REPORT Nº 12/96 (*)

    ARGENTINA

  CASE 11.245

March 1, 1996

 

 

       1.     On November 17, 1993, a claim against the Government of Argentina was lodged with the Commission regarding the situation of Jorge Alberto Giménez.  The claim alleges that the holding of Mr. Giménez in preventive custody since September 1989 in the absence of a sentence violates the rights that are set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights--in particular Article 7(5) (his  right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings) and Article 8(2) (the right to presumption of innocence).

 

       I.         THE FACTS

 

       2.     Mr. Giménez was taken into custody on September 29, 1989 and the order of pretrial detention was issued shortly thereafter.  He has on various occasions asked  that he be conditionally released from prison, but those requests have been denied, both by the judge of the lower court and the Court of Appeals.

 

       3.     A conviction handed down in December of 1993 in proceeding No. 1757 of the Letter "W" Sentencing Court found Jorge Alberto Giménez guilty of aggravated robbery plus two counts of automobile theft, considered to be joint offenses.  He was then sentenced to serve nine years in prison--a term which will expire on September 28, 1998.  On March 14, 1995, the Appeals Court of the Federal Capital confirmed the sentence handed down by the first instance court and sentenced Mr. Giménez to 9 years in prison.

 

       II.         LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

 

       4.       The petitioner has repeatedly asked to be released on bail.

 

       5.     On October 6, 1989, the lower court denied his request, and that judgment was upheld by the court of appeals on December 19 of that same year.

 

       6.       The adverse decision of October 6, 1989 was based on the impossibility of imposing a conditional penalty pursuant to Article 379, Section 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, given the existence of a previous sentence, issued on September

30, 1980, to three years' imprisonment for automobile theft, which he was held to have committed on more than one occasion (joint offenses).  The conditionality of the sentences imposed on December 23, 1977 and December 31, 1978 was then revoked.

 

       7.     On January 8, 1991, the judge denied his petition, and the Court of Appeals ratified the decision on January 31, 1991.

 

       8.     On May 22, 1991, the judge of the lower court again rejected the petition.

 

       9.     A new appeal was denied on September 30, 1991, and that decision was upheld  by the Court of Appeals on January 28, 1992.  This petition for release on bail was lodged when Mr. Giménez was accused by the Public Prosecutor's Department.  At that time, the prosecutor recommended that a penalty of seven years and six months of prison plus related penalties be imposed on him as the perpetrator of repeated instances of automobile theft, combined with unlawful deprivation of freedom (joint offenses).  His participation in the robbery in a populated area was considered to be a single offense.

 

       10.   To substantiate his denial of the appeal, the judge stated in his verdict that:

 

       ... the case might fall within the provisions of Article 379, Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which guarantees that the accused will not be subject to prolonged proceedings and assures him that--if court proceedings have not been instituted within the period of two years set by Article 701, either by means of an indictment or a verdict from the lower court, which would afford some possibility of estimating what the outcome of the case may be--the order to release him must be given.

 

       11.   In its decision of November 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals confirmed the lower court's decision based on the following: in the abstract, the situation of the appellant might be viewed in light of the premise cited in Article 379, Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; the nature of the offense he is accused of committing; his personal circumstances; the previous sentence; and the prospect of a severe penalty facing him, given the public prosecutor's accusation.  All of these factors combined were deemed to warrant application of Article 380 of the Code--which empowers the courts to deny a request for release on bail when an objective assessment of the nature of the deed and the personal characteristics of the accused are grounds for presuming that he will attempt to escape the law.

 

       12.       The special remedy utilized by the defendant to counter that ruling was disallowed by the Federal Supreme Court on January 28, 1992.  The Court concurred with the reasoning adduced by the National Court of Appeals prosecutor, to the effect that in the case of Mr. Giménez no serious impairment of constitutional rights was apparent.  In the view of the prosecutor, the fact that the suit had reached the final stage of the plenary proceeding, in which the prosecution had asked for a prison sentence of seven years and six months, combined with the defendant's history of previous convictions, indicated that the finding was not arbitrary.

 

 

       13.       The defendant then appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, alleging that there were no objective grounds for believing that, pursuant to Article 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he might seek to escape judicial action if his request for release from prison were granted.

