly is small, which makes it
possible to deal in an expeditious way with the matters that come before it
during the few days on which it meets. The
life of the committees, although somewhat more active than in the early years,
continues at a moderate pace. For
example, the committees that would be responsible for carrying out the work
mandated by the Assembly which met in December, 1981, had not yet been installed
three months later.
The National Assembly has little apparent impact on foreign policy,
military policy or on planning and the national budget.
These matters are submitted to the Assembly, but discussions are routine
and superficial. Leadership
officials have never been defeated in an Assembly vote.
The Council of State, the majority of which belongs to the Bureau of the
Communist Party, governs in representation of the Assembly when the latter is
not in session, which is to say nearly always.
A large part of the work of the national assembly is reduced to
ratification of laws and decrees issued by the Council of State, receipt of
reports, and performance of protocolary tasks.
Nevertheless, subjects that are not matters of “high policy” are
energetically debated in the National Assembly.
At times the authorities have withdrawn laws that have been the object of
energetic criticism. The Assembly
has had significant impact on legislation regarding environmental protection and
use of resources, soil rehabilitation and protection of marshlands, and on the
transportation code. Of course,
these debates continue to take place within the elite of the national Assembly,
but they are evidence that there is a certain degree of discussion and
disagreement within the limits of the governing group.
These debates illustrate the role of leaders other than Fidel Castro,
although they also portray him as the highest arbiter with authority to settle
all disputes. The leaders who
probably participate the most are the members of the political leadership, of
the Secretariat, of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers.
As was stated by the journal Bohemia in 1982, “not many deputies
participated in the discussion concerning the most important subjects”.
This limited but important role of the national Assembly illustrates a
general form of political stratification. The
leaders who rank below the highest officials have a moderate influence on some
decisions, although the fundamental issues of the policy of the State and the
Party remain outside the effective control of even an assembly that is made up
of an overwhelming majority of members of the Communist Party.
Below this level, influence on the decision-making process declines
rapidly, although some elements of consultation penetrate this political system
that is maintained on the basis of extensive albeit controlled political
These political consultations legitimize the authority of the governing
leaders and improve the quality of government with respect to details, but this
does not mean that they can lead to substantive modifications of the current
political system. Even so, the high
level of participation in daily matters by broad sectors of the population is a
positive step. This tendency to
allow greater controlled participation led to an experiment with respect to
local power, initiated in 1974 in the Province of Matanzas, which functioned
sufficiently well to be extended to the rest of the country two years later;
elections were held throughout the country at that time to fill public offices.
Nevertheless, it should also be pointed out that limited discussion of
fundamental policy issues by elitist circles is very far from generating active
The Group in Power
The first element that draws attention is the dominant role exercised by
President Fidel Castro in political life. Although
the Cuban Constitution provides that the President of the Council of State and
the Council of Ministers be elected and that he may be replaced by the National
Assembly, the political role of Fidel Castro is so overwhelming that these
constitutional procedures in reality are meaningless.
It is Fidel Castro who governs Cuba;
he is the only living person mention by name in the Cuban Constitution
and he is repeatedly named in the introductory section of the Statutes of the
Communist Party. Moreover, he is
treated with the highest deference by the other members of the government.
He personifies the revolution.
In fact, there is an open contradiction between the constitutional
provisions on collective organs and the reality of the State’s powers.
According to the former, power is shared among collective organs that
proceed on the basis of majority opinions, grounded in unrestricted freedom of
expression, and that obtain broad consensus due to fundamental unity in the
exercise of power.
Thus it is that the organ is much more important than its President.
It was stated above that the President of the Council of State and the
Council of Ministers, i.e., the head of Government, is subject to the respective
organizations, so that the chief representative of the Government is in fact not
the president of the republic, as in other constitutions, but rather the Council
In fact, this principle is followed only with respect to the national
Assembly, where the President plays no visible role either within or outside of
it. But this is not the case of the
Council of State and the Council of Ministers.
Neither institution stands before the public as the governors.
That role is clearly in the hands of the President of both organs, who at
all times functions as Head of Government and Secretary General of the Communist
Party. In the eyes of the public,
there is no higher authority than that of this leader.
No one in or out of Cuba attributes authority, except of a secondary
nature, to other figures or formal authorities.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Constitution always makes
provision for smaller organizations that permanently take over the work of the
principal organs. The National
assembly has the Council of State as executive and permanent organ.
In turn, the provincial and Municipal assemblies appoint an Executive
Committee (Article 114); the supreme Court has a Governing Council (Article
124). The Council of Ministers also
has an Executive Committee (Article 95). This
is also the case in the Communist Party.
