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RESOLUTION
Nº 3/87 CASE
9647 UNITED
STATES September
22, 1987 TABLE
OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-20) A.
Summary of the facts and the Petitioners' complaint B.
Proceedings before the Commission II. THE FACTS
(paras. 21-33) A.
James Terry Roach B.
Jay Pinkerton III. SUBMISSIONS OF
THE PARTIES (paras. 34-37) A.
The Petitioners B.
The Government IV. ADMISSIBILITY
(paras. 38-42) A.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the death penalty B.
The juvenile justice system in the United States V.
OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 43-63) A.
Point at issue B.
The international obligation of the U.S. under the American
Declaration C.
The Petitioners' argument D.
General principles applicable to the present case VI. Conclusion
(paras. 64-65)
I.
INTRODUCTION A.
Summary of the facts and the
Petitioners' complaint 1. The Petitioners
are James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton who were sentenced to death and
executed in the United States for crimes which they were adjudged to
have committed, and which they perpetrated before their eighteenth
birthdays. 2. The Petitioners
are represented by David Weissbrodt and Mary McClymont. The American
Civil Liberties Union and the International Human Rights Law Group have
co-sponsored the complaint. Amnesty International also filed a petition
with the Commission alleging that the imminent execution of James Terry
Roach, while lawful in the United States, is a violation of
international law. Eighteen organizations have communicated to the
Commission their support of the complaint. 3. James Terry
Roach was convicted of the rape and murder of a fourteen year old girl
and the murder of her seventeen year old boyfriend. Roach committed
these crimes at the age of seventeen and was sentenced to death in the
General Session Court, Richland County, South Carolina on 16 December
1977. Roach petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari on three separate occasions. All petitions were denied. Roach
also exhausted all appeals to the state and federal courts, and on 10
January 1986 he was executed. 4. Jay Pinkerton
was convicted of murder and attempted rape which he committed at the age
of seventeen. The death sentence was appealed to the Texas Supreme Court
which affirmed the trial court's decision. The United States Supreme
Court denied Pinkerton's writ of certiorari on 7 October 1985. Pinkerton
was executed on 15 May 1986. 5. On 23 February
1987, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that it would decide in its next
term the case of Thompson v. Oklahoma, thereby, for the first time,
taking up the issue of the execution of juvenile offenders. The
constitutional issue presented is whether the execution of a juvenile
offender violates the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. 6. In their
complaint to the Commission, the petitioners allege that the United
States has violated Article I (right to life), Article VII (special
protection of children), and Article XXVI (prohibition against cruel,
infamous or unusual punishment) of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man by executing persons for crimes committed
before their eighteenth birthday. The Petitioners allege a violation of
their right to life guaranteed under the American Declaration, as
informed by customary international law, which prohibits the execution
of persons who committed crimes under the age of eighteen. B. Proceedings
before the Commission 7. The petition on
behalf of James Terry Roach was filed with the Commission on 4 December
1985 and registered as Case Nº 9647 (United States). Jay Pinkerton's
petition was registered with the Commission on 8 May 1986 following the
setting of the date for his execution. 8. In both the
case of Roach and of Pinkerton, the Commission cabled the United States
Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, and the respective Governor of the
Petitioner's state, requesting a stay of execution pending the
Commission's examination and decision of Case Nº 9647. The Commission
stated in each telegram that its request for information did not
prejudge the admissibility of the case in accordance with Article 34 of
the Commission's Regulations. 9. Petitioner
Roach had sought provisional relief measures under Article 29 of the
Commission's Regulations. On 12 December l985, the Chairman of the
Commission cabled Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, and South
Carolina Governor, Richard W. Riley, requesting a stay of execution
pending the Commission's examination of the case. The Chairman stated
that granting such a stay of execution would "be in the spirit of
major human rights instruments and the universal trend favorable to the
abolition of the death penalty." The Commission also requested that
the U.S. Government provide information concerning the Petitioner's
complaint. 10.
On 23 December 1985 the Executive Secretary of the Commission
cabled the United States Government with additional information relating
to the date of Roach's execution scheduled for 10 January l986 and
stressed the necessity of receiving a response by that date. The
Commission also reiterated its previous request to stay the execution of
the Petitioner. Another cable was sent to the Secretary of State with a
stay of execution request on 6 January 1986. 11.
On 9 January 1986 the U.S. State Department replied. It stated
that: "Under the circumstances, with respect to the Commission's
request that the execution be stayed pending consideration of the case,
the United States is constrained to reply that the matter is now in the
hands of authorities for the State of South Carolina and, under the U.
S. federal system, there are no domestic legal grounds for executive
intervention in the implementation of the sentence." 12.