 

 

       14.   On March 30, 1993, fourteen months later, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal.

 

 

       15.   On April 7 and June 15, 1992, respectively, the examining magistrate and the Court of Appeals rejected another request for release from prison.  Further requests were similarly denied on September 30 and December 11, 1992, and again on January 6 and February 25, 1993.

 

 

       16.   On December 27, 1993, the defendant presented a writ of habeas corpus.

 

 

       17.   On December 28, 1993, an examining magistrate disallowed the writ, based on the claimant's criminal record and the fact that "he is legally held in custody where he would be available for sentencing by the court since the  prerequisite conditions set forth in Article 3 of Law 23.098 are not met."

 

 

       18.       Following a review, this finding was upheld by the Federal Supreme Court on December 29, 1993.

 

 

       19.   On September 6, 1994, a further remedy of habeas corpus was presented on behalf of Mr. Giménez.  It was denied that same day on the grounds that this had not been the proper remedy to challenge a judicial proceeding or to question a penal system whose failings "are public and notorious."  On September 7, 1994, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court judge's ruling, on the grounds that the event in dispute did not fall within any of the hypothetical cases set forth in Article 3 of the habeas corpus law.

 

 

       20.   On December 1, 1994, Mr. Giménez was released on bail, by virtue of Article 379.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The decision concluded that Giménez had served in pre-trial detention two-thirds of his sentence, "in accordance to the system  established by Law 24,390".[1]

 

       III.         PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

 

       21.   On November 17, 1993, the Commission received Mr. Giménez's complaint.

 

       22.   In a note dated February 23, 1994, the Commission relayed the complaint in pertinent part to the Government of Argentina, with the request that any relevant information by the Government be sent to the Commission within 90 days.

 

       23.   On April 26, 1994, the Commission acknowledged receipt of the additional information submitted by the petitioner.

 

       24.   In a note dated May 12, 1994, the Government requested an extension in order to gather information regarding the case.  That request was granted by the Commission in a note dated May 20, 1994.

 

       25.   In a note dated May 26, 1994, the Government of Argentina requested another extension, and it was granted.

 

       26.   On June 9, 1994, the Commission sent the Government of Argentina a note confirming the terms stipulated in its May 20 note.

 

       27.   On June 2, 1994, the Commission received the petitioner's additional information.

 

       28.   In notes dated June 9 and June 27, 1994, the Government of Argentina submitted its observations on the case, which were transmitted in pertinent part to the petitioner.

 

       29.   In a note dated August 15, 1994, the petitioner set forth his observations concerning the Government's response.  A note dated September 28, 1994  transmitted the pertinent parts to the Government.

 

       30.   In a note of October 12, 1994, the Commission acknowledged receipt of the additional information provided by the petitioner.

 

       31.   On October 26, the Government presented its final observations regarding the case.

 

       32.   In a note dated November 14, 1994, the Government's observations were transmitted in pertinent part to the petitioner.

 

       33.   On November 21, 1994, the petitioner submitted  additional observations on the case, receipt of which was acknowledged in a note dated November 29, 1994.

 

       34.   On February 23, 1995, the Commission sent both parties a letter putting itself at their disposal in order to reach a friendly settlement of the case.  In a note dated March 21, 1995, the Government informed the Commission that it was unable to negotiate a settlement.

 

       IV.         POSITION OF THE PARTIES

 

       A.       The Petitioner

 

       35.   In his original petition, Mr. Giménez alleges that he has remained under arrest pending trial for 49 months, and that there appears to be no possibility that the lower court will arrive at a sentence in his case.  The extension of his preventive custody, according to Mr. Giménez, constitutes an infringement of Article 7(5) of the American Convention and of Article 379, paragraph 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  This provision of Argentina's domestic law, he argues, presents a maximum time frame or reasonable period of preventive custody which in his case has been breached.

 

       36.   In his presentation of July 14, 1994, Mr. Giménez broadened the scope of his original petition, alleging that the prolongation of his incarceration in the absence of a conviction violated Articles 7.3 and 8(2) of the Convention. Mr. Giménez argues that his protracted custody had become arbitrary detention, and that his right to the presumption of innocence has been infringed.