In this fashion, the power which appears to be exercised by large
corporate bodies in representation of the people is handed over, in immediate
decisions, to smaller groups where the President of the Council of State,
President of the Council of Ministers, President of the Executive Committee of
the Council of Ministers and Secretary General of the Communist Party has a
predominant role. That is the
From a juridical and political viewpoint, the foregoing is very important
since other systems rest openly on the figure of the chief, in the understanding
that he assumes all power through the authentic delegation of the people who
consider themselves embodied in his authority.
The problem raised by this situation is how it has come about that the
severest critics of this personalistic exercise of power, who are dedicated to
replacing it with a new organization with full participation of the people,
offer, in the external features of their system, all the characteristics of an
The second element to consider is that the Cuban political system is not
simply a one-man government. The
other members of the principal organs of the State and the party also play
principal roles in today’s Cuba, and it should be pointed out that very few
changes have taken place in the membership of these higher ranks.
For example, only four of the sixteen members of the political Bureau of
the Communist Party did not already hold an important position within the
government in the mid-sixties (usually the position of Minister which was the
highest office at that time). Of
the four exceptions, three were members of the Communist Party prior to the
revolution, which had not yet formally entered the Government coalition, but who
already in 1961 held high-ranking positions, as they have done since then. Seven senior executives of the Council of State have been
high-ranking government leaders since 1961.
Since 1965, only two “new” members have been added to the fourteen of
the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers.
It can be seen from the above that the leadership of Cuba has remained
practically unchanged for two decades.
Moreover, the overlap among the stable elite’s that control these key
political institutions is extraordinary. Eleven
of the sixteen members of the political Bureau are also members of the Council
of Ministers with a direct line of responsibility; fourteen of the members of
the Political Bureau of the party served on the Council of State where they held
a majority. Of the fourteen members
of the Executive Committee of the Council of ministers, eight belong to the
political Bureau and all are members of the Central Committee of the Party.
A combined total of twenty-two persons occupy the Political Bureau of the
party, the highest executive positions of the Council of State and the Executive
Committee of the Council of Ministers.
In sum, an extremely small number of people have been in power for many
years without interruption, holding all the most important political positions
of the party, State and governmental institutions.
Therefore, there is no genuine political autonomy or opposition between
these three institutions at the highest level of leadership, or is any of these
bodies capable of avoiding the arbitrary measures adopted by one of them,
because they are composed of the same people.
A comparable degree of continuity can be observed at the next level of
government. For example, 84% of the
members of the Central Committee in 1965 was reelected to the same posts in
1980. In general, the members of
the Central Committee who died or left office were replaced b the same kind of
persons: white men, born around
1930, who were active in the 1950’s in the struggle against the Government of
Batista and who formed part of the July 26 Movement headed by Fidel Castro, and
who have faithfully served the revolutionary government since 1959.
Nevertheless, approximately one-fifth of the leaders are older people,
old members of the Communist Party prior to the revolution.
The proportion of non-white members on the Central Committee has been
kept low and constant: approximately 10 or 15%, although no less than one-fourth of
all Cubans is not of the white race. In
1980 women represented 12% of the members on the Central Committee, duplicating
their earlier participation, although their number is still small.
31. Since the defeat and imprisonment in 1968 of
the so-called “microfaction” within the Cuban Communist Party, led by Anibal
Escalante, there has been no effective opposition to political power in Cuba.
Although the formal procedures of the Party and the State theoretically
allow for rotation in government, in reality this has not occurred and it is
extremely difficult to imagine that is could occur.
The Limits on Participation
It can be seen from the above that political participation is extremely
reduced with respect to both national and international substantive policy.
It is possible that this limitation is the result of the influence of
several factors, especially the requirement of ideological adherence, the
requirements attached to electoral mechanisms and the intolerance of the group
in power toward forms of political opposition, two of which will be analyzed
Political participation, especially in substantive matters, requires an
ideological adherence that can be described as dogmatic.
The origin of this requirement is to be found in the text of the
Constitution and it penetrates the entirety of Cuban society.
As Marx indicated, here also ideology plays a role similar to that of
cement in the construction of a building. It
serves to keep the various elements that compose it united.
Because it is closely tied to the subject of freedom of opinion, this
aspect will be treated in Chapter V of this report; at this point, it is
sufficient to point out its particular relevance to the exercise of political
A further significant limitation of political participation is that
derived from the electoral mechanisms that function at the provincial, municipal
and national levels. In this
regard, it may be observed that as the Cuban regime became institutionalized,
the Government undertook an opening of the political system.
The above cited experiment in local government in 1974 in Matanzas, and
the elections held in 1976 throughout the country to fill public offices, reveal
various characteristics that define and limit the impact of this change.