On 9 January 1986 the Secretary General of the Organization of
American States cabled an appeal to the Governor of South Carolina to
"follow the current tendency of almost all the countries in this
hemisphere and to stay the execution." 13.
On 9 January 1986, Governor Riley of South Carolina responded to
the cables requesting a stay of execution by informing the Executive
Secretary of his decision not to intervene in the case of James Terry
Roach. The Governor stated that he had reviewed the case thoroughly and
believed that the case had been "fairly litigated at the trial
level and that all of his appeals in the courts have been given full and
fair consideration." As a result, he found "no reason to
intervene in the judicial process or to grant a request for
clemency." 14.
On 20 February 1986, the lawyers for the Petitioners filed a
brief on Case 9647 with the Commission, setting forth their legal
arguments pertaining to the case. 15.
On 8 April 1986, the Petitioners requested that additional
information compiled by Amnesty International on comparative national
laws which proscribe the execution of persons under the age of eighteen
around the world be incorporated by reference into the Petitioners'
brief. 16.
On 26 March 1986, the United States requested an extension of
time until 28 August 1986 in order to respond fully to the issues raised
by the Petitioners. The Commission at its 67th Session granted the U.S.
Government an extension until 1 July 1986 in order to have a draft
decision on the case before its next regular session. 17.
On 9 May 1986, after having been informed by the Petitioners that
Jay Pinkerton was to be executed on 15 May 1986, the Commission cabled
the Secretary of State and Governor Mark White of Texas requesting a
stay of execution in the case of Jay Pinkerton pending the Commission's
examination and decision on Case 9647. 18.
The U.S. Government responded on 14 May 1986. It stated that, as
in the case of James Terry Roach, "the United States considers that
U.S. domestic standards with respect to application of the death penalty
are fully consistent with the principles stated in the
Declaration," and given the U.S. federal system "there are no
domestic legal grounds (...) for executive intervention in the
implementation of Mr. Pinkerton's sentence." The Governor of Texas
did not respond to the Commission's request for a stay of execution. 19.
On 15 July 1986, the U.S. Government submitted its brief in
response to petitioners' brief. C. The final
decision 20.
This final decision was drawn up by the Commission in accordance
with Article 53 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. The text of this final decision was adopted by the
Commission on 27 March 1987. The following members were present: Gilda
Russomano, President Marco
Tulio Bruni Celli Oliver
H. Jackman Elsa
Kelly Luis
Adolfo Siles This
final decision is now transmitted to the parties. Bruce
McColm, a U.S. national, chose not to participate in this decision,
pursuant to Article 19 of the Commission's Regulations. Marco
Gerardo Monroy Cabra was not present at the Commission on that date. II.
THE FACTS 21.
The facts of the present case are not in dispute between the
parties. 22.
In the present case, the Petitioners allege that the United
States has denied them the internationally protected right to life by
condemning them to death and executing them for crimes committed while
under the age of eighteen. The issue presented is: Does the absence of a
federal prohibition on the execution of juveniles offenders within U.S.
domestic law violate the human rights standards applicable to the United
States under the inter-American system? A. James Terry
Roach 23.
Petitioner Roach was seventeen years old when he committed the
rape and the murder of a fourteen year old girl and the murder of her
seventeen year old boyfriend. Evidence revealed that Roach was
borderline mentally retarded, with an I.Q. of between 75 and 80 and that
he apparently suffered from Huntington's Chorea, an incurable brain
disease. The psychological and medical evidence presented at the April
l980 postconviction proceedings suggest Roach actually functioned at the
mental age of twelve when the offense was committed. Roach had two
codefendants. One was another youth of 16 who turned state's evidence
and received life imprisonment. The other was J.C. Shaw, a twenty-two
year old adult, who received the death sentence on 11 January 1985.
Evidence showed Roach had been under the adult's influence when the
offenses were committed. 24.
Jurisdiction of the juvenile court in South Carolina is limited
to those under seventeen years of age. Therefore, Roach was sentenced to
death in adult criminal court in pursuance of South Carolina's death
penalty statute which follows the Georgia statute upheld by the Supreme
Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The South
Carolina death penalty statute provides for a bifurcated trial which
first considers the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and then upon
conviction, a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine
whether the defendant is to be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.
Roach pleaded guilty to the charges. At the sentencing hearing, the
judge heard additional mitigating and aggravating evidence. At least one
aggravating circumstance must be found beyond a reasonable doubt before
the death sentence may be imposed. South Carolina law has seven
statutory aggravating circumstances and nine statutory mitigating
circumstances. Among the mitigating factors is that, "The defendant
was below the age of l8 at the time of the crime." S.C. Code,
16-3-20 (C)(b)(9). 25.