 

       37.       The petitioner also argues that the State has violated his right to personal integrity as set forth in Article 5 of the American Convention, given that the conditions of his incarceration have resulted in psychological and moral injury to him.  Such injury, according to the plaintiff, also entails a social dimension, in that his family has suffered from the worry produced by his uncertain situation as well as from financial losses.  The petitioner considers that the damage caused his family constitutes a violation of Article 5.3 of the Convention, which states that punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal, as read in conjunction with Article 17 of the Convention.

 

       38.  In addition, he alleges a violation of Article 5.6 of the Convention, which stipulates that punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and social readaptation of the prisoners; of Article 11, paragraph 1, which speaks to the right to have one's personal honor respected and dignity recognized; of Article 24 guaranteeing equality before the law; and of Article 25.1 on the right to judicial protection.

 

       39.   In his written response to the Government's observations, the petitioner contends that--given the absence of a federal crime--the refusal of the Supreme Court of Justice to admit the special remedy he had sought to oppose the Court of Appeals' finding against his release from prison violates his right to be judged by a competent, independent and impartial court, as well as his right to the presumption of innocence.

 

       40.   He goes on to say that the fact that a sentence was handed down by the lower court does not change his status as an accused prisoner, since the sentence in question was not a final judgment (not appealable) since an appeal had been presented but had yet to be resolved.  He adds that, given the reservation expressed in the federal context pursuant to Article 14 of Law 48, in the event that a sentence is determined at the appeal level, the Supreme Court of Justice will still be required to rule on the special remedy.  Only then will his trial have reached its conclusion.

 

       41.   He maintains, further, that the lower court's sentence convicted him for crimes that fell outside the scope of the criminal accusation, thereby violating the principle of "congruence which must exist between accusation and defense," as well as Article 8 of the American Convention.

 

       42.   He goes on to say that his trial has remained at a standstill for more than two years and six months when the tally includes nonworking days, legal holidays and the suspension of activities by civil servants in the judiciary.  The petitioner also adds the 14 months during which the original docket remained at the Supreme Court of Justice, due to the appeals procedure he himself had instituted.  He maintains that the original ought never have been sent.  Certified photocopies should have been submitted instead to avoid interrupting the course of justice and to prevent the resulting delay, which he termed "unwarranted and arbitrary."

 

       43.   As to the application of Article 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in his case, the petitioner's position is that the domestic law precept in question cannot be invoked by the Argentine Government, pursuant to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Treaty Law, simply in order to justify a violation of international law.  The petitioner argues that the American Convention takes precedence over Argentina's domestic law; and that, as of the date said Convention entered into effect in the country's law, Article 380 automatically ceased to apply.  He goes on to point out that application of the precept in question inflicts a twofold stigma on the individual, since it deems him suspect and in addition spawns the suspicion of future felonious conduct without any evidence that such suspicion is justified.

 

       B.         The Government

 

       44.       The Government understands that application of Article 379 Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not automatic.  That provision vests a power in the judge, for use at his or her discretion.  It therefore follows, according to the Government, that the tenor of Article 380 in that same source enables the judge to deny release on bail when an objective assessment of the facts and the personal history of the accused in essence permit the presumption that he or she will seek to evade justice.

 

       45.       The Government cites the criterion adopted by this Commission in its report on case 10.037 (Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for 1988-1989, page 59).  In that report, the Commission stated that the provisions in question grant the judge broad authority to order the release of the prisoner, or not to do so.

 

       46.   It considers that the reasonable nature of the imprisonment--i.e., the proportionality which should exist between a means and the end which it is hoped to achieve--should be examined in each instance, pursuant to an inherent and specific context, in the absence of any generally valid criteria for that purpose.

 

       47.   It understands that a general ruling regarding the length of preventive imprisonment cannot be set without taking into account the specific circumstances of each concrete instance.

 

       48.   The Government notes that it has taken specific steps to avoid prolonging the preventive custody of the accused.  To that end, it reproduces part of the text of decrees 56/92 and 406/92, issued by the Ministry of Justice, which instruct the representatives of the Attorney General's Office to conduct a case-by-case study of the feasibility of a request for release of persons held for trial in circumstances where the necessary procedures have been unreasonably protracted.  The Government of Argentina invokes these norms to show that, in some cases, custody pending trial ceases to be reasonable when two years have elapsed while in others, this is not the case.