Direct elections are held only to fill municipal legislative offices.
There is no direct vote for any executive or legislative office except at
the municipal level. Citizens do
not have the right to run of their own will and self-nomination is illegal.
Candidates must be proclaimed at an assembly in a vote by a show of hands
and they cannot manage their own electoral campaigns.
Only the Communist Party and the mass organizations have the right to
distribute propaganda or organize electoral meetings.
Therefore, critics of the Government cannot exchange opinions or
information, and do not have the right to association.
Only the Government has the right to publish the official biography of
the candidate, and he may not delete any information that the Government wishes
to disseminate. This method lends
itself to being used to discourage candidates that the Government deems
undesirable, and, to avoid humiliation, many of them have withdrawn from races.
The members of the party may be personally active in the assemblies for
nominations to guarantee that their favorite candidates are on the lists,
although the party does not formally support candidates.
The most important change introduced by the electoral legislation and
which has been followed in practice, has been the requirement that there can be
no fewer than two candidates for the same office in the municipal assembly.
Beyond the municipal level, there are still severe restrictions on the
opposition. All delegates to the
provincial assemblies, deputies in the National assembly and leaders of local
municipal governments are elected by local assemblies.
The list of candidates for these offices is drawn up and presented by a
committee chaired by a member of the Communist Party and made up of
representatives of the Party, the Union de Juventudes Communistas (Young
Communist League) and the mass organizations.
The number of candidates is only 25% higher than the number of offices.
It should be pointed out that the proportion of Party members rises
steadily from the municipal assemblies to the national Assembly:
over 90% of the members of the latter are also members of the party,
despite the fact that only 7% of the electorate is affiliated to it.
Provincial delegates and national deputies need not have been directly
elected as members to the municipal assemblies.
The nomination committees, chaired by a party member, are free to
nominate the candidate of their choice. Over
two-fifths of the deputies in the national Assembly have never appeared directly
before their electorate, which can result in protecting them from monitoring by
the people. Electoral legislation
also contains provisions for dismissal that can be employed to easily remove
elected municipal delegates from office.
The intolerance of the opposition
Nevertheless, the intolerance of the group in power toward any form of
political opposition represents the principal limitation on participation.
The constitutional basis that legitimizes this tendency is Article 61 of
the Constitution that was analyzed above.
Although the proscription of unconstitutional acts is reasonable, the
radical text of this article limits even simple freedom of expression.
Speeches that are critical of the objectives of the Socialist State,
although not linked to other actions, may be prohibited.
Even the articles of Chapter VI of the Constitution on fundamental
rights, duties and guarantees drastically limit the formal political rights
necessary to any democratic regime. Article
52 recognizes freedom of expression and of the press, but only “in keeping
with the objectives of socialist society”.
Should this leave room for any doubt, the article further stipulates the
condition that “the law regulates the exercise of these freedoms”.
Article 54 states that religious beliefs may not be used as the basis for
the political opposition to the regime because it is “illegal and punishable
by law to oppose one’s faith or religious belief to the Revolution”.
Freedom of expression is also limited in Article 38. Subparagraph e),
where it is stated that artistic freedom exists “as long as its content is not
contrary to the revolution”. The
Constitution therefore establishes the legal basis for censorship, since it is
the State that determines whether oral or written expression, art, religious
beliefs or actions are contrary to the revolution.
The Constitution also provides the legal basis for the State to direct
all artistic, cultural, or press activities.
The above-mentioned Article 31 of the Statute of the Communist Party is a
clear indicator of the limits within which even its own members carry out their
In fact, political practice has demonstrated that prejudice against
public opposition is widespread. Since
1960, all of the information media have been in the hands of the Government.
There are no legal means to openly challenge the policies of the
Government and the Party or to compete as a group, movement or partisan
organization for the right to govern, to use peaceful means to replace the
Communist Party and its leaders and to set new and different policies.
The principal criticism expressed in public against Government policies
comes from the very members of the upper levels of the Government.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to set forth an open and organized
criticism of the policy of the Government and the Party that would make the
highest leaders assume responsibility, hold them accountable, and subject them
to dismissal from office.
This is, therefore, a markedly authoritarian regime which has used
various methods—control of information and scientific and cultural activities,
imprisonment of opposition, massive migration abroad, etc.—in order to
restrict and even eliminate any form of political opposition.
Although it is true that the current regime has undergone all kinds of
both internal and external pressures, which authorize it to adopt exceptional
measures in its defense, it is also true that the eradication of any kind of
opposition—even within the Communist Party itself—is a clear statement of a
political intolerance that goes beyond the limits set by the legitimate reaction
of the State as a result of the need to defend itself. Furthermore, the Commission considers that the methods
employed have often been illegitimate and disproportionate to the magnitude of
the faults committed, as will be seen below when the situation of political
prisoners is reviewed.