In considering the mitigating factors in the Roach case, the
sentencing judge found that Roach had been under the domination of an
adult during the commission of the crime. The judge also found that
Roach's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
was substantially impaired, and that he was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance as he and his codefendants were
"shooting up" drugs and drinking beer before the offense.
Another mitigating factor was that Roach had no significant history of
prior criminal activity involving the use of violence against another.
Roach's mental retardation, anti-social personality disorder, and the
fact that he was below the age of 18 at the time of the crime, were also
considered by the judge in Roach's sentencing. Roach v. Martin,
757 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (1985). 26.
Nevertheless, the sentencing judge also found beyond a reasonable
doubt three statutory aggravating circumstances: murder committed while
in the commission of rape, murder committed while in the commission of
kidnapping, and murder committed while in the commission of robbery.
S.C. Code 16-3-20 (C)(a)(1)(a), (c), (e). The judge found the evidence
in the case warranted the imposition of the death penalty after weighing
both mitigating and aggravating circumstances. 27.
This sentence was upheld on direct appeal by the South Carolina
Supreme Court. State v. Shaw (and Roach), 255 S.E. 2d 799,
(1979).[1]
South Carolina law provides for a mandatory review in the
imposition of the death penalty. Roach was later denied post conviction
relief by the state trial court and the appeal of this was denied by the
State Supreme Court of South Carolina. Roach v. State, Memo Op. Nº
81-MO-197 (S.C. July 17, 1981). 28.
Petitioner also sought review of his case from the United States
Supreme Court. He challenged as unconstitutional, among other issues,
the imposition of the death penalty as being grossly disproportionate
and offensive to contemporary standards of decency due to, among other
factors, his age when the crime was committed. However, the Supreme
Court denied the writ of certiorari. Roach v. State, 444 U.S.
1026, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 1104 (1980). He again raised the same
issue of his age, as being one factor which resulted in the
unconstitutionality of the imposition of the death penalty, in another
petition for certiorari. This was denied on 25 January 1982. Roach v.
South Carolina, 455 U.S. 927 (1982). 29.
Roach brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.
District Court of South Carolina. This request was also denied. Roach
v. Martin, Civil Action Nº 81-1907-14 (May 11, 1984). He appealed
this denial, raising again the issue of his age as being a factor
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district courts denial of
the writ. Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir.
1983). His final appeal to the United States Supreme Court was denied on
7 October 1985, and the petition for rehearing was denied on 2 December
1985. See, Roach v. Aiken, Nº 85-6155 (A-531). Petitioner Roach
was executed in Columbia, South Carolina on 10 January 1986. B. Jay
Pinkerton 30.
Petitioner Pinkerton was found guilty of murder in the course of
burglary with the intent to commit rape. The crime was committed when he
was seventeen years old. Petitioner at seventeen was also beyond the age
limit of the jurisdiction of Texas juvenile courts (age 17) and was
tried as an adult. He was sentenced to death in accordance with the
Texas capital punishment statute which had been upheld by the Supreme
Court. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 31.
The Texas death penalty statute currently provides for the
imposition of the death sentence only for capital murders. A capital
murder is the intentional or knowing killing of a person accompanied by
one of five listed aggravating factors. These factors focus on the
identity of the victim and the dangerousness of the actor's conduct.
Pinkerton was convicted of intentionally committing murder in the course
of committing burglary which is one of the statutory aggravating factors
defining capital murder. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art. 19.03 (a)(2). 32.
Conviction of capital murder results in either a mandatory death
sentence or life imprisonment. The jury at the sentencing hearing must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the actor killed intentionally
or knowingly; (2) he will probably commit other crimes of violence if
not executed; and (3) the killing was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, of the deceased. To warrant the death sentence all
twelve jury members must answer each of these issues affirmatively. The
Supreme Court of the United States upheld this Texas statute in Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), finding that the second question is
interpreted to allow the defendant to bring to the jury's attention
whatever mitigating circumstances he may be able to show. Id. at 272.
Therefore, although the statute does not specify age, this may be taken
into consideration at the sentencing hearing. Texas law prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty on anyone younger than seventeen when
the capital felony was committed. Texas C.C.P., 8.07(e). 33.
Pinkerton's statutorily provided review was taken to the Court of
Criminal Appeals where his conviction and sentence were affirmed.
Subsequent federal and state appeals were denied. The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari on 7 October 1985. Pinkerton v.
McCotter, 88 L.Ed. 2d 158 (1985). Jay Pinkerton was executed by the
State of Texas on 15 May 1986. III.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The
Petitioners 34.