 

       49.   As criteria to evaluate the time frame in question, the Government of Argentina proposes:  a) the actual length of such detention; b) the nature of the offense(s) that have given rise to the proceedings; and c) the legal problems or difficulties entailed in preparation of the case.

 

       50.       The Government acknowledges that Mr. Giménez has been held in custody since September 29, 1989 and that no difficulties have arisen in processing of the case other than those to be expected in this type of procedure, given the number of persons held for trial (five in this instance).

 

       51.  The Government concludes by maintaining that there is no evidence of unreasonably protracted detention in the case of Mr. Giménez.  He has been given procedural opportunities to apply for release from custody and he has exercised them.  The requests have been denied, based on an appraisal of the considerations  set forth in Article 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure--and, in particular, on the personal history of the accused and on the fact that his claim has lost merit, since the time which he has already served has been taken into account and will be subtracted from the length of the penalty imposed by the lower court's sentence.

 

       V.         ADMISSIBILITY

 

       52.       The claim meets the requirements of formal admissibility established in Article 46(1) of the Convention and Article 32 of the Regulations.

 

       53.   i.       The Commission is competent to hear the case because it presents facts that characterize violations of rights protected in the Convention, namely, article 7 (right to a trial within a reasonable period of time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings) and article 8 (judicial guarantees including the right to be presumed innocent during such time as guilt has not been legally established), in relation to article 1(1).

 

       54.   An examination of the petition shows that it is neither manifestly unfounded nor obviously totally without merit.  The Government has argued that Mr. Giménez' request is inadmissible because the claim of injury sustained by being held in custody pending trial has lost merit, inasmuch as the verdict sentencing him to nine years in prison for having been found guilty of various counts of robbery took into account the time spent in detention as part of the time he is sentenced to serve.

 

       55.       The Commission does not share that opinion because the complaint relates to the period of time spent in prison pending trial.  The fact that an individual is subsequently released or convicted does not vitiate the possible transgression of the reasonable length of time contemplated in the Convention.

 

       56.   ii.       The petition is not pending before any other international organization, nor does it replicate any petition that has already been reviewed by the Commission.

 

       57.   iii.       The Commission considers that in the case of Mr. Giménez, the exhaustion of remedies refers to the internal procedural remedies utilized to secure an end to his being held in prison pending conviction.  In the context of pre-trial detention, the presentation of the request for conditional release followed by the denial thereof suffices to substantiate the exhaustion of remedies.  After having examined the background details adduced in the trial documents, the Commission concludes that Mr. Giménez has exhausted the procedures established by Argentina's law to challenge the legality of his incarceration.

 

       58.   iv. As to the possibility of a friendly settlement provided for in Article 48(1)(f) of the Convention and Article 45 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, the Commission has set itself at the disposal of the parties but an agreement could not be reached.

 

       VI.         ANALYSIS

 

       59.       The case before us raises the following problems in interpreting the various provisions of the Convention.  First is the question of establishing what the entitlement "to be tried within a reasonable time" means in the context of Article 7(5) of the Convention; and, in particular, whether in this case the prolongation of detention has ceased to be reasonable.  Another question is the determination of whether prolonged incarceration without trial beyond a reasonable time constitutes a violation of the presumption of innocence guaranteed in Article 8(2).  The Commission must also consider whether the prolonged imprisonment of Mr. Giménez also violated his right to a trial with a reasonable time as contemplated by Article 8(1) of the Convention.

 

       A.         Relevant domestic law

 

       60.       The Argentine courts have based their decisions rejecting the request for release on various provisions of internal positive law.

 

       61.       According to Article 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preventive custody may be ordered when the following requirements are met:  there is prima facie evidence of a crime; the accused has made a statement during the preliminary examination, or is apprised of the charges against him or her; and there exists a reasonable suspicion as to his or her guilt.[2]

 

       62.       Article 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the conditions under which an accused person can be released on bail.  In particular, paragraph 6 states that such  release  must be  granted  when  the period  of preventive  custody  has exceeded the term specified in Article 701, which may in no case be more than two years.