In view of the above, the Commission finds that, in its normative
structure, the Cuban political system establishes principles, the observance of
which could lead to the adequate protection of human rights.
However, the absence of the necessary separation of powers leads to a
marked subordination to political power of the range of activities in Cuban
society. This situation is reinforced by the use in the Constitution
of terms and concepts taken from doctrines of political philosophy which are of
little use to bring about the effective observance of the principles of
objectivity and legality, which are necessary guarantees against impairment of
the rights of citizens by political power.
The Commission also considers that the Cuban political system grants a
counterproductive preponderance to the Communist Party, which, in fact, has
become a stronger force than the State itself and which impedes the existence of
healthy ideological and Party pluralism, which is one of the bases of a
democratic system of government. The
most important state organs are controlled by members of the Communist Party who
also wield decisive influence in the operation of the mechanisms for the
selection of candidates to hold elective office.
This enforces an ideological adherence that may be described as
uncritical and dogmatic.
In the opinion of the Commission, the existence of supreme organs of a
collegiate nature is a positive feature of the Cuban political order, since it
emphasizes the use of negotiating procedures to obtain the necessary consensus
for effective political action; in principle, the collegiate organs constitute a
sound basis to achieve the broad participation of the citizenry in national
policy. The Commission points out, however, that in practice the
principal organs of the State and the Communist Party have been controlled by a
small group since the very beginning of the current Cuban political process.
Within this group, the role played by President Fidel Castro, who in effect and
in the last instance exercises power in Cuba, stands out clearly.
This situation was brought about and is maintained by the exercise of
marked intolerance toward any form of political opposition, for the elimination
of which illegitimate methods or methods disproportionate to the magnitude of
faults committed have often been employed.
The Commission also recognizes that, in so acting, the Cuban State has
responded in many instances to real and serous threats, both internal and
46. The Commission considers the high level of participation of the people in matters of a local and sectoral nature, and the progressive conversion of municipal administrative positions to elective office as a positive element of the Cuban political system. The Commission hopes that the internal and international conditions will be created to bring about the effective and authentic participation of the citizens of Cuba in the political decisions that affect them, in a framework of freedom and pluralism necessary to the effective observance of all human rights.
It will be
appreciated that, the concrete exercise of these political rights is closely
linked to the practice of other fundamental rights, such as, for example,
the right to association and to freedom of expression.
However, for reasons of methodology, the observance of these rights
is analyzed separately.
73, No. 42 (October 16, 1981), page 48 and No. 3 (October 23, 1981), p.50.
April 6, 1981, p. 4, and October 30, 1982.
las elecciones del poder popular”, Verde Olivo
20, No. 10, March 11, 1979, p.9.
January 31, 1981, p.1; October 23, 1981, p.4, January 23, 1982, p.2; Gamma
Weekly Review, October 5, 1980, p.2; Bohemia 73, No. 44, (October
30, 1981, pp.48 and 52
Bach, Jennifer B. Bach and Timothy Triplett, “The Flotilla ‘Entrants’:
latest and Most Controversial,” Cuban Studies 11 No. 12 and
12 No. 1 (July 1981 – January 1982): 29-48; and Gaston A. Fernandez,
“Comment – The Flotilla Entrants:
Are they Different?” ibid, pp.49-54.
Dominguez, Jorge, Cuba:
Order and Revolution, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1978), chapter 7.
October 23, 1981, p.4.
marcha la implantacion del sistema de direccion y planificacion de la
Bohemia 71, No. 27 (July 6, 1979), p.36; Comision Nacional de
Implantacion, Sistema de Direccion y Planificacion de la Economia, Informe
July, 1980), p. 48; Granma, December 27, 1979, p.4.
July 4, 1980, p.3.
Internal and International affairs, (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1982), pp.33-38.
discussion on the customary time limitations in the work of the national
Assembly, see Granma, July 3, 1982, pp. 3-4
March 25, 1982, p.1.
74, No. 2 (January 8, 1982), p.52.
is based on Granma of July 21, 1976, p.4; of July 22, 1976, pp.2-3;
of September 2, 1976, p.1; of September 30, 1976, p.2: of November 8, 1976,
p.31: of December 3, 1976, p.4: Granma Weekly review, August 22,
1976, p.4: and of July 11, 1982.
December 28, 1980, p.12, for the number of Party members;
preliminary data from the 1981 census, in Granma Weekly Review,
November 8, 1981, p.4.