The Petitioners allege that the imposition of the death penalty
on James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton by United States courts for
crimes committed before their eighteenth birthday violated the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Specifically, Petitioners
allege violations of Article I (right to life), Article VII (special
protection of children), and Article XXVI (cruel, infamous or unusual
punishment) of the American Declaration as informed by customary
international law which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed by juveniles under eighteen. 35.
The Petitioners state that the United States is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission as a member State of the Organization of
American States and is obligated, therefore, to observe the enumerated
rights in the American Declaration. 36.
The Petitioners' case meets the admissibility requirements of
Article 37 of the Commission's Regulations as the Petitioners have
exhausted all domestic remedies. United States courts, both federal and
state, have failed to address Petitioners' claims that the imposition of
the death penalty on juvenile offenders is constitutionally prohibited. 37.
The Petitioners' complaint may be summarized as follows: (a)
Imposition of the death penalty on juveniles violates the
American Declaration as informed by customary international law. (b)
The United States is legally bound by the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. The American Declaration should be
interpreted according to the canons of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties because the Convention represents a world-wide consensus on
how international instruments should be construed. (c)
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention set out the principal
interpretative norms for treaties and other international instruments.
According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the terms of the
American Declaration should be interpreted in accordance with their
ordinary meaning and in light of the object and purpose of the
instrument. Construing Articles I, VII and XXVI together and in
accordance with their ordinary meaning, and in light of the object and
purpose of the Declaration, these articles should be interpreted to
prohibit the execution of persons who committed offenses under the age
of 18. (d)
The U.S. Government is incorrect in asserting that the rights in
the Declaration "must be interpreted in terms of the intentions of
the member states at the time of the adoption of the Declaration, not in
terms of changing norms of customary international law." This rigid
and static approach to the interpretation of the Declaration is in
conflict with the terms of the Declaration, the norms of the Vienna
Convention, the normal approach which international bodies take to human
rights instruments, the practice of the Commission, and the practice of
the United States in its own domestic cases. The preamble to the
American Declaration states, "The international protection of the
rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving
American law...." (Emphasis added). (e)
In construing the terms of the American Declaration in light of
its object and purpose, the Commission should pay particular attention
to Article XXVI which forbids "cruel, infamous or unusual
punishment." This is broader than the United States constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Juveniles are
recognized as lacking in maturity and are most susceptible to various
influences and psychological pressure. Killing a young person who has
not had the chance to mature to adulthood is the "ultimate cruel
punishment," therefore, Article XXVI should be interpreted as a
prohibition against the execution of juveniles. Then, on its ordinary
meaning and in light of the object and purpose of these articles, the
United States is violating the American Declaration by executing
juveniles. (f)
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also looks to "relevant
rules of international law" to help interpret treaties. Therefore,
the Commission should take into account the customary international law
norm prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders. This prohibition
has obtained the status of customary international law. Pursuant to
Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law" is one of the sources of international law. Treaties are
clearly evidence of State practice, especially if accompanied by opinio
juris, or claims in the treaty or the travaux préparatoires
indicating that a treaty provision is a restatement of pre-existing
customary laws. (g)
The major human rights instruments such as the American
Convention on Human Rights (Article 4(5)), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Article 6(5)), and the Fourth Geneva
Convention prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on persons under
eighteen years of age. Article
4(5) of the American Convention reads: "Capital punishment shall
not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed,
were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be
applied to pregnant women." The fourth Geneva Convention states in
Article 68, in relevant part: In
any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person
who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence. As
of January 1º, 1986 there are 162 states parties to this Convention,
including the United States. This Convention applies to periods of
international armed conflict and Article 68 forbids the execution of
civilians and military personnel no longer in combat, who committed
offenses prior to the age of 18. If nearly all the nations of the world,
including the United States, have agreed to such a norm for periods of
international armed conflict, the norm protecting juvenile offenders
from execution ought to apply with even greater force for periods of
peace. (h)
In addition, approximately two-thirds of the nations of the world
have either abolished the death penalty or have prohibited it for
juveniles by adhering to these human rights instruments. Whereas the
European "Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms" (1950), in Article 2 allowed the death
penalty, an evolving abolitionist philosophy is reflected in Protocol Nº
6 which states "the death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall
be condemned to such penalty or executed." Petitioners
point out that the travaux préparatoires of these Conventions
demonstrate that these prohibitions against juvenile executions are in
fact codifications of customary international law as can be derived from
the debates during the drafting of the provisions of these Conventions. (i)
As further evidence of State practice, in terms of actually
carrying out the death sentence, Petitioners submit evidence, compiled
by Amnesty International, to the effect that since 1979, although 80
nations of the world have executed over 11,000 persons, only six persons
who committed offenses under 18 were executed by four nations, including
the United States. In
the United States, the laws of various jurisdictions which permit the
use of the death penalty nonetheless recognize the uniqueness of
juvenile offenders and at least 21 states set a minimum age for
imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, although the data is
incomplete, available information shows that national laws, as well as
the practice of states not to execute minors, further demonstrate the
existence of a customary law norm prohibiting execution of offenders who
committed capital crimes as juveniles. (j)
The Commission should not rely on the travaux préparatoires
of the American Declaration as the U.S. Government argues. The United
States relies for support on the deletion of language pertaining to
capital punishment from the Inter American Juridical Committee's draft.