 

       63.       Article 701 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in turn provides that "All cases must be completely terminated within the period of two years, not counting any delays caused by statements of the parties, letters rogatory or requisitions, the testimony of experts or other necessary procedures the duration of which is not governed by action of the court."  The Government contends that the two-year period stipulated in Articles 379(6) and 701 provides the foundation for a "reasonable length of time" which corresponds to the guarantees established in Article 7(5) of the Convention.  However, the Government rejects the notion that these laws indicate that any period of preventive detention beyond two years has exceeded a reasonable period of time and therefore the application of Article 379(6) must be automatic.  Rather, the Government asserts that by using the word "may" in Article 379, the Code of Criminal Procedure bestows upon the judge the authority, but not the obligation, to release an accused from preventive detention.

 

       64.       Moreover, the Government argues that this interpretation of Article 379 is reinforced by the provisions in Article 380 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Article 380 states:

 

       In spite of provisions in the preceding article, a request for release of the prisoner may be rejected when the objective assessment of the characteristics of the act and the personal conditions of the accused could, in essence, make it possible to assume that the above said prisoner will attempt to evade justice.  The provisions in this article shall not restrict the application of subsections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article.

 

       65.   To support its argument, the Government also cites the Commission's decision in its Report No. 17/89, which holds that "When vesting this power,  the legislator is appealing to the sound judgment of the judge.  In other words, what is involved is a regulated power, not an obligation, and hence the release of the prisoner is something that is within the discretionary powers of the judge."[3]                      

       66.       Therefore, the Government contends that in each case the definition of a "reasonable length of time" must come from the harmonious consideration of Articles 379(6) and 380.  Preventive detention beyond two years may be "reasonable" under Argentine law if so decided by the national judicial authority in accordance with Article 380.

 

       67.       The Commission considers that a "reasonable length of time" for incarceration before conviction cannot be established in the abstract and thus belies the Government's contention that the 2-year period stipulated in Article 379(6) provides a criteria of reasonableness which corresponds to the guarantees found in Article 7(5) of the Convention.  A period of pre-trial detention cannot be considered per se "reasonable" simply because it is prescribed by law.  Rather, as the Government itself argued in defending its analysis of Article 380, whether a period of detention exceeds a reasonable length of time must be based on the "sound judgement of the judge," using those criteria established by law.

 

       68.       Therefore, to determine whether the use of pre-trial detention in the present case is compatible or incompatible with the Convention, the Commission must determine what constitutes a "reasonable length of time" for incarceration without conviction under Article 7(5) of the Convention.

 

       69.   In its response to petitioner's allegations, the Argentine government recognized, as did the Commission in its Report  17/89, that the concept of "reasonable time" in the Convention cannot be defined with precision.[4]  In this regard, the Commission has recognized that member states to the Convention are not obligated to set a fixed period of time for incarceration before conviction independent of the individual circumstances.[5]  Since it is not possible to establish an abstract criteria for a "reasonable length of time," what is reasonable must be analyzed in light of the specific facts of each case.[6]

 

       70.       The Commission has always held that the determination of whether or not a detention is unreasonable inevitably must be analyzed on a case by case basis. However, this does not preclude the possibility of a norm that establishes a general term limit beyond which a detention is considered prima facie illegal no matter the crime charged or the complexity of the case.  This would be consonant with the principle of presumption of innocence as well as all other rights associated with due process.[7]

 

       71.       Although the Commission agrees with the government that article 701 of the Argentinean Criminal Procedure Code need not imply an automatic release from pre-trial incarceration, any detention that is prolonged beyond that period should be deemed prima facie unlawful.  This follows because any norm that authorizes the release of a prisoner from jail cannot be interpreted so as to allow the preventive detention to be prolonged for a greater length of time than the procedural code deems reasonable for the entire judicial procedure.

 

       72.       The State's interest in resolving alleged criminal cases cannot breach the reasonable restriction of the individual's fundamental rights.  This concern is evident in the Argentinean legislation which regulates time limits for the criminal prosecution.  To this end, it is crucial to note that preventive detention applies only in exceptional cases and its extension must be strictly scrutinized especially when the duration exceeds the time limit stipulated by law for the entire criminal procedure.  Preventive detention may be unreasonable without exceeding two years.  At the same time, incarceration without conviction may be reasonable, even after the two-year period stipulated in Articles 379(6) and 701 has expired.