The original Article I reads as follows: Every
person has the right to life, including the fetus ("los que están
por nacer") and the terminally ill, the insane, and mentally
retarded. Capital
punishment shall only be applied in cases in which pre-existing law has
established it for exceptionally grave crimes. The
original second sentence of Article I concerning capital punishment was
dropped in the subsequent and final drafts. Like the capital punishment
language, the latter half of the first sentence was also deleted in
subsequent and final drafts. The present version of Article I reads: Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his
person. The
deletion of the capital punishment language can no more be interpreted
to infer that the drafters necessarily meant to authorize widely its use
than can the deletion of the clause in the first sentence be interpreted
to mean that the insane, terminally ill, or mentally retarded were no
longer afforded the right to life. Instead, the deletion of the capital
punishment language could be read to mean that the drafters were simply
unable or unwilling to delineate each and every instance when capital
punishment would be prohibited as they did not want to authorize it
necessarily in every context. (k)
Finally, there is a limit on any State's ability to regulate a
matter, such as capital punishment, if the result will violate
international law. Domestic legislation of member states cannot validate
conflict with international obligations; a state cannot invoke its
contrary domestic law as justification for its failure to abide by an
agreement. The United States argument that at the time of the drafting
of the Declaration the death penalty was widely practiced and could not
generally be considered cruel or unusual is irrelevant. Petitioners
argue that "[H]uman rights instruments. . . are drafted to improve
the human rights situation and not certainly to reconfirm any alleged
right of nature to continue violating human rights." (l)
The petitioners request that the Commission find that the United
States has violated the American Declaration, as interpreted in the
light of customary international law, by having executed Petitioners
Roach and Pinkerton for offenses they committed while under the age of
eighteen. Petitioners also request the Commission to recommend that a
moratorium be imposed on the execution of other juvenile offenders in
the United States. B. The
Government 38.
The U.S. Government considers that the absence of a prohibition
on the execution of juvenile offenders within United States domestic law
is not inconsistent with human rights standards applicable to the United
States. The Commission must look to the American Declaration for the
relevant standards as the United States is not a party to the American
Convention. The argument may be summarized as follows: (a)
The American Declaration is silent on the issue of capital
punishment as Article I simply states, "Every human being has the
right to life, liberty and the security of his person." From the
drafting history of the Declaration, there is evidence that Article I
was not meant to affect the legislative discretion of the American
states with respect to capital punishment. A Declaration that does not
expressly limit the circumstances under which the death penalty may be
imposed may not be interpreted as foreclosing the reasonable discretion
of the American states to determine for themselves the minimum age at
which imposition of the death penalty is appropriate. (b)
The drafters considered and declined to adopt any specific
standards on the issue of capital punishment. The reference to capital
punishment prohibiting it except for exceptional crimes was deleted in
the final draft. The debate surrounding Article I demonstrates that a
standard on capital punishment could not be devised due to the diversity
of State legislation in the hemisphere. Therefore, the States are able
to legislate within their own discretion on the issue of capital
punishment. (c)
Only Article I is at issue because if no standard on capital
punishment was incorporated into the American Declaration, then a
prohibition against the execution of juveniles could not be
"silently subsumed" within the other rights. Article VII on
the special protection and care of women and children was not
contemplated to extend to juveniles convicted of serious crimes. There
is no official record of the drafters' intentions but the use of the
word "children" was not meant to refer to juveniles nearing
their eighteenth year. There
is also no official record of the drafters' intentions with regard to
the prohibition against "cruel, infamous or unusual
punishment" of Article XXVI. However, at the time of the drafting
the death penalty was widely practiced and therefore, could not be
considered cruel or unusual. None
of the three articles of the Declaration cited by petitioners addresses
the death penalty or establishes any particular age of majority. The
U.S. Government believes that the Declaration is deliberately silent on
the issue of capital punishment. Therefore, there purposely is no
limitation on the legislative prerogative of the American States
regarding the imposition of the death sentence. (d)
The Vienna Convention should not be relied on to interpret the
American Declaration as the Declaration is not a treaty and it is not
binding on the United States. The U.S. Government does not agree with
the Commission's holding in Case Nº 2141 (United States) that the
Declaration acquired binding force with the adoption of the revised OAS
Charter. Res. 23/81, OAS/Ser. L/V/II.52, Doc. 48. Mar. 6, 1981. The
Declaration was not drafted with the intent to create legal obligations,
therefore the Commission should take special care "where the
intentions of the drafters are manifest with respect to any particular
article," not to overturn that meaning. Even
assuming the Vienna Convention could be applied to the Declaration, the
Petitioners have not shown the "clear meaning" of Articles I,
VII, or XXVI. Each is "ambiguous" with respect to the
prohibition of the death penalty on juveniles. Therefore, recourse to
the travaux préparatoires is necessary. (e)
The petitioners request that the Commission look to the American
Convention and other international instruments to "interpret"
the Declaration as encompassing the standard of Article 4(5). This
requires the Commission to go far beyond its interpretative powers.
Specific standards in the American Convention, such as the prohibition
against the execution of those who committed crimes under eighteen years
of age, are binding only on those parties to the Convention. These
standards were not accepted by the United States. (f)
The three human rights instruments mentioned by petitioners are
irrelevant to the Commission's consideration of the case. The United
States is not a party to the International Covenant nor the American
Convention, and standards cannot be imposed by
"interpretation" on a State which is not a party. See, Case Nº
2141 (United States). In addition, the United States delegate at the
drafting of the American Convention pointed out that the United States
had problems with Article 4(5)'s arbitrary age limit of 18 conflicting
with its federal structure. (g)
Petitioners are also incorrect in stating that Article 4(5) of
the American Convention is declaratory of customary international law.
The age of majority for purposes of imposing the death penalty is not a
matter of uniform state practice. Some countries desired a specific age
limit while others wanted reference only to "minors" or
"juveniles" during the drafting of the International
Covenant's Article 6(5), demonstrating that they were not codifying an
already existing binding norm. Instead, this was a specific standard
intended to create uniformity where none existed. At
the same time, there is no evidence of opinio juris. Even the
states which have enacted prohibitions against the execution of those
who committed crimes before their eighteenth birthday did not do so out
of any sense of legal obligation. Since the American Convention and the
International Covenant have been enacted, any changes in state
legislation cannot be viewed as evidence of a generally applicable
customary rule of law. "Relevant rules of law" must exist
apart from any conventional or treaty standards. "Simply because
states in the U.S. or other nations have chosen eighteen as the age of
majority does not impose an obligation that other states must choose the
exact same age." (h)
The U.S. Government does not acknowledge the existence of a
customary international law norm which prohibits the execution of
juveniles. To establish a norm of customary law there must be
"extensive and virtually uniform" state practice and second,
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The rule must be recognized as
a legal obligation based on the custom or practice of states. In this
case, there is neither the uniformity of state practice, nor the
required opinio juris to regard the standard as a binding norm of
customary international law. (i)
The U.S. Government further maintains that it has dissented from
such a standard. It abstained from participating in the debate and vote
on the draft International Covenant, and submitted it to the U.S. Senate
with reservations. The United States also opposed Article 4(5) of the
American Convention, and when president Carter signed the American
Convention he proposed the Senate advice and consent to ratification of
the treaty be accompanied by a reservation stating that "United
States adherence to Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and other
law of the United States". Four Treaties Pertaining to Human
Rights, Message from the President of the United States, S. Doc. Nº
Exec. C, D, E, 8F, at xii, 95th Cong., 2d Sess (1978). The
U.S. Government concludes its brief by stating that "There is no
basis in international law for applying to the United States a standard
taken from treaties to which it is not a party and which it has
indicated it will not accept when it becomes a treaty." (j)
The U.S. Government requests the Commission to hold that the
recent executions are not inconsistent with the American Declaration. IV.
ADMISSIBILITY 39.
In denying Roach's and Pinkerton's appeals for a writ of
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately decided not to review
the issue of the constitutionality of the execution of juvenile
offenders. As pointed out in Petitioners' brief, Justice Brennan in his
dissent stated that the Roach case afforded "an opportunity to
address the important question whether an accused may...be sentenced to
death for a capital offense he committed while a juvenile." Since
the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to address the question the Commission
finds that the Petitioners had no further domestic remedies to exhaust. 40.