 

       73.   As a result, since this is an area that in the domestic law of Argentina is largely subject to interpretation by the courts, it is up to the Commission to decide whether the criteria used by the domestic courts are  "relevant and sufficient" to justify the length of the detention period.

 

       B.      Reasonableness of the length of incarceration without conviction: article 7(5)

 

       74.       Article 7(5) of the Convention stipulates that:

 

       Any person detained....shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable period of time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings.

 

       75.   To understand the precise scope of this provision it is helpful to set it in context.  Article 7, which begins with an affirmation of the right of everyone to liberty and security of person, specifies the situations and conditions in which derogations from this principle may be allowed.  It is in light of this presumption of liberty that national courts, and then the Convention organs, must determine whether the detention of an accused person prior to a final judgment has, at some stage, exceeded a reasonable limit.[8]

 

       76.       The rationale behind this guarantee is that no person should be punished without a prior trial which includes a charge, the opportunity to defend oneself, and a sentence.  All these stages must be completed within a reasonable time.  The time limit is intended to protect the accused with respect to his or her fundamental right to personal liberty, as well as the accused's personal security against being the object of an unjustified procedural risk.

 

       77.       The State must prove guilt within a reasonable period of time in order to ensure and institutionalize confidence in the system's procedural fairness.  The statement of guilt or innocence is equally fair as long as due process guarantees are respected. The fairness and impartiality of the procedure are the ultimate ends to be achieved in a state governed by the rule of law.

 

       78.       Thus, the principle of the rule of law that establishes the need for criminal prosecution of all crimes by the State, cannot justify an unlimited length of time to resolve the criminal matter.  Otherwise, there would be an implicit assumption that the State always prosecutes guilty people and that thus the length of time taken to convict the accused is irrelevant. By international standards, all persons accused of a criminal offense must be considered innocent until proven guilty.

 

       79.       Article 8(2) of the Convention, which guarantees the right to presumption of innocence states:

 

       Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law...

 

       80.   In addition, the risk of inverting the presumption of innocence increases with an unreasonably prolonged pre-trial incarceration.  The guarantee of presumption of innocence becomes increasingly empty and ultimately a mockery when pre-trial imprisonment is prolonged unreasonably, since presumption notwithstanding, the severe penalty of deprivation of liberty which is legally reserved for those who have been convicted, is being visited upon someone who is, until and if convicted by the courts, innocent.

 

       81.       The right to defense also guaranteed in the Convention under article 8(2)(f) is threatened by lengthy incarceration without conviction because, in some cases, it increases the defendant's difficulty in mounting a defense. With the passing of time, the limits of acceptable risks that are calculated into the defendant's ability to present evidence and counterarguments are enhanced.  The possibility to convene witnesses diminishes as well as the strength of any counterarguments.

 

       C.         The prolonged imprisonment of Mr. Giménez was unreasonable

 

       82.   In the present case, the Commission must analyze the Argentinean judicial authorities' reasons for repeatedly denying Mr. Giménez' request for release from prison to properly conclude whether the justifications for pre-trial incarceration are "relevant and sufficient" such that the accused's detention is "reasonable" under Article 7(5) of the Convention.[9]

 

       83.   To this effect, the Commission has developed a two-part analysis to determine whether an accused's pre-trial incarceration violates Article 7(5) of the Convention.  First, the national judicial authorities must justify an accused's preventive detention using relevant and sufficient criteria.  Second, where the Commission concludes that the findings of the national judicial authorities are adequately "relevant and sufficient" to justify continued detention, it must then examine whether these authorities used "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings so that the length of detention would not be unreasonable.[10]  The Convention organs must determine whether the time that has elapsed, for whatever reason, before judgment is passed on the accused has at some stage exceeded a reasonable limit whereby imprisonment without conviction imposes a greater sacrifice than could, in the circumstances of the case, reasonably be expected of a person presumed innocent.[11]  Thus, where continued detention ceases to be reasonable, either because the justifications for incarceration are not "relevant or sufficient," or the length of the judicial proceedings is unreasonable, provisional release must be granted.[12]