In spite of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue of the constitutionality of applying the death
penalty to juvenile offenders, it has established certain trial and
sentencing standards for state death penalty cases. A review of the
evolution of these Supreme Court standards is relevant here. A. The United
States Supreme Court and the death penalty 41.
In the United States, since the 19th century the courts have
moved away from mandatory death sentences, as such a system fails to
take into account the individual and his circumstances. However, by 1972
the United States Supreme Court found that the courts had moved so far
from a mandatory system that unlimited discretion had been given to the
judge or jury to decide who received the death penalty. In Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court held that such unguided
discretion created arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. While the Furman decision did not hold
that the death penalty, per se, violates the Eighth Amendment,
it, in effect, suspended executions and made federal and state death
penalty statutes inoperative until new laws were drafted which would
comply with the Constitution in light of Furman v. Georgia. The
execution of Gary Gilmore on January 17, 1977 was the first execution
since June 2, 1967. In the decade since Gilmore there have been more
than 60 executions. In the decade 1976-1986 over 3,000 people have been
sentenced to death in the United States. Between 1963 and 1985 the U.S.
did not execute a criminal who was under the age of 18 at the time of
the crime. Since then three have been executed. After
Furman many states enacted new death penalty statutes. In 1976,
the Court began to examine the post-Furman statutes and in Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), it addresses the question avoided
in Furman, namely, is the imposition of the death penalty per
se unconstitutional? The Court in Gregg stated that it was
not unconstitutional, and began to set out guidelines for imposition of
the death penalty. a) The U.S.
Supreme Court held in Gregg v. Georgia that the Eighth Amendment,
which has been interpreted in a flexible manner to accord with
"evolving standards of decency," prohibits the death penalty
if it is grossly disproportionate to the crime or if it is imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously. The Court, however, upheld the Georgia
statute in Gregg because it was carefully drafted to ensure that
the sentencing authority was given adequate information and guidance.
The Georgia statute provides for a bifurcated trial in which the jury
first determines the defendant's guilt or innocence. At the sentencing
hearing, the jury then considers any mitigating and/or aggravating
circumstances in the case. Before the death penalty could be imposed the
jury had to find that one or more statutory aggravating factors existed
beyond a reasonable doubt and that such factors were not outweighed by
mitigating factors. b) In two
companion cases, the Court upheld the death penalty statutes of Florida
and Texas which provide that the judge or the jury is given specific and
detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose the death
sentence or life imprisonment. Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Each statute guides and focuses the
sentencing authority's objective consideration of the particular
circumstances of the offense and the offender. c) The standards
necessary to guide the jury or judge in sentencing have focused on the
nature and circumstances of the crime and the character and record of
the defendant. Aggravating circumstances may include such issues as
whether the murder was committed by a convict or if the murder was
atrocious or heinous. Special attention has been given by the Supreme
Court to the mitigating factors. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978), the Court struck down the Ohio death penalty statute which only
specified three factors to be considered in the mitigation of the
defendant's sentence. The Court found that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer, "not be precluded from
considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's record
or character and any of the circumstances of the offense...." Id.
at 604. In that case, the sentencing judge had been precluded by the
Ohio statute from considering as mitigating factors: the defendant's
lack of a prior criminal record; the fact that she was twenty-one; her
lack of specific intent to cause death; and her relatively minor part in
the crime. d) In Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Court added that the states
must consider the background and mental and emotional development of the
defendant as mitigating factors. The defendant in Eddings had committed
a murder at the age of sixteen. The Court had granted the writ of
certiorari on the question of whether, in the light of contemporary
standards, the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a defendant who
was under eighteen at the time of the offense. The Court, however,
declined to address that issue. It decided the case instead in light of Lockett
v. Ohio, vacating the death sentence because it had been imposed
without the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors
required by the Constitution. The Court's reversal of the death sentence
evidences the importance the Court attaches to mitigating evidence in
determining fair and just sentencing. The trial judge had refused to
take into account the defendant's unhappy childhood and unique emotional
disturbances. The Court's consideration of the mitigating evidence in
the case emphasized the defendant's youth, his "serious emotional
problems," his severe lack of the "care, concern and paternal
attention that children deserve," and his "neglectful,
sometimes even violent, family background." B. The juvenile
justice system in the United States 42.
The U.S. criminal justice system, since the beginning of the
twentieth century, has treated children differently than adults.
Reformers in the U.S. wished to abolish the harsh adult procedures and
sentences applied to children who had committed crimes. The belief was
that children should be treated and rehabilitated and therefore should
not be subjected to the "harshness" and "rigidity"
of the adult criminal law. (See, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).)
a) Every state in
the United States has juvenile courts. The maximum age over which a
juvenile court has jurisdiction is set by the state legislature. The age
limits vary for juvenile jurisdiction, but most states set the limit
between sixteen and eighteen. The focus in juvenile court is on the
child's condition, not his guilt. Therefore, the purpose of a separate
juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate children and to make social
services available to help them. Punishment in juvenile court is not
stressed; the maximum sentence which can be imposed is institutional
confinement until the child reaches twenty-one years of age. b) Sometimes a
juvenile court may have jurisdiction but it may waive its right to hear
a case. The case is then brought before an adult criminal court. In some
states the prosecutor may have the discretion of choosing which court to
file in, but in most states the juvenile judge has the discretion of
deciding whether to transfer a case or not. In some cases the juvenile
may benefit from being transferred to criminal court. He is entitled to
all the constitutional protections of an adult, such as the right to a
jury trial and perhaps the ability to post bond if the jurisdiction
provides such measures. Juries may be more sympathetic to a youth in
criminal court. Nevertheless, because transfer to criminal court
subjects the accused juvenile to adult punishments, the transfer process
has been recognized as a critically important stage in juvenile court
proceedings. (See, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).) c) There is little
statutory guidance as to which children should be transferred for trial
in adult criminal court. The juvenile court judge is given a great deal
of discretion in determining who stays within the family court's
jurisdiction. Since Kent, many states have adopted objective criteria by
statute to be used in waiving juvenile jurisdiction. The two most common
criteria used are the age of the youth and the nature of the offense. d) Many states set
a minimum age at which a child cannot be transferred out of juvenile
court jurisdiction. The exact age limit varies from state to state, from
l3 years of age in Mississippi to l6 years in California. e) The nature of
the alleged offense and the accused's prior history of criminal activity
are also often used at a transfer hearing. For extremely serious crimes
such as murder, rape and aggravated assault, states will rarely retain
juvenile court jurisdiction. Such crimes are often used as objective
criteria to determine that the child is not amenable to treatment within
the juvenile system. Some states allow only for discretionary transfer
if the juvenile is accused of a felony (e.g., Colorado). Other states
such as Pennsylvania and Massachusetts have mandatory transfer
provisions which are triggered if a child over fourteen years has
allegedly committed murder. f) Some U.S.
states have no death penalty laws in force, others prohibit the death
penalty for juveniles. Fourteen states as of l985, specifically mention
age as a mitigating factor in their death penalty statutes. Indiana,
however, allows for the transfer of a l0 year old in certain cases to
adult criminal court. Indiana does not specify age as a mitigating
factor in its death penalty statute, but it may be considered under
"any other circumstances appropriate for consideration." Ind.
Code Ann. 35-50-2-9. Therefore, in Indiana it is possible that a ten
year old could receive the death penalty and be executed. V. OPINION OF
THE COMMISSION A. Point at
issue 43.
The question presented by the petitioners in the present case is
whether the absence of a federal prohibition within U.S. domestic law on
the execution of persons who committed serious crimes under the age of
18 is inconsistent with human rights standards applicable to the United
States under the inter-American system. Crimes
in the United States fall under either state or federal jurisdiction. A
defendant may be tried in federal court if he is charged with the
commission of a crime under federal law, or he may appeal to a federal
court from a state court under certain circumstances. A great deal of
autonomy has been left to the states in prescribing the appropriate
punishment for criminal conduct. However, all punishment must be in
conformity with the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. B.
The international obligation of the United States under the
American Declaration 44.
The American Declaration is silent on the issue of capital
punishment. Article I of the American Declaration reads as follows: Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his
person. 45.
The American Convention on Human Rights, on the other hand,
refers specifically to capital punishment in five of its provisions.
Article 4 of the American Convention, which protects the right to life,
reads as follows: Article
4. Right to Life 1.
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right
shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of
conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 2.
In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court and in accordance with a law
establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of the
crime. The application of such punishment shall not be extended to
crimes to which it does not presently apply. 3.
The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that have
abolished it. 4.
In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political
offenses or related common crimes. 5.
Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the
time the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70
years of age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women. 6.
Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for
amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all
cases. Capital punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is
pending decision by the competent authority. 46.
The international obligation of the United States of America, as
a member of the Organization of American States (OAS), under the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is
governed by the Charter of the OAS (Bogotá, 1948), as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires on 27 February 1967, ratified by the United
States on 23 April 1968. 47. The United States is a member State of the Organization of American States, but is not a State party to the American Convention on Human Rights, and, therefore, cannot be found to be in violation of Article 4(5) of the Convention, since as the Commission stated in Case 2141 (United States), para. 31: "it would be impossible to impose upon |
